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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the effects of employer 
recruiting practices on the gender and racial composition 
of jobs. Using the Metropolitan Employer-Employee Survey, 
I examine how the structural characteristics of 
organizations, occupations, industries and jobs affect the 
manner in which employers recruit for certain vacancies. 
The results show that employers use informal recruitment 
techniques, such as recruitment through professional 
colleagues and business associates, to recruit for 
executive/managerial, professional and other white-collar 
occupations. Employers use formal recruiting techniques 
for jobs in large establishments, in government agencies, 
and lower-level white-collar jobs.
The dissertation addresses the link between 
recruitment practices and the gender and racial 
composition of jobs. The results show that informal 
recruitment through colleagues and business associates has 
a negative effect on the percentage of females and blacks 
employed in occupation-by-industry categories. Moreover, 
these effects are net of other measures which control for 
both the supply of qualified labor and employer demand for 
certain types of labor. However, informal recruitment 
through current employees has no effect on the racial and 
gender composition of jobs. The ramifications of these 
results are explored and discussed in detail.
x
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Following the job composition analysis, I extend the 
analysis to other labor market issues by analyzing the 
interrelationship among recruitment, job composition and 
salary. The results of this analysis show a positive 
relationship between informal recruiting through 
colleagues and the starting salary of a job, and a 
negative relationship between starting salary and percent 
black and female employed in a job. I conclude that 
employers' use of informal recruitment through business 
associates and colleagues is associated with better paying 
jobs, and that this type of recruitment disadvantages 
females and minorities. In the last chapter, I argue that 
structural efficiency models of labor market inequality 
need to be amended to incorporate Weberian notions of 
social closure.
xi
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The Problem
Occupational segregation by race and gender has 
negative economic consequences for affected groups, and is 
linked to many contemporary social problems. In a recent 
paper, Tomaskovic-Devey (1993b: 76) contends that 
occupational segregation is the dominant sociological 
reason for the male/female earnings gap. He also notes 
that earnings decline for all groups when the percent 
black increases in an occupational category. The social 
consequences of occupational segregation are well- 
documented. Occupational segregation forces women and 
minorities into a narrow range of occupations which offer 
little training and few opportunities for advancement 
(Charles, 1992; DiPrete and Soule, 1988; Kaufman, 1986). 
The consequences of occupational segregation are lower 
wages (Tienda et al., 1987; Rosenfeld, 1980; 1983; 
Abrahamson and Sigelmann, 1987; Fossett et al., 1987; 
Kaufman, 1986; Jacobs, 1989a; Corcoran, Duncan and Ponza, 
1984), less autonomy (Singelmann and Mencken, 1992; Jaffe,
1989) , and less authority (Jaffe, 1989; Wolf and 
Fligstein, 1979a; 1979b) for affected groups.
In addition, occupational segregation and low wages 
are linked to the feminization of poverty (Roos and 
Reskin, 1992) . The wage-gap has long-term negative 
effects on the earning power of single women, and negative
1
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consequences for the educational and occupational 
attainment of the children in female-headed households 
(Sandefur, McLanahan, and Wojtkiewicz, 1992). Jacobs 
(1989a) contends that the wage-gap leads to power 
inequalities in the household, which leads to lower self­
esteem among women. Moreover, the poor work histories 
which often result from the occupational segregation of 
black workers are associated with unemployment, labor 
market isolation and the cycle of poverty (Wilson, 1987: 
60). Occupational segregation also constrains the 
productive capacity of the labor force, robs the economy 
of valuable human resources, and exacerbates the problems 
mentioned above (Blau, 1984) .
There are competing explanations which attempt to 
explain occupational segregation. Supply-side theories 
emphasize the choices that men and women make concerning 
training and career paths. These choices are affected by 
the prevailing gender-role ideology, which, beginning at a 
young age, socializes individuals into their proper gender 
roles. In another argument, the human capital perspective 
contends that gender differences in career and education 
choices lead to skills and experiences which are unequally 
valued in the market.
Demand-side perspectives focus on employer demand for 
female and minority labor. For example, the "taste" model 
contends that racial and gender segregation is a result of
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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"tastes for discrimination" among employers, employees, 
and customers. The statistical discrimination perspective 
claims that employers discriminate based on racial and 
gender stereotypes. For example, women are perceived as 
having higher turnover rates, and employers are reluctant 
to hire women (and minorities) for positions that require 
a long-term commitment, based on the perception that they 
are statistically more likely to quit.
Another demand perspective is job queue theory. 
According to this theory, employers rank jobs based on 
certain criteria. Employers rank jobs not only on the 
skills that are required to perform the job, but also on 
the appropriate race and gender attributes of a job 
(Reskin and Roos, 19 9 0). For example, jobs that require 
the supervision of white males are not considered 
appropriate for females and/or minorities (Kaufman, 1986). 
Therefore, employers will make white male status as one of 
the job requirements.
The social closure theory contends that employer 
practices are attempts at preserving white male privilege 
at work, home and the community. Employers reserve the 
best jobs for white males. This protects the status of 
white males at the job level, and at higher levels in the 
organization. Additionally, reserving the best jobs for 
white males reinforces the image of white males as
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
superior, and also protects the image of self among white 
males (Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993a).
Occupational segregation by gender and race is a 
complicated process. Each of the above perspectives 
contributes something unique to the overall equation. For 
example, differences in quality of education between 
blacks and whites has some effect on racial differences in 
the types of jobs that whites and blacks occupy. However, 
among equally educated blacks and whites, there are still 
differences which can only be accounted for by differences 
in the employer demand for labor (Tomaskovic-Devey,
1993a).
Employer demand for labor is shaped by different 
factors. Certain employers discriminate and hire only 
whites for certain jobs (Kaufman, 198 6). Other employers 
are afraid to hire women and minorities, because both 
groups have higher turnover rates (Tomaskovic-Devey,
1993a). Cultural beliefs about gender and race also 
influence the perception of appropriate employees. 
Employers are reluctant to hire black females into jobs 
which require them to supervise white males (Kaufman,
1986). Each of the above explanations is correct, and 
each makes some contribution to our understanding of the 
process of segregation.
In this dissertation I focus on the job matching 
process, and how it affects the racial and gender
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
composition of jobs. Job matching encompasses labor 
supply and labor demand. From the supply-side of the 
labor market, job matching involves potential employees 
searching for jobs. Much research has already been done 
on this topic, which I review in the next chapter. From 
the demand-side of the labor market, job matching involves 
employers recruiting and hiring new employees. The 
relationship between employer recruitment and 
occupational composition is speculated on (Roos and 
Reskin, 1984; 1992; Rosenfeld, 1984; Boylan, 1992), but 
has not been directly investigated. One reason for this 
is the lack of appropriate data to test the relationship. 
However, I have a unique data set which allows me to 
assess the effects of recruitment practices on the racial 
and gender composition of jobs across an entire SMSA.
This dissertation focuses on the effects that 
recruitment practices have on the racial and gender 
composition of jobs. There are two competing theories 
concerning recruitment and occupational composition. The 
efficiency approach maintains that informal recruitment 
techniques help employers reduce hiring risks. Because 
females and blacks are structurally unconnected to the 
informal recruiting networks, they are excluded from 
certain jobs, and are more likely to be recruited into 
jobs that use formal recruitment techniques.
Unfortunately, this rational action sometimes leads to
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
irrational, yet unintended consequences (see Stinchcombe,
1990) .
In contrast, the institutional theorists maintain 
that practices of informal recruitment segregate men and 
women into different occupations, into different job 
ladders, and into different levels of responsibility 
within occupational titles. Furthermore, their 
segregating effects reinforce culturally defined notions 
about the proper roles of men and women, whites and 
minorities in society. In essence, the segregating 
effects of informal recruitment satisfy and reproduce the 
cultural beliefs of market actors, which explains their 
persistence over time (Roos and Reskin, 1984; 1992; Reskin 
and Roos, 1990; England and Brown, 1992; DiPrete and 
Soule, 1988; Kanter, 1977).
The link between recruitment and occupational 
composition addresses empirical and theoretical issues 
beyond the segregating effects of these practices.
Embedded in this relationship are issues concerning the 
structure of labor markets, and the interconnection 
between labor markets and other market types. Another key 
issue concerns the link between employer recruitment 
practices and the characteristics of jobs being recruited 
for. The empirical research in the following chapters 
will show that characteristics of jobs have important
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influences on the manner in which employers recruit for 
those positions.
An important theoretical issue concerns the structure 
of labor markets and the movement of job information 
through labor markets. Economists maintain that labor 
markets are a frictionless bourse where the laws of supply 
and demand allocate individuals to jobs in the most 
efficient manner. Many of the studies in the new 
structuralist research tradition identify the labor market 
structures that deviate from the neoclassical model 
(Kalleberg and Berg, 1987; Doeringer and Piore, 1971; 
Sorenson, 1983; Beck et al., 1978). However, much of this 
work focuses on internal labor markets and job matching 
processes within the firm.
Yet, according to Boylan (1992), most sociological 
and economic approaches to labor markets assume that 
external labor markets fit the competitive model described 
in the neoclassical wage model. Moreover, Boylan (1992) 
contends that external labor markets are segmented by the 
recruitment techniques that employers use to fill 
vacancies. He also maintains that recruiting for 
employees through existing market contacts segments 
external labor markets because these practices deny 
certain individuals the opportunity to compete for these 
jobs.
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Conceptual Model
Throughout this introductory chapter, I argue that 
embedded in the issue of employer recruitment practices 
are empirical and theoretical questions concerning the 
types of recruitment techniques and when they are used, 
the inequality in access to job information that these 
techniques create, and the effects of various techniques 
on the racial and gender composition of jobs. I view 
these three questions as interconnected in a linear 
sequence. That is, recruitment techniques logically comes 
before market segmentation, which logically precedes 
occupational segregation. This model is represented in 
the conceptual model presented in Diagram 1. I use this 
model to guide the sequence of analysis in this 
dissertation.
Structure of the Dissertation
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter in which I 
briefly introduce readers to the problem which this 
dissertation addresses. Chapter 2 is a review of 
theoretical and empirical conceptions of labor markets.
In this chapter I present the theoretical idea of labor 
markets as social structures. I also present Fararo's 
(1989) general theory of social structure, and my ideas as 
to where it fits into our understanding of the social 
structure of labor markets.

















Work Structures and (a)







Gender and Racial <------- ___  ___ i1Job Composition
Diagram 1. The Conceptual Model Linking Job Matching Processes to Occupational Segregation.
\o
Chapter 3 is a test of the first path of the 
conceptual model. In this section I review pertinent job 
matching and recruitment literature in sociology, 
economics and other fields. Taking a new structuralist 
perspective, I derive hypotheses concerning the 
relationships between work structure correlates and the 
recruitment techniques used to fill vacancies in these 
structures. Using a representative survey of employers 
from the greater Chicago SMSA, I regress the frequency of 
use of different recruitment techniques on the 
characteristics of jobs, and the characteristics of 
industries, organizations and occupations in which these 
jobs are embedded.
In Chapter 4 I test path (b) of the conceptual model. 
In this chapter I present Boylan's theory of external 
market structure and attempt to show that recruitment 
techniques create external labor market segments. I 
employ two methods. First, I cluster analyze the 
characteristics of jobs and the industries, occupations 
and organizations in which they are embedded with various 
recruitment techniques. Second, once these clusters are 
identified, I subject the clusters to discriminant 
analysis, to analyze which variables in each cluster have 
the strongest association with membership in that cluster. 
Finally, using analysis of variance, I analyze the effects
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of these clusters on the racial and gender composition of 
the jobs in question.
In Chapter 5 I directly test the relationship between 
recruitment techniques and the racial and gender 
composition of occupation-by-industry categories. I 
regress the percent female and percent black on two 
informal and four formal recruitment techniques, 
controlling for an array of job, organizational, 
industrial and occupational characteristics. The analyses 
from this chapter support the hypotheses that informal 
recruitment has a negative effect on the percentage of 
females and blacks employed in occupation-by-industry 
categories.
Chapter 6 is a conclusion chapter, where I focus on 
the theoretical shortcomings of Fararo's dissemination 
model, especially as it is applied to labor markets, and 
labor market inequality research. Drawing on existing 
literature, and the empirical analysis in this 
dissertation, I attempt to show where appropriate 
modifications could strengthen the model, and expand its 
applicability to stratification research. I close with 
some general remarks about the strengths and limitations 
of my study, policy implications, and future research.
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CHAPTER 2. JOB MATCHING THEORIES 
Institutional theorists argue that the practice of 
informal recruitment through work related and "old boy" 
networks serves to deny females and minorities access to 
certain jobs (Rosenfeld, 1983; Roos and Reskin, 1984;
1992; Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980; Kanter, 1977). 
New structural theorists concur, arguing that the manner 
in which workers are recruited to work structures may 
explain why some structures have more or less individuals 
with certain attributes—  such as race and gender 
(Kalleberg and Berg, 1987) .
Intrinsic to the relationship between recruitment and 
job composition are theoretical and empirical issues of 
job matching, labor markets and the movement of job 
information in labor markets. Job matching models have 
done an excellent job of understanding how workers are 
matched to jobs in internal labor markets (see Kalleberg 
and Sdrenson, 1981; Sorenson, 1983; Osterman, 1984; 
Althauser, 1989b). Unfortunately, research on jobs filled 
through external labor markets has either relied upon the 
neoclassical wage determination model or the concept of 
occupational internal labor markets to explain the job 
match process (Boylan, 1992; Bridges and Villemez, 1991).
In this chapter I argue, with the support of relevant 
literature, that the neoclassical model cannot adequately 
explain how individuals are matched to jobs in external
12
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labor markets. I focus my critique on the neoclassical 
view that labor markets are cleared by the same price- 
equilibrium mechanisms that clear commodity markets. 
Following the critique, I present Granovetter's theory on 
the social structural embeddedness of job information. In 
particular, I focus on the important role that social 
contacts play in clearing labor markets, from both labor 
demand and labor supply perspectives. Granovetter's 
theory relies heavily upon inter-organizational networks 
to disseminate job information. Therefore, I also review 




According to Kaufman (1988), economists rely upon the 
neoclassical wage determination model to explain the 
movement of information in labor markets. In the 
neoclassical model, the labor market operates like a 
commodity market. The model rests on assumptions of ample 
buyers and sellers of labor, perfect information about 
jobs, free and costless mobility, no organization among 
buyers or sellers, no social aspects of the labor market, 
no personal relationships between, and maximizing behavior 
among buyers and sellers (Kaufman, 1988; Kerr, 1988; 
Dunlop, 1988). The market is a competitive and 
frictionless bourse (Osterman, 1984). As Kaufman (1988:
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149) describes the model, "...the competitive forces of 
supply and demand create an equilibrium or going wage, for 
similar workers and jobs and an optimal structure of wages 
and allocation of labor across industries and
occupations." In other words, the job market fully
determines wages at an equalized rate, which are attached 
to workers and are equal to the workers' marginal products 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Any firm that pays less than 
the going rate will lose its workers to other firms; 
conversely, in an effort to maximize profits, no firm will 
pay more than the going rate. The forces of supply and
demand bring the market into equilibrium, clear the market
(i.e. match workers to jobs), eradicate all long-term non­
compensating wage differentials, and ensure that labor is 
used in the most efficient way.
The neoclassical model (or shopping model) tends to 
view buyers of labor as benign actors in the market. It 
assumes that workers shop the market until they find a 
best match between employer needs and worker skills 
(Granovetter, 1988: 190). Market characteristics generate 
a distribution of potential wage offers to workers of 
equal levels. Job searchers "shop" the market, gathering 
information on potential offers. Shopping the market is 
an investment of both time and money. Therefore, workers 
are expected to search for offers until the expected 
marginal return, or the marginal wage rate increase from
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one additional search, equals the marginal cost of 
searching for another offer.
The neoclassical labor model is built upon the same 
assumptions as commodity market models (Granovetter,
1981). The labor model assumes that actors in the labor 
market invest time in evaluating several job offers, in 
the same manner that a consumer evaluates several durable 
goods (such as a refrigerator) before making a final 
purchasing decision. There are several key problems with 
grounding labor and commodity markets on the same 
assumptions. First, evaluating durable goods is easier 
than evaluating jobs or employees because providers of 
these goods go to great lengths to inform consumers (i.e. 
they advertise). There are non-profit organizations which 
publish much information about durable goods (i.e.
Consumer Reports) . Also, the variety of a particular 
durable good is relatively limited. For example, there 
are ten major automobile manufacturers in the U.S. market, 
each of which produces a comparable product in a 
particular market (i.e. Toyota Camry, Honda Accord, Ford 
Taurus).
Jobs are different from commodities. According to 
Granovetter (1981), there are very few jobs for which a 
great number of people are not qualified (at least on 
paper). The lack of job advertisement puts the burden on 
a job searcher. Moreover, for many occupations, the
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number of potential employers in the U.S. labor market is 
astronomical.1 Take a simple example of a manager. The 
number of potential employers is, at a minimum, a function 
of the number of industry sectors that employ managers and 
the number of firms within each industry sector.
Commodity product markets are more homogenous. While 
commodity markets benefit greatly from advertising, formal 
channels of job advertisements—  such as employment 
agencies and newspapers—  present a very small proportion 
of all vacancies at a given time (Granovetter, 1981: 22; 
see also Roos and Reskin, 1984) . Also, there are even 
fewer methods by which job searchers can advertise their 
services to a pool of potential employers. This means 
that the opportunity costs of searching for a commodity 
are significantly less than the opportunity costs of 
searching for a job (or a new employee).
Also, the search model assumes that the more 
extensively one searches for a job, the greater the 
maximum offer available. However, there is little 
empirical evidence to support this claim (Corcoran,
Datcher and Duncan, 1980). The opportunity costs of job 
searching are high because searching for a job takes time 
and money. The neoclassical search model operates from 
the empowered but unemployed assumption. That is, a
1 The neoclassical wage model assumes a national 
market, or costless mobility across local labor markets.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 7
searcher is not employed but has the financial resources 
to engage in a rigorous, time consuming job search.
Employed searchers rely upon internal opportunities 
because they have limited time to pursue external 
opportunities. Moreover, for those who are actively 
searching for jobs, Rees (1966) argues that instead of 
workers searching extensively for job offers, and 
intensively researching each particular offer, the labor 
market is often characterized by individual job searchers 
pursuing rumors about job leads (see also Rees and 
Schultz, 1970). Finally, Granovetter (1981; 1988) argues 
that most job movers (those who find jobs) are employed 
and not actively searching when they first learn of their 
new position.
A group of economists argue that empirical 
observations do not fit theoretical labor market models 
very well and that the market does not clear because 
market participants do not have perfect information about 
jobs and prospective employees (see Granovetter, 1981; 
Kaufman, 1988; Rees, 1966; Rees and Schultz, 1970; Barron 
and Bishop, 1985). Rees (1966) claims that this poor fit 
between expectations and outcomes is attributable to the 
inability of the neoclassical model to account for the 
movement of job information (see also Rees and Schultz, 
1970; Cohen, 1960; Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Rees 
(1966: 560) argues that without market information
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structures, employers and employees have little 
information about one another, buyers and sellers of labor 
search blindly for one another, and the job match is 
achieved through a chance meeting in the market.
Rees (1966) contends that formal and informal 
channels of information dissemination are necessary for 
the efficient operation of labor markets (see also Rees 
and Schultz, 1970). Formal channels include advertising 
in newspapers, and employment agencies (public and 
private). Formal methods of information clearing are 
accepted as an efficient response to the market. These 
structures allow rational actors to better shop the market 
and gather quotes on other job offers. Formal structures 
also allow for the efficient operation of the market 
without seriously violating the assumptions of the 
neoclassical model (Rees, 1966). Granovetter (1981: 22) 
argues that economists attribute the need for formal 
information structures to irrational behavior on the part 
of job searchers. Moreover, economists believe that the 
expansion of public and private employment agencies and 
computerized job matching would put labor markets in 
equilibrium. In addition, many economists have sought an 
active national employment policy in which Job Service (a 
public sector employment clearing house) would be used to 
increase the efficiency of the market (see Haulman et al.,
1987). However, others (Granovetter, 1988; Rees, 1966)
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point out that, empirically, formal methods are seldom 
used and that the importance of informal methods and 
social contacts in matching workers to jobs is largely 
ignored.
While Rees and other economists (see Barron and 
Bishop, 1985; Barron et al., 1982; Rees and Schultz, 1970; 
Pissarides, 1984) emphasize the need for structures to 
disseminate job information, they fail to develop a 
comprehensive theory as to how information about jobs 
moves through labor markets. That is, they fail to 
explain how information originating at an employer reaches 
a prospective employee through informal information 
channels. I turn to Fararo and Granovetter's works, which 
provide a theoretical framework of information movement 
through its focus on the social nature of labor markets. 
Markets as Social Structures
The above critiques of labor market theory and 
research lead to the general conclusion that labor markets 
do not work as economists generally expect them to. Given 
this conclusion, the question that needs to be answered 
is: How do labor markets work? In this section I
maintain that labor markets can be better understood from 
a social structure or network approach. However, 
structural models of labor markets need to be amended to 
incorporate Weberian dimensions of social closure in order 
to understand how labor markets operate.
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Network theorists maintain that markets are 
structured networks of interconnected buyers and sellers 
which facilitate the movement of information, goods and 
services among market actors (Wellman and Berkowitz,
1988). Thinking of markets as social structures is 
important to understanding how job matching contributes of 
occupational segregation. Fararo's work is important to 
this dissertation because it provides a general 
theoretical model of labor markets as information 
processing systems which have a tendency to structure or 
bias the flow of information away from certain groups.
Fararo (1989) views complex social systems as web­
like structures of connected nodes, or individuals. The 
basic unit in society is the tie or path between two 
individuals in the social structure. Moreover, this web 
of connected nodes facilitates the exchange of goods and 
services within any given context (product market, 
resource market, labor market, etc.). Fararo also 
maintains that the underlying structure of any given 
context can be uncovered by analyzing the flow of 
information through that structure. Therefore, we can 
understand the underlying structure of a labor market by 
analyzing how information flows through that context.
That is, by analyzing the flow of job information from 
employers to prospective employees we learn something 
about the structure of the labor market which should be
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helpful in understanding the process of occupational 
segregation.
Fararo (1989: 271) defines structure as the 
propensity to foster or inhibit the flow of information. 
Individuals in a social structure have homophily bias, 
which influences the flow of information through that 
context. According to Fararo, homophily is the propensity 
to be connected to individuals in similar social space—  
that is, to form relationships with individuals of the 
same race, religion, education, and income. In terms of 
labor markets and recruiting, homophily biases the flow of 
job information in the direction of those individuals who 
are socially similar to the originator of the job 
information. For jobs that typically employ white males, 
recruiting through informal work-related contacts biases 
the flow of job information to other white males.
One major theoretical problem with Fararo's model, as 
it pertains to recruitment, is that it does not adequately 
specify the mechanism which creates bias in the flow of 
information through labor markets. Fararo's general model 
assumes that bias results from a lack of integration 
within a social structure. The distribution of bridging 
ties connecting local network cliques is not sufficient to 
increase the access of all network nodes to the 
information being disseminated. Extending Fararo's model 
to labor markets assumes that affected groups (females and
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minorities) are structurally unconnected to the network 
nodes through which much job information passes. However, 
work is one area in which homophily is reduced because 
work settings bring together heterogeneous groups—  people 
of different education, income and ages—  and provide 
opportunities for non-homophilous ties. Fararo's (1989) 
theory also predicts that homophily is reduced, and 
integration increased, in certain context, especially 
where the need for cooperation is greatest. The 
integrative properties of the work environment also 
explain why research has failed to show strong evidence of 
gender and race segregated work networks (Moore, 1990; 
Brass, 1985).
I am not arguing that there is not homophily bias in 
networks, even within the context of labor markets. What 
I am saying is that Fararo's model lacks a motivation for 
homophily. What is the source of the homophily 
preference? Why would individuals prefer (homophily 
implies preference of own kind) to pass along job 
information to those who are similar in social space? I 
believe that Fararo's theory needs to be amended to 
include Weberian notions of social closure. Not only 
would it improve the applicability of Fararo's theory to 
labor market issues, but it would also provide a mechanism 
of human behavior which drives homophily in his model.
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There are two forms of social closure: closure by 
exclusion and closure by usurpation (Parkin, 1979). 
Exclusionary social closure is the attempt to close-off 
opportunities to members of "outsider" or "inferior" 
groups. Exclusionary closure first involves the 
identification of outside or inferior groups.
Historically, identification of outsiders has been based 
on race, ethnicity, religion, language, and social origin. 
Parkin (1979) identifies exclusionary closure as an 
attempt to protect material status; I argue that 
exclusionary closure is also an attempt to protect images 
of self and self-esteem. When members of an inferior 
group begin to encroach upon your status, your image of 
self as superior is damaged. For example, when blacks 
start to move into white neighborhoods in the South, this 
threatens not only the material status of the whites (i.e. 
the belief that it lowers property values), but it also 
threatens the self-esteem of the whites in the 
neighborhood (i.e. we are no better than the blacks).
Closure by usurpation, on the other hand, is an 
attempt by the dominated or "inferior" group (or groups) 
to gain access to the excluded resources. It is an upward 
use of power. One example of closure by usurpation is the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Through legislation, blacks 
attempted to gain greater access to representative 
government denied them by southern whites through such
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exclusionary practices as poll taxes and literacy tests. 
Legislation aimed at creating fairness in the labor market 
(anti-discrimination, equal opportunity legislation, 
affirmative action) are attempts by disadvantaged groups 
at closure by usurpation.
Social closure can be integrated into Fararo's model 
to explain homophily in general, and exclusionary labor 
market practices in particular. Fararo's model needs a 
better explanation as to the origin of bias in information 
flow patterns through social networks. Closure is one 
reason why information has a tendency to get trapped in 
local network cliques. Moreover, in terms of 
understanding the structured flow of job information 
through labor markets, closure can be used to explain why 
certain types of job vacancy information flows away from 
females and minorities. I will return to this point at a 
later time, when I will integrate gender-role ideology and 
patriarchy arguments with notions of closure and bias in 
the flow of job information.
The Movement of Job Information
The basic question of how labor markets operate (i.e. 
how are workers matched to jobs) is still unclear.
However, Granovetter's research on job matching issues 
offers insight into how employers go about finding 
employees. Although it temporally precedes Fararo's work, 
Granovetter's job matching research is largely an
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empirical assessment of the information dissemination 
models proposed by Fararo. Granovetter (1981) argues that 
job information is deeply embedded in social structural 
processes. He contends that information about jobs does 
not move through search, as the neoclassical model 
suggests (see Lippcomb and McCall, 1976a, 1976b), but that 
it is diffused from employers to potential employees 
through social processes sometimes unrelated to market 
behavior.
Granovetter (1974; 1981; 1988) argues that social 
contacts are important to labor supply and labor demand 
theories. Granovetter is probably best known for his job 
matching structural model from the labor supply 
perspective: The weak-tie hypothesis. The argument is
simple and straight-forward. Job searchers prefer to use 
social contacts to get job information because it is of 
better quality and more reliable than advertisements or 
employment agencies. Searchers learn very little about 
the working environment at a company from job 
advertisements. Also, the type of social contact is an 
important dimension in this model. Job searchers who 
gather information from acquaintances, or friends of 
friends, acquire better quality information than do those 
searchers who acquire information from close friends.
The explanation is structural. Close friends (strong 
ties) are assumed to be closely placed in the social
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structure—  in the same social circle—  and are likely to 
possess only information that you already have. Friends 
of friends (weak ties), however, are likely to bridge 
social groups and provide information not known to your 
social circle (see also Fararo, 1989). Lin (1982) expands 
Granovetter's argument to include a vertical dimension.
Lin argues that using higher status social contacts is 
beneficial because they are more likely to provide 
information about better jobs than contacts at the same 
social strata. Because of a superior position in the 
social structure, higher status contacts have more social 
resources and information.
The weak-tie hypothesis applies to labor supply 
models (models of how individuals search for jobs). Much 
research has been done in this area, and this research is 
briefly discussed in the next chapter. This dissertation 
focuses on labor demand issues of how employers notify and 
recruit potential employees. Granovetter (1981; 1974; 
1985; 1988) partially offers the rudiments of a labor 
demand model, focusing on how employers disseminate 
information to employees through social contacts, or what 
he refers to as the social structural embeddedness of job 
information.
Granovetter's model emphasizes the structural 
relations among organizations and the organization of work 
in the information dissemination process. Granovetter
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(1981) builds from the assumption that new employees 
represent sources of uncertainty to employers. Predicting 
how productive a new employee will be is a difficult task, 
because there are few set standards of productivity in any 
occupation (see also Stinchcombe, 1990). Turnover often 
results from a lack of information transmission on behalf 
of employers and employees (Wanous, 1980). Employers 
prefer to use social contacts when filling positions 
because social contacts provide employers with information 
about prospective employees that allows employers to make 
a clearer assessment of the applicant's abilities and 
short-comings. Moreover, Granovetter (1985) argues that 
information from informal sources is of better quality and 
greater reliability, because the social aspects of the 
relationship carry strong normative expectations of trust. 
Social contacts are also important to prospective 
employees, because they transmit informal information 
about the job and company that cannot be acquired through 
advertisements and interviews.2
To a certain degree, Granovetter (1974: 56) 
formalizes the job information dissemination model. He 
develops a chain length hypothesis (see also Ozga, 1960) 
to explain how data about jobs are disseminated. The
2 Such information would include what the boss and 
co-workers are like, the working environment and other 
important information individuals need to make job 
choices.
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theory is built on the assumption of exponential 
expansion. We assume that each person in an information 
chain tells some fixed number of others about the job s/he 
has heard about. If we call that number N and if the 
chain is of length L, then the number of people who 
finally hear about the job (including the employer who 
started the process) is the partial sum of the geometric 
series:
1 + N + N2 + N3 + . . .NL+1=l-N(L+2)/(1-N)
If the chain is of length 5 and each person tells three 
others who have not already heard of the job, then more 
than 1,000 people will eventually know about the job.
Once the information passes through a long chain, the job 
information essentially becomes public knowledge, and the 
information is no more unique than that obtained through 
newspaper advertisements.
Fararo (1989: 2 65) fails to find empirical support 
for the general random information diffusion model in 
networks of given density. According to Fararo, contact 
density has to be adjusted for transitivity and symmetry 
of relationships within the network. Information reaches 
more nodes in networks which have lower levels of 
transitivity. Information is less likely to get trapped 
in local cliques. In the job information diffusion-chain 
length model, Granovetter (1974) recognizes that the
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random diffusion model fails for jobs of certain types- 
especially professional/managerial white-collar jobs.
In his empirical analysis, Granovetter (1974) finds 
that most information passed through short chains is 
earmarked for a specific individual (see also Bowes, 1987; 
Collinson, et al., 1990). Most of this information is 
about better quality jobs (typically, these jobs were high 
salaried, professional or administrative type positions). 
He also finds that some employers will design new jobs 
with a particular individual in mind, and that most job 
changers are not actively searching for work when they 
learn of the opening (see also Osterman, 1984; Doeringer 
and Piore, 1971). Furthermore, he finds that employers 
are most likely to contact people who are not currently in 
the labor market through short chains. Long chains, on 
the other hand, disseminate information about less 
desirable jobs.
Implicit in Granovetter's theory is the assumption 
that employers prefer to use social contacts to 
disseminate job information. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, there are other legal, political and economic 
considerations which Granovetter's model fails to 
incorporate. These factors will play an important role in 
how employers recruit for vacancies. However,
Granovetter's model is an improvement over the 
neoclassical search model. It can easily incorporate the
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empirical findings of many sociologists and economists, 
such as social relations in labor markets, ineffectiveness 
of advertising, and employer dislike of employment 
agencies. I will use the labor demand model as a 
theoretical framework with which to address important 
issues concerning job matching and occupational 
segregation.
Work and Job Information Networks
Granovetter's labor demand model emphasizes the 
structural relations among organizations and the social 
organization of work in the dissemination of job 
information. In Granovetter's (197 4; 1985) model, the 
social organization of work plays an important role in 
establishing and maintaining inter-organizational networks 
and social contacts. In his earlier work, Granovetter 
(1974) claims that in a highly differentiated economy few 
firms are self-sufficient. Organizations comprise part of 
the external environment for one another. Therefore, it 
is necessary for almost any company to maintain face-to- 
face communication with other companies in similar or 
complementary fields. The transmission of routinized, 
straight-forward information is best suited for non face- 
to-face interactions (such as phone calls, letters, or fax 
communications). However, non-routine transactions 
between firms requires face-to-face interactions. This 
allows and requires members of different organizations to
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frequently interact with one another. Incumbents of links 
where organizations are interconnected are apt to form 
social relations with one another, which not only 
facilitate information flow between organizations, but 
also tends to stabilize interorganizational relations.
Granovetter (1974) claims that purchasing and sales 
involve the most important firm interfaces because buying 
and selling relationships rarely, if ever, reflect the 
spot market model of classical economic theory (but see 
Baker, 1990). Personnel in these positions have frequent, 
complex contact with other firms. Granovetter stresses 
the point that job and employee information flows freely 
between firms that frequently do business with one another 
because of the social relations that individuals in one 
firm make with individuals in other firms through their 
work-related interactions. Additionally, the relatively 
high level of interfirm mobility in the United States 
insures that a particular worker will be reasonably well- 
known throughout the firms that engage in activities that 
require the skills of that particular individual.
Granovetter (1985) maintains that those who 
frequently engage in inter-organizational business 
transactions with one another are apt to form social 
relations, and cites evidence to support his claim that 
economic transactions are often overlaid with social 
relations. He concludes that it is these social relations
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that stabilize the market, and guard against malfeasance, 
mistrust and opportunism. These social relations also 
stabilize labor markets, for it is through these social 
relations that much job/employee information flows. 
Information that flows through these inter-organizational 
relationships is most reliable. The social aspect of the 
relationship carries strong normative expectations of 
trust. One is not likely to cheat or mislead a friend, 
for fear of retaliation for violating that norm 
(Granovetter, 1985; Baker, 1990). The interconnectedness 
of organizations, and the social relations that pervade 
these organizational interfaces aid in the process of 
information dissemination. This process, in turn, helps 
individuals search for jobs and employers recruit new 
employees.3
Granovetter's (1988) research on how people find jobs 
underscores the importance of inter-organizational 
contacts in transmitting job information and clearing 
labor markets. Granovetter (1988: 194-5) suggests that 
the market situation of an individual changes with the 
number of individuals to whom one's skills and 
characteristics are known, and the market mobility of 
those people. Market situation is also dependent upon the
3 Granovetter (1988: 193) argues that employers 
gather a great amount of information on employees from 
those individuals known to both.
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number of firms with which one has contact. The more 
people a worker has contact with, the more social contacts 
the worker has, the broader the worker's work-related 
network structure, and consequently, the better the 
worker's market situation. Granovetter (1988: 195) argues 
that when long-tenured and isolated employees are let go 
after a corporate takeover, these individuals are not 
well-suited for the job market, despite having great human 
capital qualifications (work experience, stable work 
history, educational credentials). Granovetter further 
argues that these individuals are not taken seriously by 
employers who prefer to recruit informally because the 
prospective employee lacks the important social contacts 
which could convey the type of information for which the 
employer is searching.
Summary
This chapter began with a critique of neoclassical 
job matching models in economics. Labor market models in 
economics tend to rely upon job searchers seeking their 
reservation wages to clear labor markets. Unfortunately, 
this model rests upon the assumptions of perfect 
information (about jobs and prospective employees) in 
labor markets, and no social relations among buyers and 
sellers of labor. The review of literature in this 
chapter shows that labor markets have a stronger social 
component than the economic models will allow. Employers
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want the best possible information about prospective 
employees (Rees and Schultz, 1970; Stinchcombe, 1990; 
Bowes, 1987). Information from informal sources is 
accurate and reliable, so employers will use these sources 
to locate employees. What makes the information accurate 
is the social and economic forces that structure the 
relationship between the actors exchanging information. 
While most information about jobs comes from friends and 
relatives (Granovetter, 1974), most information about 
employees comes from current or former workers and 
colleagues (Rees and Schultz, 1970). Those with whom one 
has an economic relationship have an economic incentive to 
be trustworthy. The social aspect of the relationship 
carries strong normative expectations of trust. The norm 
of reciprocity guards against malfeasance (Granovetter,
1985). Theoretically, informal channels play an important 
role in the movement of job information through labor 
markets. Moreover, understanding how that information 
flows through the informal channels will reveal 
information about the underlying structure of the labor 
market, and can be used to explain labor market inequality 
manifested in the form of occupational segregation.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER 3. RECRUITMENT AND WORK STRUCTURE CORRELATES 
The empirical analysis in this chapter builds on the 
labor demand model by focusing on work structure 
correlates that affect employers' use of formal and 
informal recruitment techniques to fill job vacancies. I 
review literature on recruitment from sociology, 
economics, and other fields to support path (a) of the 
conceptual model and derive hypotheses about the 
relationships between work structure correlates and 
recruitment techniques. The empirical analysis tests the 
hypothesized effects of work structure correlates on the 
recruitment techniques used to recruit for particular 
jobs. The goal of this chapter is to establish an 
empirical link between recruitment practices and the 
characteristics of jobs, and the work structures in which 
these jobs are embedded. Focusing on the relationship 
between the given characteristics and informal recruiting 
practices improves the labor demand model and increases 
our understanding of the job match process.4
4This dissertation focuses primarily on the manner in 
which employers recruit employees, and the relationship 
between informal recruitment and labor market inequality. 
However, I review several studies which focus on the 
manner in which employees find jobs. I do this for two 
reasons. First, due to the complex nature of collecting 
establishment level data that are representative of an 
entire labor market, there is a lack of existing 
literature which thoroughly examines the manner in which 
employers recruit for employees. Second, most of the 
recruitment studies that I will review work from the same 
assumptions as the employee search studies: Information
35
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Literature Review
A 198 6 report to the American Management Association 
(Arthur, 1986) finds that less than 8% of all positions in 
that sample are recruited through informal recruiting 
practices (using customers, clients, and current employees 
to recruit for vacancies)• Despite the argument that 
techniques which cost the least are most preferred, the 
commission also finds that formal methods of advertising 
(trade publications, regional newspapers), and internal 
job posting are the preferred manner of recruiting new 
employees. Perhaps this explains why the management 
literature gives little attention to informal methods of 
recruitment (see White and Thorner, 1982; Smith and 
Robertson, 1986; Arthur, 1986). The main points of 
interest for personnel management theorists are the cost 
and techniques of formal recruitment (budget, travel, 
interviewing, etc.) and procedures for billing appropriate 
departments for hiring services.
In a critique of human resource theory, Bowes (1987) 
concludes that most personnel management theory has little 
bearing on how individuals are actually recruited and 
employed in organizations. Moreover, he concludes that 
informal methods of recruiting and job searching are
about jobs moves through informal networks. Reviewing the 
employee search studies helps to clarify the role of 
informal networks on both sides of the market.
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important to both employers and employees, but both prefer 
different methods at different job and career levels. I 
will show in the following sections that sociologists and 
economists recognize the important role that informal 
methods play in job search and recruitment. Moreover, the 
literature presented, and the data analyzed in this 
dissertation will show that informal recruitment is more 
prevalent than the human resource literature claims.
Job Search and Social Contacts
Most of the sociological literature on the match 
between employees and jobs focuses on the role of social 
resources in employee search and status attainment 
(Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988; Wegener, 1991; Granovetter, 
1974; 1982; 1986; 1988; Bridges and Villemez, 1986; Lin, 
Estell and Vaughn 1981; Campbell and Rosenfeld; 1985; 
Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert, 1986; Lin and Dumin,
1986) . These studies use a micro-level mobility theory 
(Wegener, 1991), and rely on the weak-tie hypothesis 
(Granovetter, 1974; 1982). Granovetter's study focuses 
attention on the social dimensions of labor markets. He 
concludes that most individuals find jobs through social 
contacts, and that information acquired about jobs is 
often a by-product of other social interactions.
The core idea of Granovetter's theory is that 
individuals find better jobs by utilizing distant 
acquaintances of higher status and superior information
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(weak ties) when searching for job information. Close, 
personal friends (strong ties) provide redundant 
information, making them a less useful source of job 
information (Granovetter, 1974; 1982). Empirical studies 
support Granovetter's argument. Individuals searching for 
jobs use higher status contacts to get information 
(Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988), because these contacts have 
wider ranging networks and better job information (see 
also Lin, 1982) . Those who acquire jobs through weak-ties 
have higher levels of job satisfaction, autonomy, 
occupational status and income (Granovetter, 1974; 
Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert, 1986)
But there is also evidence contrary to the weak-tie 
hypothesis (see Wegener, 1991). Bridges and Villemez 
(1986) find that contact status (weak-tie vs strong-tie) 
does not have a significant effect on income (see also 
Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988). Campbell and Rosenfeld 
(1985) conclude that personal contacts are more 
efficacious for men than women, because women are more 
likely to contain other women in their networks, who are 
not likely to be empowered with quality job information. 
Montgomery (1992) argues that the weak/strong tie 
difference in efficacy depends upon the relative strength 
of the two distributions. If an individual has a 
dispersed strong-tie network, and a stochastic weak-tie 
network, then that individual has a higher probability of
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finding a job through a strong tie. Conversely, with a 
stochastic strong-tie network and a dispersed weak-tie 
network, the probability of finding a job through a weak- 
tie is higher. Montgomery adds that, under the assumption 
that information may pass more freely through strong-ties, 
the probability of finding a job through a strong-tie is 
higher for those individuals with near equal weak and 
strong-tie distributions.
Micro-mobility theory and research contributes 
greatly to our understanding of how workers find out about 
jobs. However, this dissertation focuses on how employers 
find employees. I turn now to a discussion of recent 
attempts to address job matching issues from the employer 
perspective.
Formal and Informal Methods of Recruitment
A small number of economists, sociologists, and other 
scholars (Marsden and Campbell, 1988; Granovetter, 1974; 
Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg, 1982; Barron and Bishop, 
1985; Rees and Schultz, 197 0; Rees, 1966; Malm, 1973; 
Wanous, 198 0; Bowes, 1987) address the ways in which 
organizations obtain workers. Marsden and Campbell (1990) 
contend that there are two general types of recruitment 
methods: formal and informal. Formal methods involve some 
intermediary between the employee and the firm. These 
methods include the use of personnel agencies, direct 
advertisements in newspapers and trade journals,
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recruitment on the campuses of colleges and trade schools, 
and help wanted signs placed in windows. Firms may employ 
another firm as a recruiting agent, such as employment 
agencies or recruiting firms (headhunters). Informal 
methods include the use of current employees to serve as 
recruiters. Informal recruitment may also occur through 
others who are in contact with the firm, such as asking 
customers, suppliers or others with whom they have contact 
to notify potential applicants of the job opening, or to 
recommend individuals for the job. Professional 
colleagues and business associates are other informal 
sources of potential employees. Informal recruitment may 
also occur through organizations exogenous to the firm, 
such as professional occupational associations (Kalleberg 
and Berg, 1987).
While I acknowledge the importance of Marsden and 
Campbell's work, I prefer a different definition of 
informal and formal recruiting techniques. I believe that 
the differences between formal and informal recruiting 
techniques involve more than just formal market 
intermediaries. The differences between formal and 
informal recruitment techniques are essentially 
differences in the visibility of job information in labor 
markets, and differences in who has access to that job 
information. When employers recruit through formal 
methods, such as advertising, they increase the visibility
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of job information and the degree of public access to that 
information (see also Haulman et al., 1987). Conversely, 
when employers use informal methods to recruit, such as 
current employees or colleagues at other firms, they 
decrease the visibility of vacancy information in labor 
markets and restrict the degree of public access to job 
information.
This is an important distinction to make. Formal 
recruitment techniques can restrict who has access to job 
information. For example, Marsden and Campbell (1990) 
consider private employment agencies formal recruitment 
techniques. I consider them informal because they 
restrict public access to job information through the fees 
(sometimes one month's salary) that they charge. 
Additionally, employers are using electronic bulletin 
boards to recruit for new employees. Whether or not 
electronic bulletin boards are considered formal or 
informal depends upon the degree to which they restrict 
access to job information. There are substantial fees 
involved in gaining access to these bulletin boards. 
Therefore, these services restrict access to job 
information, and are informal recruiting techniques.
Marsden and Campbell (1990) contend that there are 
two stages in hiring new employees: recruitment and 
selection. During recruitment, employers collect 
preliminary information about a pool of potential
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applicants. These applicants are later screened, and the 
remaining applicants are subjected to closer scrutiny 
during selection. Positions can be recruited for using 
one or more methods, either simultaneously or 
sequentially. Recruiting may include a mix of formal and 
informal methods, a mix of formal methods, or first formal 
then informal when trying to fill a position.
Additionally, many job searchers apply directly to firms 
without knowledge of possible openings. Firms can 
formally recruit without having to do anything.
Marsden and Campbell (1990) argue that selection and 
recruitment techniques will vary by the type of position 
being filled and by the characteristics of the 
organization doing the hiring. Most applicants are 
screened initially with a brief interview. More intensive 
screening processes include testing, checking references 
and credentials, and extensive psychological and medical 
tests (Rees and Schultz, 1970). Selection and recruiting 
also vary in costs. However, the costs of a job going 
unfilled or inadequately filled are also high. Therefore, 
a tradeoff must be established between recruiting and 
selection costs and the costs of not adequately filling 
the position.
Another important issue when distinguishing between 
recruitment and selection is whether or not the manner in 
which employers search for employees is consistent with
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the manner in which they find employees. Put in other 
words, do employers use the same techniques to look for 
workers that they use to find workers? Employers may use 
both advertisements and informal recruitment through 
business associates to recruit for vacancies. However, 
they may hire those workers found primarily through 
informal recruitment via business associates. This is an 
important issue because employers with federal contracts 
are required by law (Executive Order 11375) to make fully 
public (i.e. advertise) all vacancies. However, they are 
not required to hire only through advertisements, and as 
Reskin and Hartmann (1986) point out, employees for jobs 
covered under this Executive Order are not always found 
through advertisements.
Job Match and Economic Literature
Economists focus on two aspects of recruitment, 
search at the extensive and intensive margins (Rees, 1966; 
Rees and Schultz, 1970; Barron and Bishop, 1985; Barron, 
Bishop and Dunkelberg, 1982; Cain, 1976). Rees (1966) 
argues that in any market buyers shop at the extensive 
margins by getting quotes on different homogenous items 
(e.g. similar automobiles). Buyers shop at the intensive 
margin by getting more information on items for which they 
have offers or quotes (more information about the 
automobile for which they have received a sales price). 
This idea is extended to employer search activities
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(Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg, 1982; Barron and Bishop, 
1985; see also Pissarides, 1984). Extensive search 
activities refer to the number of applicants seen prior to 
an employment offer. Search at extensive margins involves 
interviewing a number of potential employees before 
hiring. Intensive search refers to the quantity of 
information gathered concerning a typical applicant, or an 
expanded set of information obtained from each applicant 
who is interviewed. Barron and Bishop (1985: 365) 
summarize the goals of employers: "The objective of the 
employer is to choose intensive and extensive search to 
maximize the expected present value of labor services of 
the person hired minus hiring costs and the present value 
of compensation paid the new employee."5
Economists also examine the relationship between 
search and wages (Lippmann and McCall, 1976a; 1976b). 
Employers make a three-way trade-off between search 
amount, wages, and quality of workers. Some firms adopt a 
high wage strategy, in which they pay wages so high that 
the best workers cannot refuse the offers. Economists 
argue that high wages allow firms to recruit informally 
because firms do not have to invest in employee searches
5 Empirical research operationalizes extensive 
strategies as the number of applicants per offer made, and 
operationalizes intensive research by the number of hours 
spent per applicant (Barron, Bishop and Dunkelburg, 1982) .
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to find workers who are willing to take high wage jobs. 
Firms with low wages, however, adopt high search 
strategies, because they have to search hard for employees 
at lower wage levels. Firms which pay low wages typically 
use formal recruitment methods because they reach a 
broader potential workforce. A third strategy is the high 
training strategy. These firms offer low initial wages 
which rise with experience, and also typically use formal 
recruitment methods.
Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan (1980) offer both 
supply-side and demand-side explanations for why firms pay 
higher wages to those employees acquired through informal 
methods. The supply-side argument contends that market 
characteristics (fluctuations in the business cycle and 
product demand, imperfections in supply and/or demand side 
of the market) generate a distribution of potential wage 
offers to workers of a given level of competence. Job 
searchers gain information about these jobs through 
search, which takes time and money. The supply-side model 
assumes that the harder a worker searches, the higher the 
maximum offer found in the market. The model also assumes 
that workers search for offers until the expected marginal 
return (marginal wage rate increase from one additional 
search) equals the marginal cost of search. Factors that 
lower search costs increase search intensity, and 
therefore wages. Such factors include finding out about
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jobs through informal channels (which are assumed to be 
cost-free to firms and employees).
The model indicates that search intensity has a 
positive impact on the wage offered. The wage offer is 
maximized at the point of diminishing return, where the 
cost of one more search is higher than the marginal wage 
rate increase. This is the reservation wage (Lippman and 
McCall, 1976a). Finding out about a job through informal 
contacts has the effect of lowering search costs and 
raising the maximum offer. In addition, having a contact 
in the firm can reduce the costs of intensive margin 
search on behalf of the prospective employee (what the 
boss is like, etc). This lowers intensive margin search 
costs and gives the employee a short term advantage in 
wages. This last point is empirically supported by 
Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan (1980).
The demand side explanation contends that firms rely 
on informal channels to substitute wages for search. The 
higher the wage rate, the more quickly high quality 
workers will accept wage offers and the shorter the amount 
of time required for search and training activities.
Also, where turnover costs are high (in positions with 
high skill specificity and in-house training) informal 
methods are used to insure a better match between position 
and worker.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4 7
Economists put less focus on recruitment techniques. 
Sociologists focus on the formal and informal methods of 
recruiting, but economists concentrate on the equilibrium 
between employer search and wages. The exception to this 
is the 1962 Chicago labor market survey done by Rees and 
associates (Rees, 1966; Rees and Schultz, 1970). Rees and 
Schultz identify formal and informal job information 
networks. Formal networks include state and private 
employment agencies, newspaper advertisements, recruitment 
at schools/colleges, trade unions and hiring halls. 
Informal networks are characterized by no formal contact 
arranged between firm and employee. Informal networks 
include referrals by other employees, other employers, 
friends or other individuals. One major advantage of 
using informal networks to find employees is that the firm 
is generally guaranteed of good recommendations, because 
those that make the recommendation are putting their 
reputation on the line and therefore will recommend 
quality applicants (see also Granovetter, 1974) . 
Additionally, some firms pay bonuses to employees who make 
good referrals.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Recruiting Methods
The most often cited advantage of informal recruiting 
is cost (Marsden and Campbell, 1990; Granovetter, 1974; 
Malm, 1973; Rees and Schultz, 1970). Most formal methods 
of recruitment are expensive, while informal methods are
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virtually cost free (in terms of dollars). Another major 
advantage of informal recruitment for job searchers is 
that they can get much of the information about a 
particular job that an agency would not know, such as 
information about the fairness and attitudes of 
supervisors or the informal working environment. This 
reduces the possibility of a bad match between position 
and employee, and reduces turnover costs (Wanous, 1980). 
Employers like informal recruitment methods because they 
locate better applicants (Marsden and Campbell, 1990) . 
Firms in the Rees and Schultz study prefer to hire 
informally because these channels pull employees from the 
neighborhoods surrounding the establishment, which reduces 
tardiness and increases company loyalty. The major 
advantages of formal methods are the ability to reach a 
broader range of socially and geographically dispersed 
individuals (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980), and 
recruiting in areas where networks are incomplete, such as 
when a firm moves into a new location (Marsden and 
Campbell, 1990).
One of the major disadvantages cited by employers of 
informal networks is that they tend to create worker 
cliques in the firm, since employees tend to recommend 
friends and acquaintances for jobs. Marsden and Campbell 
(1990) report that current employees and others associated 
with the firm are likely to pass along information to
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socially similar individuals. This is particularly 
problematic to firms attempting to adhere to EEOC 
employment standards (Bowes, 1987). Corcoran, Datcher and 
Duncan (1980) conclude that this practice sustains labor 
market segmentation, because workers are likely to pass 
along job information to workers in the same economic 
sector. Similar job matching arguments are supported by 
Stinchcombe (1990) .
There are many disadvantages associated with formal 
methods of recruitment, cost and quality of applicants are 
the most frequently cited (Marsden and Campbell, 1990). 
Formally recruited employees also have higher turnover 
rates (Rees and Schultz, 1970). One criticism of using 
agencies is poor screening. Rees and Schultz (1970) find 
that agencies often send under-qualified and over- 
qualified candidates for interviews. Several firms in the 
Rees and Schultz (197 0) sample complained that employment 
agencies were sending too many non-white applicants on job 
interviews. Other complaints include the high turnover of 
counselors at private agencies, and employee pirating.
This is a process by which employment agencies contact 
recent placements and offer them other jobs, in order to 
collect another fee. Employers rate public employment 
agencies as the least desirable source of employees, on 
account of bad referrals (discipline problems, etc.,) and 
high turnover rates, (Wanous, 1980).
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Up to this point I have discussed the various 
advantages and disadvantages of different recruiting 
techniques. In the next section, I show how recruitment 
techniques are related to occupational, job, 
organizational and industry characteristics.
Structural Characteristics that Influence Recruitment
The literature reviewed in this section shows that 
the structural features of organizations, jobs, 
occupations, and industries influence the manner in which 
an organization recruits for a vacancy. This section 
makes a link between the recruitment literature and 
Granovetter's labor demand model. Granovetter argues that 
employers prefer to recruit informally through social 
contacts. This section will show that the use of social 
contacts to recruit for positions is constrained by 
political and legal factors. I also show how the 
literature on recruitment can be integrated into the new 
structuralist framework, a perspective which emphasizes 
the manner in which the characteristics of organizations, 
occupations and industries influence labor market 
outcomes.
The new structuralist perspective is, in part, a 
critique of the neoclassical model of earnings and labor 
allocation (Kalleberg and Sprenson, 1981). My use of the 
term new structuralism is consistent with Baron and 
Bielby's (1980) challenge to "bring the firm back in." I
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use new structuralism to assess how organizational 
characteristics and behavior—  and the interconnections 
among market types, industries and occupations—  affect 
the demand for labor, and how that demand is satisfied.
New structuralism maintains that many characteristics 
of firms, jobs and occupations have profound influences on 
the manner in which new employees are recruited into 
positions (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980; Marsden and 
Campbell, 1990; Malm, 1973; Rees, 1966; Rees and Schultz, 
197 0; Barron and Bishop, 1985; Barron, Bishop and 
Dunkelberg, 1982; Pissarides, 1984). The organizational 
characteristics identified include size of the firm, fixed 
high wages in the firm, unions in the firm, and firms with 
government contracts. Job and occupational level effects 
cited include the long-term costs of making a hiring 
error, level of skill complexity, level of firm-specific 
training, level of training and education required, blue- 
collar vs white-collar, and jobs in seniority systems or 
internal labor markets. Each of these factors in some 
manner represents a correlate of a work structure in the 
new structuralist literature. In this section, I make 
more explicit the link between recruitment and these 
characteristics of jobs, industries and establishments, 
and derive hypotheses to be tested.
A number of neoclassical revisionist economists (see 
Kerr, 1988; Kaufman, 1988; Dunlop, 1988; Rees and Schultz,
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1970; Doeringer and Piore, 1971) and new structuralist 
sociologists (see Granovetter, 1974; 1981; 1985; 1986; 
1988; Osterman, 1984; Kalleberg and Berg, 1987; Kalleberg 
and Sdrenson, 1979; 1981) argue that markets, especially 
labor markets, are comprised of significant social 
characteristics. Such factors identified include 
seniority systems, internal labor markets and social 
relations among employers.
These revisionists seek to isolate the social forces 
that limit the role and influence of competition, and to 
identify empirical deviations from the neoclassical labor 
market model. Unemployment, uniform wage rates, long-term 
attachment to firms, higher than market wages, unions, 
pirate codes, internal labor markets and collective 
bargaining are some of the empirical observations that 
revisionists present as evidence of a divergence between 
empirical labor markets and competitive price theory 
(Kerr, 1988; Kaufman, 1988; Doeringer and Piore, 1971.3). 
Similarly, new structuralist sociologists observe that the 
allocation and pricing of labor, as well as the 
distribution of job rewards, often varies across work 
structures such as firms, industry sectors, occupations 
and social classes (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987; Kalleberg 
and Lincoln, 1988; Kalleberg, 1988; Beck, Horan and 
Tolbert, 1978; Tolbert, Horan, and Beck, 1980; Jacobs, 
1983; Hodson, 1984; Wholey, 1985). New structural
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theorists stress that characteristics of firms, 
occupations and industries shape the context in which 
certain credentials and social statuses (i.e. education, 
experience, race, age, gender) are rewarded.
Work structures are at the core of the new 
structuralist perspective (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987). 
Kalleberg and Berg (1987) identify six interrelated and 
complimentary work structures: nation-states, industries, 
occupations, unions, organizations, and social classes. 
Work structures emerge as a result of social and 
historical forces operating in four markets: labor, 
product, resource and capital. Fluctuations in these 
markets lead to changes in the corresponding work 
structures. Work structures are differentiated and 
interrelated by their correlates. An example of a work 
structure correlate is size of establishment.
Organizations (a work structure) are often differentiated 
by their size.
Characteristics of establishments affect the 
recruitment techniques used to recruit for vacancies. 
Organizations are key work structures. . Organizations are 
differentiated by their range of work, hiring practices, 
growth rate, size, product market size, geographical 
dispersion, divisional structure, hierarchical grade 
structure, technology, demography, and level of 
unionization (Stewman and Konda, 1983; Baron, 1984;
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Wholey, 1985; Baron, Davis-Blake and Bielby, 1986; 
Stinchcombe, 1990; Marsden and Campbell, 1990; Wharton, 
1985; Lester, 1988; Thompson, 1967). Size of firm or 
establishment is the organizational correlate which is 
most often cited in the recruitment literature. Marsden 
and Campbell (1990) argue that large firms are less likely 
to recruit through informal methods. First, large firms 
have more positions and are likely to have more openings, 
therefore, they receive a greater proportion of 
unsolicited applications and inquiries than smaller firms. 
Second, smaller firms are more likely to satisfy all of 
their labor needs in the local labor market. Larger 
firms, however, are more likely to recruit from different 
labor markets, making it necessary to employ formal 
recruiting methods to reach a wider geographical base. 
Additionally, Marsden and Campbell (1990) point out that 
large firms are more likely to have bureaucratic personnel 
structures to administer recruitment policies.
Bureaucratic personnel structures allow firms to place 
more emphasis on screening. Large firms also have higher 
visibility, and as a result, may be more susceptible to 
scrutiny by the EEOC and interests groups which seek 
fairness in hiring (Taylor, 1979; Bridges and Villemez, 
1991; Bowes, 1987). As a result, large firms will use 
formal methods of recruitment in order to present the 
image of full-compliance with government hiring
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guidelines, especially if the firm has a high percentage 
of revenue from government agencies.
While the sociological literature finds that firm 
size has a negative effect on informal recruitment, 
economists (Barron and Bishop, 1985; Barron, Bishop and 
Dunkelberg, 1982; Rees and Schultz, 1970) identify 
scenarios where informal recruitment may be utilized by 
large firms. For example, Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg 
(1982) argue that hiring errors are costlier for large 
firms. This encourages firms to fully exploit formal and 
informal methods of recruitment. Large firms have higher 
monitoring costs and, as a result, have the most to lose 
by not making the best match between job and employee. 
Informal recruitment is one method of getting better 
information to the potential employee, and also finding 
out more about the qualifications of the potential 
employee. In addition to monitoring costs, positions with 
high termination costs are also typically found in larger 
firms. Termination costs are highest for union jobs and 
jobs in administrative bureaucratic structures (internal 
labor markets). For positions where employees are hard to 
release, it is imperative that a good match is made 
between employee and job. Other points mentioned in this 
literature are that positions in larger firms are 
typically higher skilled, require more education, higher 
paid, and are often firm-specific in their training. Each
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of these factors increases the use of informal recruitment 
techniques.
This discussion indicates that larger establishments
generally use formal methods of recruiting, but that
informal methods might be incorporated in certain
contexts. These contexts, however, are defined by job
characteristics (i.e. firm-specific training), which
represent work structure correlates other than size. I
present hypotheses about these other characteristics
below. The first hypothesis to be tested in the analysis
is formally stated as follows:
H,: There is an inverse relationship between the size 
of the establishment in which a job is embedded and 
the use of informal recruitment techniques to recruit 
for the position.
Public sector employment also affects employer 
recruitment practices. Government agencies are one of the 
largest employers at federal, state and local levels 
(Taylor, 1979). Government agencies are viewed as more 
egalitarian employers because of standardized entrance 
exams, and civil rights legislation aimed at reducing 
hiring and wage discrimination (Kaufman, 1986; Taylor, 
1979; Burstein, 1979; 1985; DiPrete, 1987; Smith, 1980). 
The 19 63 Equal Pay Act outlaws discriminatory pay 
practices, while Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
prohibits discriminatory practices in hiring. The 1964 
act created the EEOC, but gave it no power to prosecute
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offenders (Burstein, 1979) . However, the 1972 amendment 
to Title VII extends limited prosecutorial power to the 
EEOC. The positive effects of EEOC have been limited 
primarily to the public sector (Taylor, 1979; Smith, 1980; 
Eisinger, 1986).
While the effects of EEOC have been limited to the 
public sector, Executive Orders 11246 and 11375 extend 
anti-discrimination guidelines to federal contractors.
The Department of Labor consolidated all previous 
monitoring agencies under the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCCP). OFCCP is empowered with 
authority to prosecute contractors who fail to implement 
nondiscriminatory recruiting and hiring practices and 
affirmative action programs to help women and minorities 
(Reskin and Hartmann, 1986: 87). Additionally, OFCCP has 
enforcement power over private contractors, and public 
agencies and local governments who receive federal funds. 
OFCCP is generally believed to be much more effective at 
enforcing anti-discrimination guidelines (Bergmann, 1986; 
Braun, 1984; Burstein, 1985).
According to Burstein (1985), the primary aim of 
equal employment legislation is the elimination of 
discriminatory employment practices. Moreover, the intent 
of Title VII is the application of universal criteria in 
hiring in both the public and private sectors. Taylor 
(1979) argues that government agencies are better
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promoters of equal opportunity and affirmative action in
employment because of congressional scrutiny, public
scrutiny and private sector criticism. In particular,
private sector firms are vocal critics of government
malfeasance because private firms expect the government
agencies to adhere to the standards that the government
tries to impose on others. Taylor (1979) concludes that
government agencies are less likely to discriminate than
other firms. I maintain from the above evidence that
recruitment procedures for public sector jobs, and for
jobs in establishments with federal contracts are more
likely to be formal. The following hypotheses are derived
from this discussion:
H2: There is an inverse relationship between the 
public sector status of a position and the use of 
informal recruitment to fill the position.
H3: There is an inverse relationship between the 
percentage of establishment revenue from federal 
contracts and the use of informal methods to recruit 
for vacancies in the establishment.
Internal labor markets are work structure correlates 
which differentiate firms (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987; 
Kalleberg, 1988; Baron, 1984). According to Doeringer and 
Piore (1971), internal labor markets are a set of 
administered rules and regulations, which govern the 
allocation of workers to jobs and determine wages. These 
structures are often referred to as firm internal labor 
markets. Within internal labor markets, there are no
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supply and demand curves for a given position, jobs are 
posted internally, and limited applicants for each 
position is limited (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Mobility 
is often based on seniority. Internal labor markets 
create long-term attachment to the firm, reduce inter-firm 
mobility and lessen the effects of competitive forces in 
pricing labor.
Doeringer and Piore (1971) also point out that there 
are portals of entry into and exit from internal labor 
markets. Entry portals are typically connected to 
internal mobility clusters, or groupings of jobs within 
which an employee is customarily upgraded, downgraded, 
laid off or transferred. Exit from internal labor markets 
is also regulated by rules and procedures, such as those 
specifying when to switch from one mobility cluster to 
another, or when to retire from the firm. There are also 
rules and procedures which govern the process of portal 
exit (exit interviews, severance pay, conversion of 
retirement benefits, etc.).
Economists (Barron and Bishop, 1985) contend that 
structures such as unions and internal labor markets 
represent high fixed wages in firms. Where wages are 
fixed at a high level, firms are forced to economize 
elsewhere, such as with the cost savings of informal 
recruitment. Internal labor markets are efficient 
responses to insure an adequate supply of trained labor,
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especially for jobs in which the training is firm-specific 
(Stinchcombe, 1990). Consequently, the presence of 
internal labor markets implies potentially high turnover 
costs to a firm. Therefore, firms with such work 
structures are inclined to recruit informally, in order to 
best fill these positions. In a similar argument, unions 
represent high fixed wages for a firm, and workers who are 
hard to release (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980; Malm, 
1973). Therefore, firms with unions are likely to recruit 
informally (Barron and Bishop, 1985) .
However, unions and union contracts are associated 
with bureaucratic rules and procedures for hiring, firing 
and promotion. Therefore, companies that employ union 
workers are likely to recruit them through formalized 
procedures. Additionally, unions generally reserve the 
right to assign workers to particular firms. Therefore, 
the interesting question concerning recruitment, unions 
and inequality is how union members are recruited into 
unions, and assigned to jobs with different companies by 
union bosses (see Roos and Reskin, 1984; Rees, 1977).
Also, jobs covered by union contracts must employ only 
union members, and these are generally from a local union 
shop. Therefore, I expect companies to have formal 
arrangements with local unions concerning employees.
The above discussion indicates that internal labor 
markets and unions represent high wage structures and high
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potential turnover costs. Unions and firm internal labor
markets are labor allocation structures where workers are
hard to release due to poor performance and where turnover
costs are higher (Bridges and Villemez, 1991). However,
companies that recruit union members from union halls may
do so through formal procedures, which might have been
negotiated as part of a collective bargaining arrangement.
Therefore, I expect job ladder entry portals to be
recruited for through informal methods, and unions to be
recruited for through formal methods. The hypotheses are
formally stated:
H4: There is an inverse relationship between union 
job status and the use of informal methods to recruit 
for those jobs.
H5: There is a positive relationship between job 
ladder entry portal status and the use of informal 
recruitment techniques to recruit for such positions.
Job level characteristics have important effects on
recruitment (Marsden and Campbell, 1990). Organizations
are more vulnerable in some spots than others. Long-run
costs of inappropriate recruitment decisions for many
comparatively attractive positions can be quite high.
Turnover costs are especially high for highly skilled
positions, and those positions for which training is firm-
specific. For these vulnerable positions, the match
between job and employee is crucial for organizational
success. Personnel who occupy these positions will have
an important impact on the organization and are likely to
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be governed by rules and procedures which insulate them 
from dismissal. Therefore, it is important to get the 
right person into the right job. Firms maximize their 
recruiting efforts for important positions, and this 
implies exhausting all efforts to find the best fit 
between employee and organizational needs (Marsden and 
Campbell, 1990). Other positions are less important and 
organizations will "satisfice" in recruiting for these 
positions, or minimize recruiting costs by hiring from 
among a few adequate candidates.
The blue-collar/white-collar job status distinction 
is another job characteristic that has demonstrated an 
influence on recruitment in past studies. Corcoran, 
Datcher and Duncan (1980) contend that informal channels 
are most useful in recruiting blue-collar workers, and 
that employers rely on these methods because they are a 
way of certifying workers (see also Stinchcombe, 1990). 
They further argue that for white-collar occupations, 
formal degrees and certificates serve as signals to 
employees. Rees and Schultz (1970) report that one-half 
of white-collar workers, and four-fifths of blue-collar 
workers are recruited through informal networks. Malm 
(1973) shows that there is a clear, positive relationship 
between white-collar professional occupations and informal 
recruitment. Anecdotal evidence also supports the 
importance of informal recruitment for white-
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collar/professional jobs. Rees and Schultz (1970) report 
that one firm recruited and hired the accountant who 
prepared the firm's taxes the previous year. Campbell and 
Rosenfeld (1985) argue that low and middle level white- 
collar jobs are more likely to be filled through formal 
methods, in particular formal employment agencies, but 
that individuals are apt to find out about upper-level 
white-collar jobs through informal networks.
Occupational internal labor markets are closely 
related to job level characteristics. Occupational 
internal labor markets are work structure correlates which 
differentiate occupations (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987). 
Althauser (1989a; 1989b) argues that occupational internal 
labor markets are discrete clusters, or subsets of jobs. 
These are found within or across occupational categories. 
They are also found within and across firms. They are 
often referred to as career lines across firms (Spilerman, 
1977; Osterman, 1984), and are more likely to include 
white-collar, professional jobs.
The factors which differentiate OILM structures from 
firm internal labor markets include easier access from the 
external market, and jobs that require more general rather 
than firm-specific training. Mobility in occupational 
internal labor markets occurs across companies. Job 
security comes through the competitive supply of skill, 
which is typically controlled by an occupational group or
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organization, and often sanctioned by the state, through 
certification and licensing (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987; 
Althauser, 1989a; 1989b).
Occupations in OILMs are more likely to have a 
professional membership association. Such associations 
help to establish informal networks among members of the 
same occupation, which can be utilized to recruit new 
employees (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1990). Informal recruitment methods also have a tendency 
to become institutionalized in white-collar and 
professional labor markets (Stinchcombe, 1990: 261; Roos 
and Reskin, 1984: 236). That is, informal recruitment 
practices become stable fixtures in certain labor markets 
across time.
According to DiMaggio and Powell's theory of 
institutionalization, mimetic and normative isomorphic 
processes can lead to the institutionalization of 
organizational practices. According to this theory, 
uncertainty in the external environment forces mimetic 
isomorphism. Organizations reduce uncertainty by 
mimicking other perceived successful organizations in 
their environment. Moreover, managers search for 
successful operating models, often imitating the managing 
and personnel practices of other firms. Normative 
pressures toward institutional isomorphism are driven 
primarily by the professionalization of certain
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occupations. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1990: 70), 
professionalization is the attempt to achieve social 
closure over membership, ground the occupation in a 
cognitive base of knowledge, and establish legitimacy for 
occupational autonomy.
One important step in the process of 
professionalization is the expansion of occupational 
member networks across organizations which allow for 
diffusion of the occupational professional model.
Filtering personnel is an important process in 
professionalization. Members are carefully recruited, 
socialized and placed in the profession through inter- 
organizational networks and professional organizations 
(see also Stinchcombe, 1990: 261-2). As the networks 
expand and the occupation approaches professional status, 
uniform practices, procedures and policies for members of 
the profession emerge and become formalized in the 
structure of organizations.
One explanation for the institutionalization of 
informal recruitment practices in white-collar labor 
markets is the isomorphic pressure of mimetic and 
normative processes. The professionalization of certain 
occupations leads to the institutionalization of inter- 
organizational networks (see also Granovetter, 1985) and 
the customary or normative practice of using informal 
recruitment networks to fill vacancies within certain
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occupations. Furthermore, once occupations become 
professionalized, and the personnel policies regarding 
these occupations become institutionalized in 
organizational and market structures, managers may use one 
occupational recruitment model for other (similar) 
occupations.
Another factor which explains why informal 
recruitment practices become entrenched in the formal 
structure of organizations is the perception that these 
techniques are cost efficient. Zucker (1987) contends 
that practices which are compatible with organizational 
goals of reducing search and evaluation costs are more 
likely to become institutionalized in the formal 
procedures of organizations. Granovetter's labor demand 
model stresses the effectiveness of using informal market 
contacts to recruit (see also Marsden and Campbell, 1990). 
Combining both of these ideas together, I argue that 
informal recruitment techniques become institutionalized 
in certain labor markets, in part, because of their 
perceived effectiveness at locating employees and reducing 
search costs.
Roos and Reskin (1984; 1992) offer an alternative 
explanation for the institutionalization of informal 
recruitment practices in certain labor markets. They 
contend that informal recruitment serves to deny females 
and minorities access to certain jobs because they are not
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informed of the openings. Moreover, informal recruitment 
practices are supported by the prevailing culturally 
defined appropriate roles for males and females, whites 
and non-whites. In essence, the segregating effects of 
informal recruitment serve to sustain their practice 
across time because the results reinforce culturally 
defined norms of proper social roles. I will expand this 
argument further in Chapters 4 and 5.
The above discussion shows that occupational status 
and job content directly affect the manner in which 
establishments recruit for such vacancies. Jobs with high 
levels of complexity and high skill demands represent 
vulnerable spots in organizations. Others argue that 
informal recruitment techniques tend to become 
institutionalized in professional, managerial and other 
high status white-collar labor markets. Additionally, 
middle and lower status white-collar occupations are more 
likely to be recruited for through formal channels, such 
as employment agencies. From the discussion, I derive the 
following hypotheses to be formally tested in the 
analysis:
H6: There is a positive relationship between the 
professional, managerial and executive occupational 
status of a position and the use of informal methods 
to recruit for those positions.
H7: There is a positive relationship between the data 
complexity of a position and the use of informal 
methods to recruit for the position.
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H8: There is an inverse relationship between the non­
professional, non-managerial, white-collar 
occupational status of a position and the use of 
informal methods to recruit for the position.
Industry sectors also affect the manner in which
vacancies are recruited for. Market sectors have been
defined by occupation, industry, organizational
characteristics, social class, firm size and unionization
(Sakamoto and Chen, 1991). One of the most well-known
alternatives is to define sectors around the relationship
between firms and product markets. This approach
(sometimes referred to as dual economy theory) challenges
the assumption that economic returns are uniform for
worker characteristics within primary and secondary
industry sectors (Beck, Horan and Tolbert, 1978; Tolbert,
Horan and Beck, 1980; Jacobs, 1983; Hodson, 1984;
Kalleberg and Berg, 1987; Sakamoto and Chen, 1991; Hachen,
199 2). Large firms with a stable market share, capital
intensity, and above average wages constitute the core
sector, while firms with tenuous market shares, which
utilize labor intensive technology, and which pay lower
than average wages constitute the peripheral or
competitive sector.
Core firms tend to be capital intensive and utilize
cutting edge technology, this results in high turnover
costs and long-term planning. As a result, these firms
are willing to offer contracts to workers in return for
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long-term attachment to the firm. Consequently, primary 
sector firms often contain unions and internal labor 
markets. These structures enable firms to consider labor 
a fixed cost over the long-run, which enables managers to 
plan more effectively and to retain their share of the 
product market.
Competitive firms are labor intensive. Positions in 
this sector are typically low-skilled. Short term profits 
are the goal of the firm, and market share is tenuous. 
Firms in these markets better reflect the neoclassical 
competitive labor market model. Manufacturing jobs of this 
sort are apt to head overseas in search of cheaper labor 
(Falk and Lyson, 1988).
Granovetter (1974; 1988) suggests that jobs in the 
core sector are more apt to be recruited for through short 
chains, while jobs in the competitive sector are more 
likely to be recruited for through long chains, which are 
basically formal methods of recruitment. Also, many of 
the characteristics of jobs in the core sector have 
already been identified as factors which positively 
influence the use of informal methods in recruiting for 
those positions (e.g. professional occupations, jobs on 
internal labor markets, jobs with high levels of firm- 
specific training). Given this evidence, one might 
conclude that informal recruitment is more likely for jobs 
in the core sector.
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Additionally, movement between sectors is argued by 
some to be nearly impossible, because jobs in the core 
sector usually have highly screened entry portals and 
access to entry portals is often based on skills and 
credentials not possessed by workers in competitive 
sectors (Kalleberg and Sdrenson, 1979). This is an 
important point to some scholars (see Corcoran, Datcher 
and Duncan, 1980) who argue for the ubiquity of informal 
recruitment methods in core and competitive sectors. 
Informal recruitment is one method by which inequality is 
perpetuated. Workers in the competitive sector often lack 
the network structure to learn of jobs in the core sector 
(Campbell and Rosenfeld, 1985; Corcoran Datcher and 
Duncan, 1980). Therefore, informal recruiting has the 
tendency to fill core sector openings with core sector 
workers, and to further impede the movement of workers 
from the competitive to the core sector.
However, Jacobs' (1989a) revolving door theory 
contradicts these assumptions. His analysis shows that 
there is more movement between sectors than the dual 
economy model predicts. Also, in the past, the dual 
economy theory has been challenged on the empirical 
existence of the core and periphery sectors (see Hodson 
and Kaufman, 1982; Snipp and Bloomquist, 1989). Given 
past critiques of the dual economy model, I argue that it 
is important to control for the durable goods
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manufacturing industry status, instead of the 
core/periphery distinction. Companies in this industry 
sector produce tangible goods which better allow them to 
develop economies of scale (see Kaufman, 1986; Singelmann 
and Mencken, 1992) .6 In addition, Kaufman (1986) argues 
that achieving economies of scale is important because it 
allows companies to engage in long-term strategic planning 
and to better weather business cycle fluctuations. In 
addition, Kaufman (1986) argues that durable goods 
manufacturing plants tend to employ only white-males. 
Analyzing the effects of this industry sector on 
recruitment will allow me to assess what role recruitment 
plays in keeping females and minorities out of this 
sector. I expect that durable goods manufacturing 
establishments use informal recruitment because firms in 
this sector use firm-specific technology, generally have 
higher turnover costs and offer long-term contracts to 
employees. Others (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980; 
Stinchcombe, 1990) imply that informal recruitment is one 
method by which males retain their dominance in these
6 According to Singelmann and Mencken (1992), 
economies of scale are easier to achieve in goods 
producing industry sectors than in service or information 
producing sectors because goods can be stockpiled, while 
services need to be consumed as they are produced. 
Stockpiling allows companies to engage in better long-term 
planning, and to regulate inventory and production with 
fluctuations in product demand.
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sectors. The following hypothesis is derived to address
industry sector effects on recruitment:
H9: There is a positive relationship between durable 
goods manufacturing status and the use of informal 
recruitment methods.
Turnover costs greatly affect the manner in which 
positions are recruited for. As a general rule, where 
turnover costs are perceived to be higher, informal 
recruitment techniques are used. Much of the discussion 
concerning the characteristics of jobs and recruitment 
focuses on the costs of replacing workers who do not work 
out well in the positions for which they are hired. 
Economists (Rees and Schultz, 1970; Barron and Bishop, 
1985; Barron et al., 1982) focus on turnover costs, and 
emphasize informal methods of recruitment as a way of 
reducing turnover costs. Wanous (1980) provides a 
detailed monetary analysis of what turnover actually costs 
a firm for given positions.
Turnover results from worker job-mismatch, which 
manifests itself in poor performance and low job 
satisfaction. Turnover also results from poor information 
on part of both workers and firms. Many firms recruit 
according to a traditional scheme that emphasizes "selling 
the organization." Only the most positive aspects of the 
firms are presented to the prospective employee. This 
process is designed to attract as many candidates as 
possible, in order to achieve a preferable selection
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ratio. The selection ratio is the criteria which 
personnel departments use to justify their budgets to 
upper management. By hiring only a few of the applicants 
for a position, the personnel department makes itself look 
active, and justifies their current level of spending. 
Large numbers of applicants also make the company look 
desirable to those in the market place (i.e. a lot of 
people want to work there). This, in turn, makes market 
actors more eager to accept offers.
Another problem with the traditional way of 
recruiting is the focus on matching firm needs with a 
candidate's abilities. Most interviewees are motivated to 
receive as many offers as possible (Wanous, 1980: 23). 
Therefore, they do not disclose to interviewers their 
shortcomings, and will describe the job that they are 
looking for to match the job that they believe the 
organization has to fill. Applicants who mislead 
employers of their abilities are at risk of being offered, 
and accepting, jobs for which they are not qualified.
This, in turn, can lead to poor performance, low job 
satisfaction, and employee turnover. Misinformation also 
comes from employers. Wanous (198 0) claims that companies 
attempt to project the best possible image. In the 
process, they often mislead candidates about the working 
environment and advancement opportunities. Therefore, 
information systems are important in labor markets to
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clarify misinformation. Employers will use social 
contacts to find out as much information concerning the 
"true” capabilities of a candidate. Prospective employees 
will use their social resources to find out as much 
information about the company as possible.
Wanous' analysis makes clear the importance of 
transmitting quality information about jobs and employees, 
and adds further support for the benefits of using 
informal networks when recruiting employees. However, 
Wanous' analysis focuses primarily on formal methods of 
recruitment, mainly at colleges and universities. Other 
studies show (see Campbell and Rosenfeld, 1985; see also 
Granovetter, 1981) that this type of recruiting (formal at 
colleges/universities) makes up a small percentage of all 
recruiting efforts. In fact, Wanous (1980: 33) cites 
other evidence which suggests that employers in his survey 
prefer to use informal channels to fill positions.
In a similar argument, Stinchcombe (1990) claims that 
all new employees are an unknown commodity. One of the 
most complex uncertainties that firms must contend with is 
whether or not employees that are hired are willing or 
able to do the work that is required of them (see also 
Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980). Measuring 
performance on the job is an imperfect task. There are 
few standard measures of productivity in any field. Any 
information that an organization can gather on a potential
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employee represents data that can be used to reduce the 
risk that the employee will not match the job that s/he is 
hired to perform. For hiring and promotion decisions, one 
needs information about how the employee performed in the 
past, as well as information on how s/he will perform in 
the future. Therefore, employers rely on certification 
systems to make predictions about potential employees.
The certification systems cited by Stinchcombe (1990) 
include seniority systems, internal labor markets, craft 
or professional certification, strong-tie networks and 
certification through union shops. These systems fill the 
gap between the poor measurement and the poor 
predictability of productivity. These systems allow 
employers to find out as much information on a new 
employee as possible. They transmit signals to the 
employer that the employee is capable of doing the job for 
which they are being considered. This reduces some of the 
uncertainty in the job match process, and long-term 
turnover costs. However, Stinchcombe's typology is 
incomplete. Informal recruitment methods allow employees 
to find out about the firm, their prospective boss, and 
other factors, while at the same time allow the firm to 
acquire better information about the employee. This 
process is believed to enhance the possibility of a good 
match between worker interests/abilities and firm needs.
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Turnover costs and the need for a good match between
employee and position are cited as primary reasons why
employers recruit informally for employees. Wanous (1980)
points out that the actual turnover costs for a position
are difficult to calculate. However, there are several
measures used in other studies as indicators of turnover
costs (i.e. firm-specific training, transportability of
skills from firm to firm, time to learn a job—  see
Bridges and Villemez, 1991). I use similar measures in my
analysis. The following hypotheses are derived to test
the relationship between turnover costs and recruitment.
H 10: There is a positive relationship between the 
length of time that an employee is expected to stay 
with the establishment and the use of informal 
recruitment methods to recruit for the position.
H u : There is a positive relationship between the 
amount of time that it takes a worker to learn a job 
and the use of informal methods to recruit for the 
position.
H 12: There is an inverse relationship between the 
marketability of skills learned on a job and the use 
of informal methods to recruit for the position.
Analysis
Data
The analysis uses OLS and logistic regression to 
analyze the effects of establishment, job and industry 
characteristics on eight recruitment measures (Pedhauzer, 
1973; Agresti, 1990). The data for the first model come 
from the Metropolitan Emplover-Worker Survey (MEWS). This 
study includes data from a dual telephone survey of
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7 7
employees and their employers in 1981. The employee 
sample is based on a random-digit-dial telephone survey of 
2,713 employed adults in the Chicago SMSA.7 Eligible 
employee respondents are 18 years or older who worked 2 0 
hours or more per week for someone else (not self- 
employed) . A random-digit-dial telephone survey is used 
to collect the data, with a response rate of 86% of 
eligible participants (Villemez and Bridges, 1988; Bridges 
and Villemez, 1986). In the second survey, personnel 
managers involved in the hiring decisions are interviewed. 
They are asked specific questions concerning the position 
held by the employee, as well as general questions 
concerning the firm's hiring practices. These data are 
supplemented by data provided by Brad and Dunstreet, and 
other industrial data sources (Villemez and Bridges,
1988). The sample is representative of workers in the 
greater Chicago area.8
The employee file has 2,713 cases and the individual 
is the unit of analysis. The corresponding employer file
7 The Metropolitan Emplover-Worker Survey was funded 
by NSF grant SES-8012117.
8The sample is representative of workers in the 
Chicago area, but this may pose a problem when the 
employer file is used. Large establishments are over­
represented in the sample. Establishment size has 
relevance for any study that addresses hiring issues 
because establishments with less than 25 employees are 
exempt from EEOC guidelines. However, the sample is 
representative of workers in the labor market.
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has 1,927 cases, and the position in the establishment is 
the unit of analysis. There are no employer data 
available for 786 individuals. Furthermore, the employer 
file is differentiated by whether the position is 
recruited for exclusively outside of the establishment, 
from both within and outside of the establishment, and 
exclusively within the establishment. Of the 1,927 
positions in the employer file, 969 are recruited 
exclusively from outside of the establishment, 341 from 
both within or outside of the establishment, and 617 are 
recruited for exclusively from within the establishment.
I am concerned primarily with job matching issues in the 
external labor market, and I use only those 969 cases 
which are recruited for exclusively through the external 
market. I drop the 341 cases from the internal/external 
file because I do not have questions concerning how these 
positions are recruited for when they are filled 
internally. Only partial recruitment information is 
available. It could be that internal recruitment is more 
important for these cases than external recruitment, but 
the data do not allow me to address this question. 
Recruitment Measures
I use 8 recruitment measures. Two are discrete 
measures of the use of formal or informal recruiting 
techniques. These measures permit a contrast of formal 
only to all others, and informal only to all others.
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There are six measures of recruitment that capture 
frequency of use. The six scales have ordinal properties 
and should prove useful in examining the relationship 
between work structure correlates and recruitment.
The MEWS contains six questions asked of key 
informants that address external recruitment. I classify 
the first two as informal and the following four as 
formal.
Informal:
1. When seeking applicants from outside (company 
name) do you often ask your employees for 
recommendations? (Employees)
2. When seeking applicants from outside (company 
name) do you often ask business associates or 
professional colleagues for names of applicants? 
(Colleagues and Associates)
Formal:
1. When seeking applicants from outside (company 
name) do you often place advertisements in 
newspapers, on the radio, or other mass circulation? 
(Advertisements)
2. Do you often use signs outside on your premises? 
(Signs)
3. Do you often notify employment agencies? 
(Employment Agencies)
4. Do you often rely on applicants walking in or 
applying on their own? (Walk-ins)
For each of the above questions to which the
respondents answered "yes," they were asked the following
question: How many of your employees presently working as
(job) have been recruited in this way? Would you say
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l)none, 2)a few, 3)some, 4)most, 5) all. If they respond 
with a "no" to the first question, then that position is 
assigned to the "none" category. This provides an ordinal 
scale of recruitment consistency for each of the 
techniques used to recruit for a position. Also, I have 
measures of informal-only recruitment and formal-only 
recruitment. Positions for which none of the four formal 
techniques are used to recruit are classified as informal 
only. Positions for which neither of the two informal 
methods is used are classified as formal-only. Both of 
these measures are binary variables (1,0).
Independent Variables
The independent variables in the models are 
operationalized as follows:9
1. Size of establishment- this variable is 
operationalized as the number of full and part time 
employees employed in that location.10 This is a 
continuous measure. Since the distribution of 
establishment size is skewed toward large establishments,
9In the proposal, I originally included a measure of 
the number of significant competitors an establishment 
has. I am excluding this measure because over 3 0% of the 
cases are missing.
10 The measure for establishment size is taken from 
the employer file. Where these data were missing, 
Villemez and Bridges combined measures from the employee 
file and from Dun and Bradstreet (see Villemez and 
Bridges, 1988: 242).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 1
the natural log of establishment size is used throughout 
the analysis.
2. Government agency status- this measure is 
operationalized by the response to the following question: 
Is this establishment part of federal, state or local 
government? The measure is a binary variable (1,0), with 
a score of 1 meaning the establishment is part of a 
government agency.
3. Percent of revenue from government sales (% of 
Sales from Government)- this measure is operationalized by 
the following question: About what percentage of the 
revenue of this establishment comes from shipments, sales 
or services to government agencies? The measure is the 
actual percentage of sales to government agencies.
4-6. Professional, executive/managerial, white-collar 
status (Professional, Executive/Managerial, White-Collar)- 
I operationalize these three measures as binary variables 
(0,1), using the 1980 Census occupational codes. If the 
position is located under one of these major headings, 
then it is considered to have professional, 
executive/managerial, or white-collar occupational status, 
and has a score of 1. The comparison category is all 
other occupations.
7. Internal job ladder (Job Ladder Entry Point)- 
whether or not the position is part of an internal job 
ladder is operationalized as a binary variable by the
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following question: Is this job part of a regular series
of positions by which people move to a higher level? If 
the answer is yes, then a score of 1 is assigned, if the 
answer is no, then a value of 0 is assigned.
8. Union Job- this measure is operationalized as a 
binary variable by the following question: To be eligible 
for the job, is it required that the applicant be a member 
of a particular union?
9. Durable Goods Manufacturing Establishment- this 
variable is operationalized as a binary variable (0,1) 
taken from all United States Bureau of the Census Standard 
Industrial Classification codes. It includes all industry 
codes that fall under the major heading of durable goods 
manufacturing industries.
10. Data complexity (DOT Data Complexity Score)- this 
variable is operationalized by the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (DOT) measure of job complexity.
Scores were originally assigned to base occupations by 
Department of Labor occupational analyst. These scores 
were transformed onto Census occupational categories, by 
taking the average score on each job title in a particular 
Census occupational category (Spenner, 1980). The range 
on this measure is from 1 to 9, where 9 represents an 
occupation with low levels of data complexity. I take the 
inverse of these scores, so that the range is from .111 to 
1, with a value of 1 representing the highest level of
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data complexity. Examples of occupations with high levels 
of data complexity are electrical and civil engineers, 
lawyers, editors, social scientists, and management 
analysts.11
11-13. Firm specific training/turnover costs- there 
are three variables to measure this concept. The first 
(Time Needed to Learn Job) is the response to the 
following question: From the time that they begin, how 
much time does a typical new employee need to learn the
job of __ in your establishment? 6) years, 5) months, 4)
weeks, 3) days, 2) hours, 1) minutes. It assume that the 
longer the employee needs to learn the job, the more firm 
specific the training. For non-firm specific positions, I 
assume that the employee acquired the skills prior to 
employment. The second measure (Transportability of 
Skills Learned) is a Likert scale based on the previous 
question, and is as follows: How much of what the
employee learns during this period of time would be useful 
to the employee if he or she moved to a similar job in a 
different organization? Would you say l)all of it, 2)
11 When the DOT were constructed by the Department of 
Labor, the following definitions were used to 
operationalize data: Information, knowledge, and
conceptions related to data, people, or things, obtained 
by observation, investigation, interpretation, 
visualization, mental creation; incapable of being 
touched; written data take the form of numbers, words, 
symbols; other data are ideas, concepts, oral 
verbalization (Morris, 1990) .
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most of it, 3) about half, 4) less than half, 5) none of 
it. The higher the value, the less valuable the skills 
are at another company and the more firm-specific the 
training. The third measure (Permanence of Employee) 
captures how long a new employee is expected to stay with 
the establishment. When looking for a quality in a 
worker, is it 4) extremely important, 3) somewhat 
important, 2) not very important, 1) not at all important 
that the candidate is likely to stay with the organization 
for a long time, that is, are permanent.
Measurement Issues
The measurement of the independent variables in this 
analysis are more reliable because they are management- 
source data. Villemez and Bridges (1988) maintain that 
management-source data are more accurate than data 
collected from non-members of management, especially when 
measuring establishment and job content characteristics. 
However, there are several issues concerning these 
measures which will affect the interpretation of the 
analysis, and the discussion of the conceptual model. 
First, I maintain that entry portals for internal job 
ladders are more likely to be recruited for through 
informal methods because competition for jobs further up 
the ladder is limited. However, I cannot assess to what 
extent the measure in the analysis represents job ladders 
where future competition is limited. The question in the
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MEWS asks whether or not employees who stay with the 
company 10 years would be promoted to a higher level. It 
asks nothing concerning competition for jobs further up 
the ladder. These job ladders could have other entry 
portals. If the ladders are fairly permeable at higher 
rungs, it implies that asset-specificity is reduced 
because the needed skills can be acquired from elsewhere. 
This, in turn, may affect the recruitment practices for 
entry portals.
The analysis also contains several occupational 
status measures. I include measures of professional, 
executive/managerial and white-collar occupations. These 
categories overlap. However, I do this to analyze the 
effects of professional occupational status and 
executive/managerial status on recruitment practices. In 
addition, I include the white-collar measure to first 
assess the white-collar/blue-collar distinction in 
recruiting, an important distinction addressed by others 
(Malm, 1973; Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 198 0; Rees and 
Schultz, 1970). Second, in regression analysis, the 
effects of white-collar are net of the effects of 
professional, and executive/managerial occupational 
status. Therefore, white-collar status contrasts the 
effects of non-professional/executive-managerial white- 
collar occupations against blue-collar occupations.
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I also include a measure of data complexity taken 
from the DOT (see Spenner, 1980). A score of data 
complexity is attached to each 1980 occupational category. 
There is a distribution of data complexity scores within 
each of the above occupational status categories. I 
assume that the DOT scores represent job content better 
than broad occupational categories (professional, 
executive/managerial). This allows me to address the 
institutional vs efficiency argument in the recruitment 
literature. If the efficiency argument holds, then I 
expect that job complexity is more important (i.e. to have 
larger relative effects) than occupational categories. 
Morris (1990) has raised some questions concerning the 
ordinal properties of DOT measures. However, data 
complexity is used as an ordinal measure elsewhere (see 
England et al., 1988).
The literature review indicates that turnover costs 
are important factors which influence the use of informal 
recruitment techniques. In the analysis I attempt to 
measure turnover costs with three indirect measures of 
asset specificity and external market viability. I argue 
that jobs which take a long time to learn also have high 
turnover costs, since substantial training investments 
must be made in the worker. I also assume that employers 
would want to keep the worker for long periods of time for 
jobs that are high in asset specificity, and which have
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higher turnover costs. The measure of how permanent the 
employer wants the worker to be is designed to capture 
this dimension. Finally, I expect that jobs which have 
transportable skills across companies have high external 
market viability. That is, the skills acquired at one 
company are useful at another company. My concern with 
these measures is that employers may misinterpret the 
intent of these questions. For example, employers may 
substitute experience for skills. Positive experience at 
any job would be useful for any other job that an 
individual might acquire, regardless whether or not the 
skills learned in one job are useful for another. 
Therefore, when employers answer questions concerning how 
useful the skills an employee learns at one job would be 
at another job, the employer may substitute experience for 
skills when giving a response.
Another possible issue concerns the length of time 
that employers want employees to stay with the firm. 
Employers may report that they want all of their employees 
to stay with the company for a long time. Employers may 
confuse tenure with a company with worker stability and 
answer the question based on this perception. However, I 
use the measure to indirectly assess the establishment 
specific nature of the skills used in the job. I assume 
that employers want workers who will stay a long time with
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the establishment for jobs that are high in asset- 
specificity.
There are several measurement issues concerning the 
dependent variables in this chapter. In the conceptual 
model, recruitment techniques are the endogenous dimension 
in path (a). In the empirical operationalization of this 
path, the recruitment indicators are not as exhaustive as 
I would prefer. I have two ordinal measures of informal 
recruitment and four ordinal measures of formal 
recruitment. Unfortunately, I do not have an indicator 
which measures the use of head-hunter firms to recruit for 
vacancies. These recruitment agencies are particularly 
important in recruiting for higher status white-collar 
jobs (Marsden and Campbell, 199 0) . Moreover, given the 
absence of this measure, the employment agency indicator 
may represent some of the recruitment through head-hunter 
firms. Therefore, some of the employment agency effects 
may be attributable to head-hunter firms.
Another issue concerns the correlation between the 
two informal measures of recruitment. It is conceivable 
that employers use colleagues and business associates, and 
current employees to recruit for a professional, or 
executive/managerial vacancy. However, it is not likely 
that employers use business associates and colleagues to 
recruit for low level jobs with high external market 
viability. Yet, it is very likely that they use current
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employees in the same position to recruit for such jobs 
(see Rees and Schultz, 1970). Using current employees 
allows employers to avoid advertising costs for low-level 
jobs. Also, they can hold current employees responsible 
for the friends that they recommend. My problem is how to 
manage the potential bimodal nature of this type of 
recruitment. In regression analysis, the positive 
association between the use of current employees to 
recruit and the characteristics of both "good" and "bad" 
jobs may yield an equation with no clear relationships. 
Unfortunately, for the dichotomous measure for informal- 
only recruiting, these two measures could not be 
separated, because to do so would skew the binary 
distribution (less than ten percent of responses in the 0 
or 1 category) so that a generalized linear model could 
not be used (Agresti, 1990).
The analysis in this chapter concentrates on the 
relative effects of the independent variables on each of 
the recruitment techniques. Little attention is given to 
examining the variance explained in each model. The use 
of five-point ordinal scales as dependent variables 
suppresses the variance. Therefore, it is not reasonable 
to expect that the model will explain a high percentage of 
the variance in the dependent variables. One alternative 
to ordinary least squares analysis is to use an ordinal 
response generalized linear logit model with maximum
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likelihood estimation. However, Agresti (1990) points out 
that there are problems with using continuous measures 
(such as establishment size) as predictors in these 
models. The results which I am searching for can be 
acquired using OLS, and the interpretations do not involve 
logits and odds-ratios, making them more straight-forward. 
Correlation Results
Table 3.1 presents simple descriptive statistics for 
all variables in the analysis. Table 3.1 shows that about 
10% of the jobs that are recruited for exclusively in the 
external labor market are done so through informal 
recruiting methods only (colleagues and current 
employees). Moreover, about 35% of all jobs are recruited 
for through formal recruiting methods, and the remaining 
55% are recruited for with both formal and informal 
techniques. This shows that informal methods are 
important to employers for recruiting; about 65% of all 
jobs recruited for in the external labor market are 
recruited for, in some manner, by informal recruitment 
techniques. This finding challenges the claim made by 
Arthur (1986) that less than 8 percent of all vacancies 
are recruited with informal recruitment techniques.
Table 3.2 presents the zero-order correlation 
coefficients for all of the recruitment variables in this 
analysis. The correlations show that none of the 
recruitment measures are highly associated (no positive
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Table 3.2. Zero-Order Correlations among Dependent Variables (n=812).
XI
Advertisements (XI) 1. 000 X2
Signs (X2) . 074* 1.000 X3
Walk-Ins (X3) -.111* . 186* 1. 000 X4
Employment Agencies (X4) . 062* . 006 -.060* 1. 000 X5
Employees (X5) . 013 . 091* . 026 . Oil 1.000 X6
Colleagues and
Business Associates (X6) . 037 . 001 -.133* . 096* .211* 1. 000
*p<.05
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correlation over .30). The lack of strong correlations 
reinforces my design to analyze the effects of each 
recruitment scale separately. One possible alternative is 
to subject these measures to factor analysis to see if 
some of these form distinct dimensions of recruitment.
The low correlations advise against this.
Multivariate OLS Results
The goal of this analysis is to show which 
characteristics of jobs, industries, organizations and 
occupations significantly affect which recruitment 
techniques are used to recruit employees. The R-SQUARE 
statistics for most of the models are not terribly 
impressive. This is partly attributable to using only a 
five-point ordinal dependent variable. Additionally, the 
models are not designed to forecast recruitment use, but 
to test to what extent certain work structure correlates 
influence the use of certain recruitment techniques. 
Therefore, the emphases are on the individual 
coefficients, and not on the total amount of variation 
that each model explains.
Table 3.3 presents the ordinary least squares 
results. The analysis for the use of current employees to 
recruit fails to show a regression (F Value=1.41, p=.15). 
Therefore, the results for this model are not 
interpretable. One reason why the model does not deviate 
from independence is because the use of current employees

















Table 3.3. The Effects of Work Structure Correlates on Recruitment Practices 
(Unstandardized Coefficients, n=812).
Formal Informal
Dependent Variable Advertisements Signs Agencies Walk-Ins Employ . Coll/Ass
Job Characteristics 
Job Ladder Entry Point 
Time Needed to Learn Job 
Transportability of 
Skills Learned 


































Size of Establishment 































































.069*** .048*** .155*** . 005 .079**
VO
9 5
to recruit is associated with good and bad jobs.
Quadratic or non-linear effects may improve the fit of 
this model.
The analysis for using advertisements to recruit 
shows that union status and the time it takes to learn a 
job have negative effects on advertisement use, while 
establishment size and durable goods manufacturing status 
both have positive effects. The larger the employer, the 
more likely that openings will be consistently recruited 
for through advertisements. Employers in the durable 
goods manufacturing sector are more likely to advertise 
than are employers in other industry sectors. This 
finding partially contradicts my hypothesis. However, it 
may be that durable goods manufacturing establishments 
have more bureaucratic personnel structures than 
establishments in other industries. The presence of these 
structures would allow such plants to devote more 
resources to employee testing and screening.
Durable goods manufacturing establishments may use 
deferred compensation structures to off-set potential 
turnover costs (Sorenson, 1983). With deferred 
compensation structures, employees are typically hired in 
at lower than market wages, with the promise of promotion 
to secure jobs with higher than market wages in the 
future. Job matching at the bottom of the ladder, where 
wages are low and responsibilities are minimal, is not as
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important as job matching near the top of the ladder, 
where wages are higher and responsibilities greater. 
According to Sorenson (198 3) employers control labor by 
failing to promote those workers that do not perform well. 
This allows employers to better manager their turnover 
costs. In addition, using deferred compensation 
structures to regulate job matching could be preferable to 
informal recruitment because these structures are internal 
to the company, and better insulated from external 
observation than recruiting practices.
The model for using signs outside of the premises to 
recruit shows that time and job ladder status are both 
significant predictors of the consistent use of signs to 
recruit for some vacancies. Time has an expected negative 
effect, while job ladder status has an unexpected positive 
effect. Jobs that require a long time to learn represent 
a major investment on behalf of the establishment, and 
therefore I expect that the establishment will attempt to 
locate the best applicants. Relying on signs outside of 
the premises is not a proven way of acquiring the best 
workers (Marsden and Campbell, 1990; Rees and Schultz,
1970) .
The job ladder effect is unexpected. Internal job 
ladders are typically protected by bureaucratic procedures 
which make it difficult to release a non-productive 
employee (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Therefore, I expect
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that these positions are recruited informally, since 
informal recruitment leads to better job candidates and a 
better job match (Marsden and Campbell, 1990). Moreover, 
if formal methods are used to recruit for such jobs, I 
would not expect that posting signs outside of 
establishments is a popular manner of recruiting for such 
positions. However, as with durable goods manufacturing 
establishments, employers may use deferred compensation 
structures—  as opposed to informal recruitment—  to 
control for turnover costs (Sprenson, 1983). Therefore, 
how workers are found is not a major issue.
The model for employment agency shows that white- 
collar occupational status and job ladder status are both 
significant predictors of employment agency use to recruit 
for vacancies. Both have positive effects. The white- 
collar status finding is consistent with Campbell and 
Rosenfeld's (1985) untested hypothesis that certain white- 
collar occupations are filled through employment agencies. 
The effects of white-collar occupational status in this 
model are net of the effects of professional occupational 
status, executive-managerial occupational status and data 
complexity. Therefore, in the regression models, white- 
collar occupational status represents the effects of non­
professional, non-executive/managerial white-collar 
occupations. Moreover, I hypothesized that lower status 
white-collar occupations are more likely to be recruited
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formally. These findings support this hypothesis, and 
that presented by Campbell and Rosenfeld (1985), who argue 
that employers recruit for middle and lower-level white- 
collar vacancies through employment agencies.
As with the sign model, the effects for job ladder 
status are unexpected. Rees and Schultz (1970) show that 
employment agencies are expensive and unreliable sources 
of applicants (see also Doeringer and Piore, 1971). 
Moreover, as I mentioned before, incumbents of these 
positions are often guaranteed extensive due process, 
which makes discipline and dismissal difficult (Bridges 
and Villemez, 1991; Boswell, 1988). Therefore, I do not 
expect employers to use employment agencies to recruit for 
internal job ladder entry portals. Again, the 
interpretation regarding deferred compensation structures 
(see above) may apply to employment agencies as well.
Government agency and establishment size are positive 
predictors of reliance upon walk-ins to recruit. The 
larger the establishment, the more likely that walk-ins 
are relied upon for recruiting. Public sector jobs also 
rely upon walk-ins, as do union jobs. The finding for 
establishment size supports my hypothesis concerning size 
and recruitment, and supports previous research in this 
area (Marsden and Campbell, 1990; Rees and Schultz, 1970). 
Larger establishments have higher visibility and thus 
receive more unsolicited applications for employment
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(Marsden and Campbell, 1988). The highest status firms 
may also receive unsolicited applications from the best 
qualified applicants (i.e. IBM). Therefore, it may not be 
necessary for some firms to engage in active recruitment. 
Governments (federal, state, local) are the largest 
employers and their employment process and internal 
governance structures are the most bureaucratic. Given 
the high visibility of government and civil service 
agencies, it is probably unnecessary to actively recruit 
for most vacancies.
It is also possible that job searchers have positive 
perceptions about public sector employment and apply for 
jobs in this sector. Marsden and Campbell (1990) imply 
that job searchers perceive the positive benefits of 
working in a large establishment that social scientists 
have recognized (better pay, benefits, opportunities for 
advancement, job security, etc.,). Moreover, job 
searchers operate under a time constraint. It is a better 
investment on behalf of a job searcher to apply to larger 
establishments because they are more likely to have an 
opening. The same argument can be made for government 
agencies. Government agencies are the largest employer at 
all levels. The positive benefits of public sector 
employment (especially for blacks and females) have been 
identified above (Smith 1980; Zwerling and Silver, 1992; 
DiPrete and Soule, 1988; Braun, 1984; Taylor, 1979).
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Large pools of unsolicited applications may negate the 
need to invest financial and social capital in recruiting.
Several variables have negative effects on the 
reliance upon walk-ins to recruit. White-collar jobs are 
not likely to be recruited by relying upon walk-ins.
Also, data complexity negatively affects reliance upon 
walk-ins to recruit. The amount of time it takes a new 
employee to learn a job also has a negative effect on the 
use of walk-ins to recruit for openings. All of these 
findings are expected. The data complexity and time 
variables represent establishment vulnerability to 
turnover and job mis-match. Therefore, active recruitment 
is warranted in order to optimize the job match. These 
negative relationships suggest that, despite the size of 
the establishments, unsolicited applications cannot be 
relied upon to fill every position. These results also 
show that job characteristics have important, independent 
effects net of establishment and industry characteristics.
The results for union jobs fit my expectations, but 
dispute earlier claims. Granovetter (1974) argues that 
many union, blue-collar jobs are filled through the 
recommendations of current employees (see also 
Stinchcombe, 1990: 268). However, the present analysis 
shows that there is not a significant relationship between 
the union status of the job and the frequency of using 
current employees to recruit for these jobs. Moreover,
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union jobs are negatively associated with advertising and 
positively associated with reliance upon walk-ins. One 
possible explanation is the manner in which union members 
are assigned to jobs. Unions are given considerable 
autonomy in whom to admit into the union (Rees, 1977) . As 
part of the collective bargaining process, unions may have 
won the right to assign members to particular jobs, based 
primarily on seniority. If that is the case, I would 
expect establishments to rely upon unions to send them 
proper applicants. This may explain why establishments 
rely on walk-ins when recruiting for union jobs. 
Unfortunately, these data are not designed to answer 
questions about union membership procedures. However, the 
results suggest that the topic is worthy of further 
investigation.
The use of colleagues and business associates is the 
last of the recruitment scales to be analyzed. Public 
sector job status has a negative effect on using 
colleagues to recommend applicants for positions. 
Government agencies are required, both formally and 
informally, to abide by EEOC and Affirmative Action hiring 
policies (Taylor, 1979) . Therefore, it is unlikely that 
they will recruit informally. Executive/managerial 
occupations are more likely to be recruited for through 
colleague recommendations than are other occupations. 
Professional and white-collar occupations are more likely
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to be recruited for through colleagues and business 
associates also. These findings are consistent with the 
theme playing throughout the literature review: Better
jobs are more likely to be filled through informal 
recruitment.
Logistic Regression Results
The logistic regression results are presented in 
Table 3.4. Table 3.1 (simple statistics) shows that less 
than 11% of all cases in the sample are recruited 
exclusively by informal techniques, and 34% of all 
positions in the sample are recruited exclusively by 
formal methods. The logistic regression model for the 
informal-only model deviates significantly from 
independence (chi-square=60.94 w/13 d.f.), and reduces
11.02% of the error in the intercept-only model 
(independence).12 However, there are only two significant 
coefficients in the model, establishment size and 
professional occupational status. The estimate for the 
natural log of establishment size is -.395. This shows 
that a 1% increase in establishment size increases the 
odds that informal-only recruiting methods are not used by 
49%. A 10% increase in establishment size increases the 
odds that informal-only recruiting methods are not used by
12The error represents that portion of the -2 log 
likelihood function not explained by the model. At 
independence, the error is equal to the -2 log likelihood 
function (see Agresti, 1990).

















Table 3.4. Logistic Regression Models for Formal-Only and Informal-Only Recruitment 
Techniques (n=812).
Dependent Variable Formal-Only Informal-Only
Estimate Odds-Ratio Estimate Odds-Ratio
Job Characteristics 
Job Ladder Entry Point -.025 .980 -.498 . 670
Time Needed to Learn Job -.005 .994 . 1081 . 114
Transportability of 
Skills Learned -.135 . 874 . 1011 . 106
Permanence of Employee . 055 1. 057 .2511 . 287
Union job -.191 .820 -.028 . 972
Oraanizational Characteristics
Size of Establishment (In) .216*** 1.242 -.395*** .670
% of Sales From Govt. . 003 1.003 -.009 1. 009
Government Agency . 516*** 1. 675 -.006 .993
Manufacturing Durable 
Good Est. .013 1.014 -.461 . 630
Occupational Characteristics 
DOT Data Complexity 
Scores . 106 1.112 . 1011 . 106
White-Collar -.412* . 662 . 085 1.089
Executive/Managerial -1.044*** .352 .386 1.472
Professional -.433 .649 .721* 2.057
- 2 Log Likelihood 
(Intercept Only) 1142.835*** 552. 772***
Model Chi-Square 69.286*** 60. 940***
Proportional Reduction 




over 500 percent. It is clear that jobs in larger 
establishments are not going to be recruited for 
exclusively by informal methods. Net of the size effect, 
professional jobs are twice as likely to be recruited for 
through informal-only methods than non-professional jobs 
(odds ratio of 2.05).
The model for formal-only recruitment reduces the 
error in the independence model by 6.0%. The reduction is 
significant (chi-square=69.28, w/13 d.f.). Size and 
government job status have positive effects. A 1% 
increase in the size of establishment increases the odds 
that formal-only methods are used by 24%. Jobs in larger 
establishments have a higher probability of being 
recruited for through formal-only techniques. Government 
jobs are 67% more likely to be recruited for through 
formal-only methods than are non-government jobs. Both of 
these findings support the multivariate findings for each 
separate recruitment scale, and the hypotheses concerning 
the relationship between establishment size, public sector 
status and recruitment.
While size is clearly a strong predictor in the 
model, the effects of white-collar occupational status, 
executive/managerial occupational status and the 
transportability of skills are significant. All are 
negatively associated with formal-only techniques. White- 
collar jobs are 51% less likely to be recruited for
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exclusively by formal methods of recruitment. 
Executive/managerial jobs are 184% less likely to be 
recruited for exclusively by formal methods than are non­
executive/managerial jobs.
The logistic regression analysis addresses the 
important distinction between how employers look for 
employees, and how employers find workers. The informal- 
only and formal-only measures are taken from the 
recruitment filter questions that ask how employers 
typically look for employees. The recruitment measures in 
the multivariate analysis are taken from the questions 
which measure how employers typically find employees (i.e. 
how many current employees were recruited in that w a y ) .
In order to better address these questions, I re-analyze 
the models using both logistic regression and cumulative 
logit models. Logistic regression models are used to 
estimate the effects of the independent variables on the 
initial filter questions presented above. This analysis 
addresses whether or not employers typically look for 
employees with a certain technique.
The cumulative logit analysis replicates the OLS 
analysis, but cumulative logit models are more appropriate 
given the restricted ordinal nature of the recruitment 
measures. The cumulative logit analysis addresses how 
employers find workers because it assess how many workers 
currently employed in that position with that company were
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recruited in that way. I do not show these coefficients 
in a table. The analysis for all six measures shows that 
the same characteristics that influence employers to look, 
also influence employers to find employees. For example, 
professional occupational status and executive/managerial 
occupational status both have positive effects on 
employers looking for employees through colleagues and 
business associates, and finding employees through 
colleagues and business associates. The one interesting 
inconsistency between looking and finding is with 
employment agencies. Executive/managerial occupational 
status has a positive effect on the use of employment 
agencies to look for employees, but no effect on the use 
of agencies to find employees. Another interpretation is 
that executive/managerial occupations are recruited for 
through employment agencies, but employers do not 
typically locate employees through employment agencies. 
However, as the OLS analysis in Table 3.3 shows, 
executive/managerial status has a positive effect on the 
use of colleagues and business associates. While 
employers may recruit through employment agencies for 
executive/managerial positions, they locate these workers 
through colleagues and business associates. In Chapters 4 
and 5 I will address the consequences of this finding for 
the gender and racial composition of these jobs.
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Discussion
The goal of this chapter is to uncover recruitment 
patterns in external labor markets. The analysis 
establishes some interesting patterns between work 
structure correlates and recruitment techniques.
Employers use advertisements to recruit for jobs on 
internal job ladders and in durable goods manufacturing 
plants. Employers use employment agencies to recruit for 
jobs in larger establishments, and lower-level white- 
collar jobs. Employers also rely on signs and walk-ins to 
recruit for government jobs, union jobs, and jobs on 
internal job ladders.
One of the most important findings that relates the 
analyses in this chapter to the overall goals of the 
dissertation, is the relationship between informal 
recruitment through colleagues and business associates and 
occupational status, especially high-quality white-collar 
occupations. The professional and executive/managerial 
occupational status variables have positive effects on the 
use of colleagues and business associates to recruit for 
employees. This is the first step in addressing the 
relationship between recruitment practices and the 
occupational segregation process. The next step is to 
assess the structuring effects of recruitment techniques 
and how they deny individuals access to job information. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will address these issues in greater
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detail. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the 
contribution that the empirical results make to the 
recruitment literature discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter.
The analysis makes contributions to the recruitment 
literature in several areas. Some economists (Barron and 
Bishop, 1985; Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg, 1982) argue 
that there may be situations where large establishments 
will need to recruit informally. Large establishments 
have higher monitoring costs and higher potential turnover 
costs. Yet there is no evidence in my study to suggest 
that large establishments utilize informal methods in any 
systematic manner. One solution that could satisfy both 
arguments is to focus on selection rather than 
recruitment. Since large establishments are likely to 
have large bureaucratic personnel departments (Villemez 
and Bridges, 1988), large establishments can devote more 
resources to employee screening to avoid the potential 
problems raised by economists (see Barron and Bishop,
1985) . Moreover, formal recruitment techniques allow 
large establishments to avoid pressure from the EEOC and 
public groups, such as Operation PUSH (see public sector 
employment below). Further investigation of screening 
practices with appropriate data are warranted.
The effects of occupational status on recruitment are 
another area where this analysis makes a contribution to
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the recruitment literature. First, Corcoran, Datcher and 
Duncan (1980) argue that education and training 
requirements of professional occupations make informal 
recruitment less likely because these serve as credentials 
to signal employers that they are qualified to fill the 
position. My analysis shows little support for this 
position. The analysis shows a positive relationship 
between recruitment through colleagues and business 
associates and professional, executive-managerial and 
white-collar occupational status. The two competing 
explanations for this finding are efficiency theory and 
institutional theory. The efficiency perspective contends 
that jobs which represent vulnerable spots in the 
organization are likely to be recruited for through 
informal channels because these methods reduce risks in 
hiring and increase the probability of a successful job 
match (Marsden and Campbell, 1990; Rees and Schultz, 197 0; 
Barron and Bishop, 1985; see also Granovetter, 1981).
Stinchcombe's (1990) institutional explanation is 
that informal recruitment through colleagues and 
associates has become institutionalized in white-collar, 
occupational internal labor markets. Entry and 
advancement in occupational internal labor markets is 
typically controlled by the workers, at least to a greater 
extent than in other labor markets (Stinchcombe, 199 0:
261). Historically, in many high status professional and
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managerial labor markets, there was often a "peer group" 
which enforced market closure over who gets in (see also 
Sbrenson and Kalleberg, 1981). Movement of workers within 
OILMs often involved the consent or advice of the "peer 
group" (Stinchcombe, 1990: 262). The industrial 
transformation from a manufacturing to a service economy 
greatly increased the relative number and labor force 
representation of professional, managerial white-collar 
occupations (Singelmann and Tienda, 1985). Therefore it 
is unlikely that a peer group can fully control who gets 
what job; but Stinchcombe (1990) implies that traces of 
the customary practice of informal recruitment for these 
jobs still remain.
A closely related argument is provided by Dimaggio 
and Powell (1990). They argue that normative pressures 
toward professionalization of some occupations establishes 
an inter-organizational network of occupation members who 
are responsible for recruiting, screening, socializing and 
allocating new members. These informal practices remain 
in occupational labor markets long after 
professionalization is complete. Kalleberg and Berg 
(1987) imply that professional associations support the 
institutionalization of these practices. Professional 
associations, a structure of which DiMaggio and Powell 
(1990) argue facilitates professionalization, serve to 
support the long-term institutionalization of informal
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recruitment practices because hiring managers use contacts 
with these associations to find new employees.
The perceived effectiveness of informal recruiting 
practices explains why they become institutionalized in 
certain labor markets. According to Zucker (1987), 
practices which are perceived to be compatible with 
organizational goals of reducing search and evaluation 
costs will enjoy long-term entrenchment in organizational 
policies. Throughout this chapter I have documented the 
perceived cost benefit of informal recruiting. Employers 
perceive informal recruitment as an efficient method of 
reducing employer search costs; and, as a result, these 
techniques become permanent fixtures in certain labor 
markets. The complimentary argument that the segregating 
effects of informal recruiting practices help to 
institutionalize these practices is further expanded upon 
in Chapters 4 and 5.
The regression results for occupational status and 
job content support the institutional explanation. 
Professional, managerial and white-collar status are 
significantly associated with informal recruitment, while 
data complexity is not. Data complexity scores are 
attached to each occupational title, while the categories 
of professional/executive/managerial collapse many 
occupational titles into binary categories. Moreover, 
there is a distribution of data complexity scores within
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each category. Under the efficiency assumption that job 
content is more important to an establishment than 
occupational category, data complexity should have greater 
relative effects on recruitment than occupational 
status.13 These results show just the opposite. When I 
remove the estimates for occupational status from the 
regression model, the effects of data complexity become 
significant, but the drop in variance explained is 
significant also.
The role that professional associations play in 
disseminating job information is worthy of further 
research. Informal recruitment may be facilitated through 
professional associations (i.e. American Bar Association). 
Kalleberg and Berg (1987) imply that institutionalization 
may persist because of professional organizations and 
associations. DiMaggio and Powell (1990) stress the 
importance of professional organizations in the process of 
professionalization. Unfortunately, these data are not
13Collinearity is one possible consideration why data 
complexity is not significant and the other measures of 
occupational status are significant. There is a positive 
correlation between data complexity and professional 
occupational status (r=.372). However, the standardized 
estimate for data complexity (.04) is lower than that for 
professional job status (.09) and executive/managerial 
status (.19). If the non-significant estimate for data 
complexity is to due to collinearity, the standardized 
coefficient should be similar to the other variables in 
question. Furthermore, standard collinearity indicators 
in SAS did not indicate collinearity was a problem in any 
of the models (see also Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980).
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adequate to address the role of professional organizations 
in recruitment. However, it is certainly a topic worthy 
of further research.
The analyses for the informal-only and formal-only 
models reinforce my other findings regarding informal 
recruitment methods and white-collar labor markets. 
Professional job status has a positive effect on informal- 
only recruiting; executive/managerial and white-collar 
occupational status have negative effects on formal-only 
techniques. Moreover, the measure I use in the logistic 
regression analysis only measures whether or not the 
technique is used to recruit for the position. The OLS 
analysis provides better indicators of technique use, 
because it measures how many of the current employees in a 
given position were recruited by a certain method. While 
the logistic regression model fails to show that white- 
collar and executive-managerial jobs are recruited 
exclusively through informal methods, the OLS models show 
that colleagues and associates are used to successfully 
recruit a significant proportion of white-collar, 
professional and executive/managerial employees.
The analysis finds mixed support for the assumptions 
about firm-specific training/turnover costs in the 
recruitment literature. The relationship between 
recruitment and firm-specific training/turnover costs is 
not as clear as the literature predicted. Jobs where
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turnover costs are higher should have a higher probability 
of being recruited for through informal methods. However, 
my results are inconclusive. I expected that the use of 
informal recruiting methods would increase with the time 
it took to learn a new job, and the length of time that 
the employer wanted the employee to stay with the 
establishment. I predicted that the use of informal 
methods of recruiting would decrease with the 
transportability of skills from one company to another 
(external market viability). Only one of these measures 
produces an effect. The time it takes to learn a job has 
a negative effect on the use of signs, advertisements and 
reliance upon walk-ins, but the relationships between the 
time measure and the informal recruitment measures are not 
significant.14 My conclusion is that firm-specific 
training/turnover concerns may not drive recruitment to 
the extent that other research suggests. My advice is to 
redirect research agendas to address the
institutionalization of recruitment techniques in various 
labor markets.
The findings for jobs that are entry portals into 
internal labor markets need further elaboration. The 
analysis shows that these jobs are more likely to be
14 There is the possibility that these estimates of 
firm-specific training are collinear, but none of the 
three measures are significantly correlated.
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recruited for through employment agencies and signs 
outside of the establishment. This is an unexpected 
finding. Following the advice of the literature, I argue 
that the best technique to maximize the job match is 
informal recruitment. However, there may be substantive 
reasons to believe otherwise. One consideration is that 
informal contacts play a more important role in job 
movement once the employee is on the internal job ladder 
(DiPrete and Soule, 1988; Roos and Reskin, 1984). That 
is, it is an internal labor market issue. Furthermore, 
S0renson (1983) argues that the deferred compensation 
promotion structures in firm internal labor markets screen 
unsuccessful candidates (see also Sdrenson and Kalleberg, 
1981). Turnover costs are minimal at entry portals. 
Typically, employees are hired at the ground level and are 
promoted once they acquire a certain level of proficiency 
and seniority. The failure to promote employees who do 
not perform well encourages these employees to pursue 
other employment. Therefore, organizations do not have to 
worry about mismatches at the entry portals, and as a 
result, informal recruitment is not necessary.
The other possible explanation is that informal 
recruitment techniques are not measured properly enough to 
capture the true informal recruiting at that job level. 
Colleagues and associates might not be a proper manner to 
recruit for entry portal vacancies. Also, relying on
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employees to refer individuals can be problematic because 
it can lead to worker cliques in organizations (Marsden 
and Campbell, 1990). Therefore, poor measurement might 
partially explain the lack of association between entry 
portal jobs and informal recruitment.
The analysis also makes a connection between 
recruitment, politico-legal pressures in labor markets and 
the assumptions of Granovetter's labor demand model. The 
results for public sector employment show that these 
agencies rely upon self-initiated applicants, and avoid 
using informal recruitment techniques. Standard entrance 
exams and the legal and political ramifications of EEOC 
hiring guidelines make informal recruitment unattractive 
to government agencies and firms with government contracts 
(DiPrete, 1987; Taylor, 1979). EEOC protects minority 
groups from discrimination in government agency hiring, 
and government agencies are constrained by congress, 
public pressure and private firms to abide by these 
guidelines. Moreover, Executive Orders 11246 and 11375 
require all vacancies to be made fully public (Braun,
1984). These orders cover all federal agencies, state and 
local agencies with federal money, and private firms with 
federal contracts. The Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance has the power to enforce these guidelines, and 
can take away federal contracts from public agencies and 
private firms that violate these guidelines (see Reskin
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and Hartmann, 1986). Therefore, these establishments will 
not use informal recruitment techniques to avoid 
investigation by the OFCCP. Additionally, larger firms 
and establishments make better political targets for 
public interest groups which seek fairness in hiring, and 
this partially explains why large firms and establishments 
rely upon formal methods of recruitment (Taylor, 1979; 
Marsden and Campbell, 1990). This evidence requires that 
Granovetter's labor demand model to be amended to 
incorporate politico-legal market structures which 
interfere with the informal transmission of job 
information.
Net of these problems, though, the analysis makes two 
important contributions to Granovetter's labor demand 
model. First, the results generally support Granovetter's 
claim that social contacts play an important role in 
disseminating information in labor markets and filling job 
vacancies. Recall from Table 3.1 that 65% of all jobs in 
the external labor market are recruited by some form of 
informal recruitment. Second, given that colleagues and 
business associates are used to recruit externally for 
certain vacancies, this analysis also supports 
Granovetter's claim that the organization of work in an 
advanced capitalist society helps to build inter- 
organizational network structures which are utilized by 
employers to move job information.
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Beyond these findings, the analysis brings into 
question the base assumption of Granovetter's labor demand 
model and suggests some needed modifications. Granovetter 
assumes that employers prefer to recruit informally 
because they get better information about better quality 
candidates. I question the validity of this assumption, 
given my results which fail to show a relationship between 
informal recruitment and the vulnerability of a job to the 
establishment, as measured by firm-specific 
training/turnover costs and data complexity. However, 
since I did not directly examine employers' motivations 
for using informal recruitment techniques, the analysis 
does not directly dispute Granovetter's assumption, 
either. What the analysis does suggest is that employers 
may use social contacts to recruit for certain vacancies 
because these practices have become institutionalized in 
certain labor markets. One reason for the 
institutionalization of these practices is that they may 
be perceived as fitting well with organizational goals of 
reducing search and evaluation costs. Because the 
analysis fails to show a positive connection between the 
use of social contacts and the vulnerability of a job to 
the establishment (as measured by firm-specific 
training/turnover costs and data complexity), I conclude
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that the institutionalization of these practices explains 
their presence in certain labor markets.15
The lack of findings for recruitment through 
employees is the last issue that I discuss in this 
chapter. The results fail to show a regression, or a 
linear relationship between recruitment through current 
employees and the independent variables in the analysis. 
One methodological explanation mentioned above concerns 
the non-linear properties of recruitment through current 
employees. Employers may use current employees to recruit 
for both good and bad jobs. Therefore, non-linear effects 
need to be estimated. However, I believe that the reason 
for the lack of effects is that recruitment through 
current employees is not perceived by employers as a 
useful way of finding employees. Some employers may use 
them, others may not; but for whatever reason, there are 
no clear patterns of using current employees to recruit 
for vacancies.
15However, this evidence in no way weakens 
Granovetter's labor supply or job search model. Although 
political and legal barriers may force employers to use 
formal recruitment techniques, individual job searchers 
may discover these formally advertised positions through 
social contacts. Take, for example, someone who finds out 
about a job recently posted at an employment agency 
through a friend of a friend. While the analysis shows 
that formal recruitment methods are used in certain 
context, it fails to weaken the critique of the 
neoclassical search model which emphasizes the social 
dimensions of labor markets.
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In the next chapter I examine to what extent 
recruitment practices segment external labor markets. I 
build on Boylan's (1992) theory which argues that certain 
job matching processes structure and segment external 
labor markets—  much in the same manner that FILMs segment 
internal labor markets—  through denying individuals 
access to job information. I also begin to examine the 
relationship between recruitment and the racial and gender 
composition of jobs.
Summary
The analyses in this chapter uncover interesting 
patterns between recruitment and work structure 
correlates. The size of an establishment and the durable 
goods manufacturing status of an establishment positively 
affect the use of advertisements to recruit. Employment 
agencies are used to recruit for jobs in larger 
establishments and job ladder entry portals. Government 
agencies have a tendency to rely upon walk-ins to recruit. 
Companies also rely upon walk-ins to recruit for union 
jobs.
The analysis in Chapter 3 establishes clear, positive 
relationships between professional occupational status, 
executive/managerial occupational status, and informal 
recruitment through colleagues and business associates. 
This is an important finding because recruiting has been 
identified previously (see Roos and Reskin, 1984) as an
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important mechanism which affects the gender and racial 
composition of these occupations. Does informal 
recruitment for these jobs serve to deny females and 
minorities access to these jobs? This chapter also shows 
a positive association between non-professional/executive- 
managerial white-collar jobs and recruitment through 
employment agencies. Does, as Campbell and Rosenfeld 
(1985) suggest, formal recruitment for such jobs lead to 
female and possibly minority employment? These questions 
will be directly examined in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 4. RECRUITMENT AND EXTERNAL LABOR MARKET STRUCTURE 
The results in Chapter 3 show that certain work 
structure correlates are associated with particular 
recruitment practices. Recruitment techniques affect the 
visibility of, and public access to job information. The 
purpose of this chapter is to build on these results and 
show that recruitment techniques restrict access to job 
information, and in the process structure and segment 
external labor markets. In this chapter, I review 
pertinent labor market theories and research and, in 
conjunction with the findings in the last chapter, attempt 
to build support for path (b) of the conceptual model 
presented in Chapter 1. Empirically, I attempt to show 
that recruitment practices structure external labor 
markets by identifying distinct clusters of job 
characteristics and recruitment practices. In addition, I 
attempt to assess the structuring affects of recruitment 
techniques by examining the racial and gender composition 
of jobs within market segments.
Literature Review 
Markets are the central feature in society that serve 
the basic human need of exchanging goods and services. 
Exchanges take place in labor, capital, product and 
resource markets, each of which can be arrayed along a 
continuum from more to less competitive. The new 
structuralist perspective argues that work structures—
122
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organizations, occupations, classes, unions, industries—  
emerge from these markets. Different conditions in 
product, labor, capital and resource markets lead to the 
emergence of different work structure correlates (i.e. 
size, skill, technology). Moreover, work structure 
correlates represent different market context in which 
ascriptive and achieved characteristics of individuals are 
rewarded (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987). Of the four market 
types, labor markets are most central to stratification 
research because it is in labor markets where individuals 
exchange their skills with employers for wages, status and 
other job rewards. However, no labor market is perfectly 
competitive and, like all market types, labor markets are 
segmented along a continuum from competitive to 
monopolistic.
Analyses of less competitive labor market segments 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Althauser, 1989a; Sdrenson, 
1983; Sorenson and Kalleberg, 1981) show how recruitment 
and job matching practices structure and segment internal 
labor markets. Vacancies on certain internal job ladders 
are restricted to a narrow pool of internal candidates on 
the same job ladder. Competition for such positions is 
limited, and workers in these labor market segments are 
often allocated based on non-competitive criteria, such as 
seniority (Osterman, 1984; Doeringer and Piore, 1971). 
Market segments at the competitive end of the market
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continuum, on the other hand, are predominantly external 
to the firm and workers are matched to work structures 
based on the laws of competitive supply and demand 
(Boylan, 1992; Bridges and Villemez, 1991). However, 
Boylan (1992) maintains that there is structure in 
external labor markets. If the manner in which workers 
are matched and recruited to jobs can segment internal 
labor markets (Sorenson, 1983), then according to Boylan 
(1992), job matching practices can segment external 
markets. I argue that recruitment techniques segment 
external labor markets because different formal and 
informal recruitment techniques limit the access 
individuals have to job information. Moreover, 
competition for jobs is limited when information about 
those jobs is restricted to contacts along informal 
networks. I use Boylan's work to build the hypothesis 
that recruitment techniques structure external labor 
market segments.
Identifying Labor Market Segments
Several studies suggest that labor market segments 
can be identified by the personnel policies which govern 
those segments (Boswell, 1988; Bridges and Villemez, 1991; 
Williamson, 1981). Boswell (1988) builds on Williamson's 
(1981; 1985) theory of transaction costs and governance 
structures, with particular emphasis on the concepts of 
metering difficulty and asset specificity. The primary
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thrust of Boswell's work is that different personnel 
policies are required for workers in different labor 
market segments. The personnel policies which govern 
particular labor market segments reflect both the control 
workers have over their work, and the their market power 
over competition.
Boswell (1988: 145) cross-classifies power by control 
and develops nine unique personnel policies, or governance 
structures, which are used to identify labor market 
segments. For example, strict market contracts are used 
to govern personnel with no power and no control. Firm 
internal labor markets, on the other hand, govern workers 
where turnover costs are high, and assets are firm- 
specific. One governance structure is not ubiquitous 
throughout the firm. Different policies are applied at 
different levels in the organization. Boswell's approach 
is similar to the new structuralist approach in that 
personnel policies (or governance structures) emerge from 
labor markets which are differentiated along the 
dimensions of power and control.
While less specific than Boswell's theory, Bridges 
and Villemez (1991) imply that certain labor market 
segments can be identified by the personnel policies used 
to govern those positions. Certain personnel policies 
(internal allocation structures, due process procedures, 
etc.,) can be used to identify market segments which are
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less competitive, where the skills are firm-specific, and 
where the markets have been internalized by the firm to 
insure an adequate and stable labor supply. In contrast, 
those workers who posses skills that are easily 
transportable across firms are not likely to be covered by 
due process procedures or to occupy jobs that are included 
on an internal job ladder.16
The models presented by Boswell (1988) and Bridges 
and Villemez (1991) coincide with the focus of the 
recruitment theories presented in Chapter 3. The same 
characteristics which influence the use of informal 
recruitment techniques also occupy an important role in 
these models. For example, asset-specificity and 
information closure (professional closure over a body of 
knowledge) both positively affect the use of informal 
recruitment techniques. In the Bridges and Villemez 
model, these market conditions are associated with due 
process structures. In the Boswell model, these factors 
reflect the power and control workers have, and influence 
the emergence of internal governance structures, such as 
firm internal labor markets (Boswell, 1988).
Unfortunately, these theories fit best with internal labor 
markets. Both models tend to view external labor markets
16 Bridges and Villemez (1991) argue that this model 
is not applicable to professional and other high-status 
white-collar occupations.
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as highly competitive, and similar to the ideal type 
market depicted in the neoclassical wage determination 
model.
Boylan (1992), however, does provide a theory of 
external labor market structures which fits well with the 
recruitment literature. In contrast to internal labor 
markets, external labor markets are assumed to be 
unstructured and to better reflect the neoclassical 
competitive model. Boylan argues that unemployment, fixed 
wages, lack of fluidity across employers and the lack of 
uniform pricing are evidence of external market structure. 
Moreover, structural theorists downplay structure in 
external labor markets because there is no administrative 
apparatus to enforce the structure- such as with an 
internal labor market. That is, these structures have not 
become formalized in the structures of organizations.
According to Boylan (1992), most structural theorists 
rely upon the concept of occupational internal labor 
markets (OILM) to capture structure in the external labor 
market. However, OILMs do a poor job because much 
mobility in external markets is across, not within, 
occupational categories. Also, intrinsic to the OILM 
concept is the ability of certain professional occupations 
to control membership through licensing and certification 
(Stinchcombe, 199 0). However, the growth in these 
occupations due to the expansion of producer and social
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service industrial sectors has reduced the capacity of 
professional groups to manage membership (Freidson, 1986; 
Singelmann and Tienda, 1985; Singelmann, 1978).
Therefore, professionals are less able to regulate OILMs. 
In addition to OILMs, Boylan (1992) criticizes career-line 
research, another attempt to capture structure in the 
external market. Where OILMs fail to represent enough 
structure by failing to account for movement across 
occupational categories, there are too many possible 
combinations of career lines to represent any semblance of 
structure.
Boylan (1992) uses a resource approach to capture 
structure in the external labor market. Resources are 
attached to positions which give the incumbents of these 
positions advantages in acquiring other good jobs in the 
external labor market. Boylan (1992) identifies four 
sources of advantage. First, jobs may impart skills which 
are in demand and transferable across employers. Second, 
certain positions confer credentials upon incumbents, thus 
providing other employment opportunities. Third, some 
positions offer the potential to signal other employers of 
their abilities. Finally, some positions provide inter- 
organizational social contacts which are useful in 
learning of other job opportunities. This dissertation 
focuses on this resource.
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Boylan (1992) maintains that certain jobs give 
incumbents advantages in external labor markets because 
they put the incumbent in contact with other 
organizations, and with inter-organizational network 
structures which are useful in getting jobs that are often 
recruited for through these networks. Theory and research 
in Chapter 3 of this dissertation shows that certain 
occupations (professional, executive/managerial, white- 
collar) which are filled through the external labor market 
are consistently recruited for through business colleagues 
and associates. Granovetter's (1981; 1985; 1988) labor 
demand model contends that an inter-organizational network 
of social contacts plays an important role in clearing 
labor markets, especially white-collar labor markets. 
Employers prefer to recruit through these channels because 
of the social dimensions of the relationships forged 
through inter-organizational transactions and 
communications. Information acquired through these 
relationships is of better quality because of the 
normative constraints that regulate these relationships 
(Granovetter, 1985).
Fararo's biased information diffusion model supports 
the argument for structure in external labor markets. 
Fararo (1989) contends that we can understand the 
underlying structure of a given context by analyzing how 
information flows through that context. Therefore, we can
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understand the underlying structure of labor markets by 
analyzing how job information flows from employers to 
prospective employees. Recruitment techniques are the 
primary manner in which employers disseminate job 
information. Moreover, based on the assumptions of 
Fararo's (1989) market structure model, the underlying 
structure of a labor market which is characterized by 
informal recruiting through colleagues and business 
associates looks different from the underlying structure 
of labor markets in which formal recruitment techniques 
are used. And as the recruitment literature suggests 
(Haulman et al., 1987; Granovetter, 1974; 1981; Marsden 
and Campbell, 1990), information about jobs that are 
recruited for through formal methods reaches a greater 
number of job searchers than information about jobs that 
are recruited for through informal networks. According to 
Fararo's model, a market characterized by informal 
recruitment has a different underlying structure than a 
market characterized by formal recruitment. In essence, 
the manner in which information is disseminated from 
employers to employees is one of the defining features of 
the market. If recruitment technique is one of the 
defining features of a market, as Boylan (1992) implies, 
then recruitment techniques serve to segment external 
labor markets.
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In an attempt to advance Boylan's theory, I argue 
that recruitment techniques represent structure in 
external labor markets, and that recruitment techniques 
serve to further segment labor markets. Similar to 
Granovetter (1981), I conceptualize labor markets as an 
arena where workers exchange skills for income and status 
(see also Kalleberg and Berg, 1987) . Empirically, labor 
markets consist of employers looking for employees to fill 
vacancies, prospective employees looking for jobs, and a 
process of clearing the market, or informing job searchers 
about job openings. Recruitment processes take place in 
external labor markets. Other dimensions of the job 
match, such as forecasting, screening and selection are 
typically done within the firm or establishment (Bills, 
1992; Marsden and Campbell, 1990).
Theory and research shows that the mode of 
recruitment in a given market segment depends upon the 
characteristics of the job openings (Marsden and Campbell, 
Rees and Schultz, 1970; Barron and Bishop, 1985; Barron, 
Bishop and Dunkelberg, 1982; Bills, 1992). Therefore, in 
order to identify a labor market segment, two criteria 
must be met. One, there needs to be distinguishable 
characteristics of the jobs being recruited for; and two, 
there needs to be methods of information dissemination. 
These include informal (business networks) and formal 
(advertisements, employment agencies) techniques of
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notifying potential workers about openings.
Unfortunately, there are no standard measures of labor 
markets, or an agreed upon technique of identifying 
markets or market segments.17 Given the lack of an agreed 
upon model for identifying external labor market segments, 
the analysis has an exploratory focus.
The criteria I choose are used to identify labor 
market segments with cross-sectional survey data. One 
important implication of this definition of a labor market 
segment is that labor markets exist temporally until the 
job match is completed. In fact, most of the critique of 
the neoclassical labor market model in economics focuses 
on the model's failure to understand that labor markets 
are sustained by on-going social processes related to the 
organization of work in society and the inter-connection 
between firms and customers/clients in product and 
resource markets (Granovetter, 1974; 1985; 1986; 1988).
The social structure of a labor market that connects 
actors and facilitates the flow of information among 
buyers and sellers of labor is not a temporary feature 
that disappears once the exchange is completed (i.e. once 
the worker is matched to a job). Conceptualizing markets
17For example, Jones and Rosenfeld (1989) take a 
macro-spatial approach, equating labor markets with SMSAs. 
Harrison (1989) identifies labor markets by clusters of 
temporally linked occupational categories. Hodson and 
Kaufman (1982) use detailed occupation by industry 
categories.
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as jobs to be filled and a manner of informing workers 
about jobs has the potential to reduce the definition of 
markets to information, which ignores the other important 
aspects of the market, such as the social arrangements 
through which job information flows. Unfortunately, 
measuring all structural dimensions of a labor market with 
cross-sectional survey data, is not feasible. Therefore,
I narrow my definition to the key components of a market 
that I can measure.
I use cluster analysis to fit my criteria for labor 
market segments. I construct clusters from the 
Metropolitan Employer-Worker Survey employer subsample, 
using characteristics of establishments, jobs, industries, 
and recruitment techniques (Bridges and Villemez, 1986).
I then use discriminant analysis to derive discriminant 
functions to test which work structure correlates and 
recruitment techniques function to discriminate the 
clusters. That is, which establishment, job, industry 
characteristics and recruitment techniques best determine 
which observations in the sample belong in each cluster. 
New structuralist theory sets no boundaries on the number 
of external labor market segments. Each of the work 
structure correlate/recruitment combinations could, in 
theory, represent a labor market segment. Therefore, an 
abundant number of hypotheses would be required to cover 
all possible combinations. I formally state only two
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hypotheses to be tested, but discuss all relationships
discovered in the analysis in detail. The two hypotheses 
are:
H13: Professional and executive/managerial positions 
cluster with recruitment through colleagues and 
business associates.
Hw : Positions in large establishments, and public 
industry sectors cluster with formal recruitment 
techniques.
Hypothesis H 13 is taken from the institutional 
arguments presented in Chapter 3. The institutional 
hypothesis contends that informal recruitment techniques 
have become permanent fixtures in certain white-collar 
labor markets. Efficiency theorists argue that informal 
recruitment techniques are prevalent in white-collar labor 
markets because they improve the job match (Stinchcombe, 
1990; Granovetter, 1981). Employers prefer informal 
recruiting because these practices gather better 
information on prospective employees (Marsden and 
Campbell, 1990; Granovetter, 1981; Wanous, 1980).
Moreover, these practices also allow potential employees 
to gather better information about the job, typically 
information that would not be acquired during an interview 
(i.e. what the working environment is like, what the boss 
is like). According to Wanous (1980), better information 
on behalf of employers and employees improves the job 
match.
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Hypothesis H14 comes from my critique of Granovetter' s 
labor demand model. Granovetter (1981; 1988) operates 
from the assumption that employers prefer to recruit 
through social contacts at all job levels. My analysis 
shows that his model needs to be amended to incorporate 
political and legal structures in the labor market. 
Briefly, my analysis in Chapter 3 shows that large 
establishments use formal recruiting techniques; and I 
argue that this is primarily because of the political 
visibility of larger establishments and firms. Larger 
employers are more likely to be targets of EEOC 
investigations and political pressure from groups which 
seek fairness in hiring (i.e. Operation Push). In order 
to avoid political and legal battles, larger employers 
recruit formally (Marsden and Campbell, 1990; Taylor,
1979) .
According to Taylor (1979), the same argument applies 
to public sector agencies. The federal government and 
Executive Orders 11246 and 11375 require all federal 
contractors (public and private) to publicly advertise all 
vacancies. Moreover, the federal government is formally 
required to adhere to all EEOC and Affirmative Action 
hiring guidelines. Along with legal requirements, federal 
agencies are under the scrutiny of private firms to 
comply. Taylor (1979) maintains that private firms are 
resentful of public intervention into their hiring
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practices, and therefore pressure public sector agencies 
to adhere to the hiring guidelines which they attempt to 
force on others. Theoretically, I argue that public 
sector positions and positions in large establishments are 
in market segments associated with formal recruitment 
techniques. Empirically, I expect public sector positions 
and large establishment positions to cluster with formal 
recruitment techniques.
Kalleberg and Berg (1987) predict that the manner in 
which individuals are recruited to different work 
structure correlates explains why certain structures have 
more or less individuals with particular attributes. 
Institutional theorists have theoretically linked the 
practice of informal recruitment to gender and racial 
occupational segregation (Roos and Reskin, 1984; 1992; 
Kaufman, 1986). Moreover, these scholars argue that the 
institutionalization of informal recruitment practices in 
labor markets is strongly supported by the prevailing 
culturally defined appropriate roles for males and 
females, whites and non-whites. Roos and Reskin (1984) 
contend that informal recruiting practices are 
institutionalized because their segregating effects 
reinforce existing cultural beliefs, and root these 
practices in the prevailing gender-role ideology. While 
less straight-forward, others suggest that the segregating 
effects of these practices reinforce a prevailing white-
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supremacy ideology (England and Browne, 1992; Kaufman, 
1986; Jenkins, 1986) .
Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a) argues for a theory of 
patriarchical closure to explain racial and gender 
segregation. According to this theory, racial and gender 
segregation results from conscious attempts by white-males 
to maintain their privileged position in the labor force 
and in society. Simply put, employers reserve the best 
jobs for white-males, while females and minorities are 
relegated to other less desirable jobs. All actions which 
bring about closure and segregation can be understood as 
attempts by white males to protect not only their status, 
but also their perceptions of self as members of the 
superordinate group (Collinson et al., 1990). What I 
intend to do is to integrate recruitment practices into 
this line of theory and research, and show that informal 
recruitment practices are associated with the best jobs 
and that these techniques exclude females and minorities 
from these jobs.
I derive the following hypothesis concerning market 
structures and the racial and gender composition of 
positions in the market segment. I predict that the 
clusters derived will explain a significant amount of the 
variation in racial and gender composition of jobs. I 
expect that the between cluster variation in percent 
female and percent black is greater than the within
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 3 8
cluster variation for each model. Moreover, I expect that
clusters which are characterized by informal recruitment
are more likely to employ fewer females and blacks, and as
a result, there should be a lower percentage of blacks and
females occupying jobs in these clusters.
H15: Clusters, or market segments, which are 
characterized by recruitment through business 
colleagues and associates have a lower percentage of 




The data used in this chapter are the same used in 
the previous chapter: The MEWS employer file. I restrict
my analysis to the subsample of positions which are 
recruited for exclusively from the external labor market. 
The industry, establishment and job characteristic 
variables (independent variables in Chapter 3) in the 
analysis are operationalized in Chapter 3. The six 
ordinal recruitment measures are the same used in Chapter 
3 .
The measures for racial and gender job composition 
are taken from the 1980 Census data for the greater 
Chicago SMSA. First, six digit occupation-by-industry 
codes are computed by cross-classifying three digit Census 
occupation by three digit SIC industry codes. Percent 
black is the number of blacks employed in each six digit 
occupation-by-industry code divided by the total number of
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individuals employed in each category. Percent female is 
the number of females employed in each six-digit 
occupation-by-industry category, divided by the total in 
each category. The numerator and denominators for the 
respective composition variables are restricted to the 
greater Chicago SMSA.
Measurement Issues
The measurement issues concerning the variables in 
the analysis are discussed in Chapter 3. One key 
measurement issue that Chapter 4 addresses concerns the 
correlation between the two informal measures of 
recruitment. It is conceivable that employers use 
colleagues and business associates, and current employees 
to recruit for a professional, or executive/managerial 
vacancy. However, it is not likely that employers use 
business associates and colleagues to recruit for lower 
level jobs with high external market viability. Yet, it 
is very likely that employers use current employees in the 
same position to recruit for such jobs (see Rees and 
Schultz, 1970). That is, employers use current employees 
to recruit for lower level jobs to save on recruiting 
costs. In regression analysis, the positive association 
between the use of current employees to recruit, and the 
characteristics of both "good" and "bad" jobs, may yield 
an equation which requires quadratic or non-linear 
effects. Fortunately, cluster analysis does not force
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linear relationships, and allows informal recruitment 
through employees to cluster with characteristics of both 
"good" and "bad" jobs.
One major measurement issue in this chapter concerns 
the measurement of gender and racial job composition. 
Conceptually, I assume that recruitment affects the gender 
and racial composition of jobs. However, the measures 
used to test the hypothesis are gender and racial 
composition of 6 digit occupation-by-industry categories 
in the greater Chicago SMSA.18 Most of the previous 
studies which address issues of occupational segregation 
utilize occupational level data. The problem, according 
to Bielby and Baron (1986; 1984), is that there is 
considerable differentiation even within so-called gender- 
mixed occupations (see also Roos and Reskin, 1992).
Within categories, women and minorities tend to be 
concentrated in jobs with less desirable duties (Reskin 
and Roos, 1990; Roos and Reskin, 1992). However, using 
the occupation-by-industry gender composition data will 
better reflect the degree of true segregation than will 
occupation data. Previous research has shown that the 
quality of work for the same occupation can vary greatly
18 According to Harrison (1989) , occupational level 
data are the best measures of job composition to which 
most scientists have access, but see Bielby and Baron 
(1984; 1986) for an exception.
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across industry categories (Tolbert et al., 1980; Tienda 
et al., 1987).
Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a) maintains that gender and 
racial composition should be analyzed at the job level, 
not the occupational level. The characteristics of jobs 
affect the tendency toward exclusionary social closure 
based on race and gender. For example, characteristics 
such as authority, autonomy, opportunity for promotion, 
and task complexity are job-level characteristics, not 
occupational characteristics. The characteristics of 
these jobs affect social closure. As the quality of a job 
increases (i.e. as autonomy, authority, task complexity 
increase), employers exclude minorities and females from 
these jobs. Moreover, within occupations, women are less 
likely to be in positions of affective authority, with 
decision-making power over products and budgets. In terms 
of authority, blacks are likely to be employed in jobs 
which supervise other blacks.
Another job level factor said to influence the racial 
and gender composition of jobs is task fragmentation.
Tasks are specialized and differentiated at the job level. 
Within occupations, the proliferation of tasks and job 
titles leads to a hierarchy of jobs which ranges from high 
to low, based on job desirability. Jobs at the top end of 
the hierarchy are more desirable and reserved for white- 
males. Jobs at the lower end of the hierarchy are
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reserved for females and minorities, and have a low 
desirability rating. While task differentiation increases 
segregation, size of job and task standardization interact 
to reduce segregation. Tomaskovic-Devey (199 3a) shows 
that jobs with a large number of incumbents and 
standardized tasks tend to be occupied by both men and 
women.
Another reason why composition and segregation need 
to be studied at the job level is that organizational 
practices affect the task fragmentation and 
differentiation of jobs. For a given occupation, the 
division of labor within organizations affects which 
characteristics are assigned to which job titles (which 
jobs have autonomy, authority, etc.,). Therefore, 
measuring the gender and racial composition of an 
occupation neglects the important processes that occur 
within the firms which employ members of that occupation. 
Another organizational level process that affects the 
gender and racial composition of jobs is the formalization 
of the employment relationship. For a given occupation, 
different degrees of formalization will affect tendencies 
toward exclusionary closure. Formal employment 
arrangements, such as written job descriptions, promotion 
schedules, and performance evaluations remove some of the 
subjectivity in the hiring, assignment and promotion of 
workers. This has a tendency to reduce closure and
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segregation. Measuring composition at the job level is 
important because it better captures the organization- 
specific influences which affect social closure and the 
gender and racial composition of jobs.
While Tomaskovic-Devey's argument is well-noted, my 
analysis is an improvement over most (i.e. Harrison,
1989), because I measure composition at the detailed 
occupation-by-industry level. Tomaskovic-Devey's research 
shows that industry sector has an important affect on the 
gender composition of jobs (however, not on the racial 
composition). His research also shows that for some 
occupations, especially semi-professional (1993a: 75) and 
unskilled blue-collar occupations (1993a: 90), gender and 
racial composition at the job level is near identical to 
composition at the occupational level. In addition, I 
believe that his conclusions are over-stated, given that 
he relies upon employee source data to measure the gender 
and racial composition of jobs. Others have shown that 
employee-source data are not always reliable (see Villemez 
and Bridges, 1988).
As mentioned above, one problematic area of past 
research is the identification of labor markets. The 
sociological study of labor markets has brought forth 
different conceptualizations. Abstractly, Osterman (1984: 
1) defines a labor market as "...a bourse where employers 
bid against each other for the service of workers, who in
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turn, shop around for the employment that offers the 
greatest net advantage." Sociologists, however, have 
conceptualized and operationalized labor markets in many 
various ways, ranging from SMSAs to occupational 
categories (see above). Sociological interests in labor 
markets receives a scholastic boost from the sociological 
dual economy perspective (Beck, Horan and Tolbert, 1978; 
Tolbert, Horan and Beck, 1980; Kalleberg and Sprenson, 
1979; Hodson, 1984). This vein of research emphasizes two 
economic sectors, core and periphery, which are largely 
organized around industrial sectors. Moreover, each 
sector has a corresponding labor market (primary and 
secondary). These labor markets are identified by certain 
characteristics: size of firms in the sector, wages, 
unionization, capital intensity, conglomerate 
organization, internal job ladders to name a few (Hodson 
and Kaufman, 1982) . Workers in primary labor markets 
enjoy higher wages, better benefits, union protection from 
arbitrary discipline and greater job security. Secondary 
labor markets are characterized by high turnover, low 
wages, low on-the-job training, layoffs and poorer working 
conditions. The dual economy theorists assume that these 
characteristics identify the labor market and industry 
sector location of workers.
Hodson and Kaufman (1982) criticize the dual economy 
model for being anti-theoretical and inconsistent with
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empirical observations. First, Hodson and Kaufman (1982) 
argue that there are more than two economic sectors. They 
provide as evidence firms which fit characteristics of 
both sectors. For example, insurance companies are large 
in size and located in a product market with relatively 
few competitors. Despite the oligopolistic nature of the 
insurance product market, the industry is very 
competitive. Second, Hodson and Kaufman (1982) argue for 
greater mobility between economic sectors than the dual 
economy model allows (see also Jacobs, 1989a).
In a later piece, Hodson (1984) attempts to resolve 
whether companies or industries are the appropriate units 
of analysis to identify labor markets. Companies define 
concentrations of economic power, and since most firms 
utilize organizational-specific skills, companies are the 
appropriate unit of analysis. The argument for industries 
is based on the assumption that competing firms in a 
particular industry sector utilize like technologies. 
Therefore, an industry sector represents a large 
proportion of workers with similar skills and is the 
appropriate unit of analysis. Hodson (1984) shows that, 
in fact, each is preferable in different context. Hodson 
(1984) further argues that dimensions of economic 
structures and economic characteristics define distinct 
markets and sectors. These economic characteristics are 
the same observations that dual economy theorists use to
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differentiate economic sectors, and include such factors 
as size of firm, product market concentration, internal 
labor markets and others.
In my conceptualization and operationalization of 
labor markets, I integrate the company and industry-based 
approaches. I incorporate as many characteristics of 
establishments, industries, occupations and jobs in my 
attempts to identify labor markets. However, my 
conceptual definition of labor markets remains simple, and 
close to Granovetter's (1981). According to my theory, 
labor markets are characterized by employees looking for 
jobs, employers with jobs to be filled, and some 
mechanism(s) of clearing the market, or moving job 
information from employers to potential employees.
Cluster Analysis Results
Originally, I proposed to use Boswell's theory of 
personnel practices to drive the analysis. However, this 
is inappropriate for two reasons. First, by his own 
admission, Boswell's model is not exhaustive, but meant to 
serve as a theoretical framework from which future 
analysis could proceed. Therefore, restricting the 
analysis to 9 clusters neglects the labor market segments 
which are not captured by his model. Second, only two 
cells in Boswell's model address external market segments, 
spot-market competitive segments and OILMs. Both of these 
concepts are the targets of Boylan's (1992) critique of
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existing external labor market theories. According to 
Boylan (1992), there is structure in the external market 
not captured by OILMs. Moreover, this is an analysis of 
jobs filled through the external labor market. Since 
Boswell's typology applies mainly to internal governance 
structures, there is not a strong conceptual basis for 
using this typology to drive the analysis. However, this 
does not diminish the importance of his proposal that 
governance structures and personnel practices can be used 
to identify labor market segments (see also Bridges and 
Villemez, 1991).
In the analysis, I cluster all of the positions in 
the MEWS subsample by the independent variables in the 
last chapter, plus the six ordinal recruitment scales. 
There are three steps in the analysis. The first step is 
a disjoint cluster analysis of all the positions in the 
sample by establishment, job and industrial 
characteristics, and the six ordinal recruitment scales. 
Each variable in the analysis is first standardized to a 
mean of zero, and a standard deviation of one.19 Disjoint 
cluster analysis is based on Euclidean distances from one 
or more numerical variables. The observations are placed 
into clusters so that the clusters are mutually
19I use PROC STANDARD in SAS (SUGI, 1985).
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exclusive.2U Theoretically, the clusters represent 
observations that are spatially similar in dimensions of 
space. Empirically, the clusters represent observations 
that are numerically similar to one another in terms of 
the variables in the analysis. Yet for this analysis, 
cluster analysis is more desirable than correlation or 
other forms of linear analysis because it does not force 
linear assumptions.
I perform a sensitivity disjoint cluster analysis and 
verify with a hierarchical cluster analysis. I begin with 
2 0 clusters and reduce the analysis until I have twelve 
clusters. I attempt to maximize two criteria: 1) the
average distance between clusters, and 2) the number of 
cases within each cluster. Setting an average distance 
criteria of 1 standard unit between clusters yields 12 
clusters with at least 2% of the total cases included in 
each cluster. I derive the clusters from the following 
process. First, I perform a disjoint cluster analysis and 
cluster the observations by variables setting the number 
of clusters to 20, 15, 10 and 5. Second, I use 
hierarchical cluster analysis to examine the distance 
between clusters at each level. The greater the distance 
between each cluster, the fewer the number of clusters.
The hierarchical cluster analysis shows 12 clusters at one
20 One observation is in one and only one cluster.
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average standard distance between cluster means.
Moreover, each of these twelve clusters contains at least 
2% of the total cases in the sample.21 There is an F- 
statistic computed in cluster analysis to show that the 
within cluster variation is significantly less than the 
between cluster variation. The F-statistic for the twelve 
clusters (F=48.56) indicates that the within cluster 
variation is significantly less than the between cluster 
variation. However, Aldenderfer (1984) cautions against 
interpreting and reporting these statistics. Therefore, I 
use discriminant analysis to better test the validity of 
these clusters (Klecka, 1980).
The second stage of the analysis is an attempt to 
show which variables influence the clustering of the 
observations into the various clusters. This is the 
important step in determining which clusters meet my 
criteria for labor market segments. I use discriminant 
analysis to compute discriminant functions for each 
cluster. There are two tests in discriminant analysis.
The first analyzes the distance between cluster centroids 
in chi-square units. This test predicts whether or not 
the distances between group centroids are statistically 
significant, as indicated by the D2 statistic. The D2
21 There is no set standard regarding the number of 
appropriate cases in each cell, I use the maximum 
likelihood criteria of at least 2% of the total cases in 
each cell (Agresti, 1990).
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statistic has chi-square properties (Klecka, 1980). I do 
not report these statistics; however, the analysis shows 
that all cluster centroids are different from one another.
The second test is central to the discussion. 
Discriminant functions are produced for each group. If 
the variables in the analysis are not standardized, the 
discriminant coefficients have little interpretive value. 
However, if the variables in the analysis are 
standardized, the effects of the discriminant functions 
have canonical properties (Klecka, 1980: 43). The 
discriminant coefficients show which variables within a 
cluster contribute the most to the discriminant (centroid) 
scores of that cluster. Another interpretation is that 
these scores represent which variables are most strongly 
associated with membership in each particular cluster. 
Positive discriminant functions have positive effects on 
the observation being included in the cluster. For 
example, if Cluster 1 has establishment size as a positive 
discriminant function, then the interpretation is that 
size is positively associated with an observation being 
included in the cluster.
One alternative to discriminant and cluster analysis 
is principle components factor analysis. This procedure 
indicates which variables share variance with other 
variables. For example, I expect recruitment through 
colleagues and business associates to share variance with
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executive/managerial and professional occupations.
However, I chose discriminant and cluster analysis because 
these two procedures compliment each other, and allow 
observations to belong to mutually exclusive clusters. 
Factor analysis, on the other hand, assigns factor scores 
to each observation. The benefit of mutually exclusive 
clusters is the ability to examine the racial and gender 
composition of OCC/IND jobs in each cluster, and to 
examine those compositions within the context of the key 
discriminant variables in each cluster. Given my 
conceptualization of a labor market segment, 
characteristics of jobs to be filled and a manner of 
information dissemination, cluster and discriminant 
analysis are more appropriate techniques to address path 
(b) of the conceptual model.
Table 4.1 presents the three strongest positive 
discriminators for each cluster. Conceptually, I define 
labor markets as employees looking for jobs, employers 
with jobs to be filled, and some mechanism(s) for clearing 
the market, or moving job information from employers to 
potential employees. Empirically, each cluster must 
contain discriminators which identify both characteristics 
of job openings in the market, and a recruitment practice 
(or practices) to notify workers of the potential opening. 
Clusters which are comprised of recruitment technique
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Table 4.1. Three Strongest Positive Discriminator
Variables, Mean Percent Female and Mean Percent Black 
for each Cluster.®
Cluster 1* (n=59)
Variable (Disc. Valued 
Data Complexity (4.42) 
Professional Occ. (3.27) 
Colleagues & Assc. (1.11) 
%Female (39) %Black (9)
Cluster 3 (n=34)
Variable (Disc. Valued 
Sign (14.5)
Walk-Ins (1.32)
Trans, of Skills (.770) 
%Female (66) %Black (16)
Cluster 5 (n=133)
Variable (Disc. Valued 
Permanent Emp. (1.35) 
Trans, of Skills (.676) 
Union Job (.559)
%Female (47) %Black (18)
Cluster 7 (n=89)
Variable (Disc. Value! 
Man. Durable Gds (1.55) 
Union Job (1.33)
Walk-Ins (.700)
%Female (29) %Black (20)
Cluster 9 (n=33)
Variable (Disc. Value) 
Government Rev. (27.7) 
Permanent Employee (.778) 
Government Agency (1.07) 
%Female (66) %Black (19)
Cluster 11* (n=40) 





%Female (39) %Black (24)
Cluster 2* (n=37)
Variable (Disc. Value} 
Signs (2.52)
White Collar (1.03) 
Employees (.856)
%Female (62) %Black (21)
Cluster 4* (n=101) 
Variable (Disc. Value) 
Exec/Man. Occ (4.22)
Emp. Agency (3.45)
White Collar (1.10) 
%Female (41) %Black (8)
Cluster 6* (n=39)
Variable (Disc. Value) 
Exec/Man. Occ (4.23)
Emp Agency (3.38) 
Colleagues (1.73)
%Female (31) %Black (7)
Cluster 8* (n=35)
Variable fDisc. Value) 
Professional Occ (2.85) 
Government Agency (2.13) 
Colleagues & Assc. (1.40) 
%Female (67) %Black (15)
Cluster 10 (n=80)
Variable (Disc. Value) 
Man. Durable Gds (1.51) 
Professional Occ (1.27) 
White Collar (1.06) 
%Female (51) %Black (7)
Cluster 12 (n=132) 
Variable (Disc. Value) 
Government Agency (1.55) 
Walk-Ins (.652)
Time to Learn Job (.532) 
%Female (57) %Black (24)
*Meets Labor Market Criteria
®Note- The percent female employed throughout the greater Chicago 
SMSA is 41%. The percent black is 14%. These percentages are taken 
from the 1980 PUMS-D file.
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discriminators, or job characteristic discriminators do 
not represent market segments.22
Six of the cluster cells (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11) fit my 
criteria for labor market segments. Three others (3, 7, 
10) show tendencies in that direction, while three (5, 9, 
12) show no clear patterns. Cluster 1 shows that data 
complexity, professional occupational status and the use 
of colleagues and business associates to recruit for such 
positions are the discriminating variables which best 
determine observation membership in this cluster. This 
cluster represents an external labor market segment in 
which professional occupations high in data complexity are 
recruited through business associates and colleagues. 
Boylan's (1992) external market structure theory argues 
that these positions have external advantage because they 
are embedded in an inter-organizational network which is 
used to recruit for vacancies, restricting competition to 
workers connected to the network.
Clusters 2 and 4 also meet my criteria for labor 
market segments. Cluster 2 is characterized by white- 
collar occupations which are recruited for through signs, 
and to a lesser extent current employees. Signs and
22 At least one job characteristic (i.e. size, 
professional occupation) and one recruitment technique 
must be among the three strongest, positive discriminators 
in the cluster cell in order for that cell to be 
considered a labor market segment.
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employee referrals are identified as means of recruiting 
for low status jobs (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980). 
Cluster 4 is characterized by executive-managerial 
occupations and other white-collar occupations that are 
recruited for through employment agencies. Campbell and 
Rosenfeld (1985) suggest that these occupations represent 
middle and lower level managerial and white-collar 
occupations which are filled predominantly by females, who 
are more likely to find employment through formal 
channels, especially private employment agencies.
The association between executive-managerial jobs and 
employment agencies may be attributable to the failure of 
the MEWS to distinguish between employment agencies and 
head-hunter firms. The latter are often used to recruit 
executives and other high status professionals (Marsden 
and Campbell, 1990) . Cluster 6 shows that some 
executive/managerial jobs are also filled by recruitment 
through colleagues and business associates. Again, 
according to Boylan (1992), informal recruitment for these 
jobs provides external market advantages to those 
individuals who are connected to the network structures 
through which these positions are recruited.
Cluster 11 shows a labor market segment of union and 
job ladder entry-portal jobs. These segments are 
characterized by sign recruitment, a recruitment technique 
generally reserved for lower status jobs (Corcoran,
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 5 5
Datcher and Duncan, 1980). Signs and walk-ins are almost 
benign methods of recruitment. Entry-portal jobs are 
filled through these techniques because greater emphasis 
is placed on screening, because employers use internal job 
ladders and deferred salary structures to encourage 
unproductive employees to pursue employment elsewhere 
(Sorenson, 1983; Sorenson and Kalleberg, 1981). I also 
argue in Chapter 3 that benign recruiting serves to guard 
against government investigation of impropriety in 
recruiting and hiring.
Cluster 8 is characterized by professional and 
government jobs that are recruited for by colleagues and 
business associates. What is interesting about this 
cluster is the relationship between government job status 
and informal recruitment. In Chapter 3, I show a 
negative, linear relationship between colleague 
recruitment and government job status. Government 
agencies are supposed to publicly advertise all positions 
and recruit through formal procedures (Braun, 1984) . 
However, this analysis shows some relationship between 
informal recruitment and government jobs, especially 
professional jobs. One possible reason why government 
agencies may recruit informally for some professional jobs 
is the inability of government agencies to recruit 
professional workers away from larger salaries in the
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private sector. However further research with appropriate 
data are needed to support this claim.
Clusters 7, 3, and 10 show some tendencies toward 
market segments. Cluster 10 includes professional, white- 
collar jobs, and durable goods manufacturing jobs that are 
recruited for through advertisements. However, 
advertising (.601) is not as powerful a discriminator as 
is white-collar job status (1.06). Therefore, I am 
hesitant to interpret these findings as showing a market 
segment. Cluster 3 has similar properties. The 
discriminant variables in this cluster are the use of 
signs to recruit, reliance upon walk-ins to recruit and 
transportable skills across establishments and firms.
This finding is partially consistent with external market 
viability theory proposed by Bridges and Villemez (1991). 
They maintain that workers in jobs where skills are less 
firm-specific have high external market viability. This 
means that employers recognize that their skills are 
easily transportable across firms, and that firms will 
typically not cover such jobs with governance structures 
of due process and promotions. The use of formal 
recruitment techniques, such as signs and reliance upon 
walk-ins is consistent with jobs where skills are less 
firm-specific and labor is more easily replaced from the 
external labor market.
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Cluster 7 shows a segment of union and manufacturing 
jobs. These positions are associated with reliance upon 
walk-ins to fill these positions. I argue in Chapter 3 
that employers yield autonomy to unions in deciding which 
member occupies which position. The relationship between 
durable goods manufacturing establishments and unions is 
documented elsewhere (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987; Rees,
1977) . I conclude in Chapter 3 that unions often retain 
autonomy in deciding which employee works in which 
position. Therefore, I expect employers with union 
positions to defer to the union when assigning workers to 
jobs, and this would be reflected in the use of benign 
formal recruitment techniques.
What do the lack of market criteria imply for the 
other clusters? One explanation is that Clusters 5 and 12 
represent residual cluster categories.23 A more appealing 
theoretical argument is that these clusters represent 
competitive external labor market segments. According to 
Boylan (1992) , external markets are competitive, and are 
often described as chaotic, with no clear mechanism for 
matching workers to jobs. Clusters 12 and 5 show no clear
23 During the sensitivity analysis I expand the 
clusters to fifteen, and these six clusters (1, 2, 4, 6,
8, 11) were the only to satisfy my criteria. Moreover, 
the number of observations in Clusters 5, 12 and 9 change 
very little. If these are residual clusters, then I 
assume that increasing the number of clusters would allow 
some of the observations in these clusters to break away 
and form other clusters.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 5 8
pattern of matching workers to jobs, nor do they show 
clear discriminators (i.e. discriminant function of 
greater/equal 1). The only significant discriminator in 
Cluster 5 is permanent employment status, in Cluster 12, 
government agency status is the only significant 
discriminator. Cluster Nine has only 22 cases. This may 
explain the lack of consistent patterns.
The first hypothesis that professional and 
executive/managerial positions cluster with informal 
recruitment through colleagues and business associates is 
supported. However, the analysis also shows a 
relationship between executive/managerial occupations and 
agency recruitment. Again, given the measures of 
recruitment in the MEWS, I speculate that some of the 
relationship between employment agencies and 
executive/managerial occupational status may reflect the 
use of headhunter firms to recruit for such positions.24 
Hypothesis H 14 is not supported. Size of establishment 
does not appear to be a powerful discriminator in market 
segments. Public sector status and formal recruitment do 
not discriminate labor market segments to the extent that 
I predict. Cluster 12 shows some weak evidence for this 
hypothesis, however, none of the recruitment coefficients
24 Haulman et al. (1987) maintain that jobs recruited 
for through headhunter firms have very restricted public 
access.
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are powerful discriminators. Additionally, there appears 
to be some informal recruitment for professional jobs in 
government agencies, which is not captured in the 
regression analysis in Chapter 3.
Boylan (1992) argues that informal recruitment offers 
advantage in the labor market, and that systematic 
informal recruitment represents structure in the external 
market because it denies individuals access to job 
information. The conceptual model in this dissertation 
attempts to build on this relationship by showing that job 
matching processes structure and segment external labor 
markets much in the same manner that job matching 
processes segment internal labor markets (Sdrenson, 1983; 
Sorenson and Kalleberg, 1981). My analysis shows some 
general support for this theory. However, the best 
support that I can provide for this hypothesis is to show 
that the structuring of these markets has implications for 
job composition.
I made reference earlier to the hypothesis presented 
by Kalleberg and Berg (1987) that the manner in which 
individuals are recruited to work structures explains why 
certain work structures have more or less individuals with 
certain characteristics (race, gender, age). Similarly, 
institutional theorists focus on the effects of informal 
recruitment on the racial and gender composition of jobs 
(Roos and Reskin, 1984; 1992; Corcoran, Datcher and
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Duncan, 1980; Rosenfeld, 1984; 1983; Reskin and Roos,
1990; DiPrete and Soule, 1986; Kaufman, 1986) . 
Institutional theorists maintain that informal recruitment 
practices have become rooted in certain labor markets and 
deny qualified females and minorities access to jobs in 
these markets.
Others maintain that the inherent uncertainty in 
hiring new employees forces employers to rely upon 
certification systems to reduce hiring risks. Females and 
minorities are often denied access to labor markets 
because they are structurally unconnected to the 
certification systems which employers use to recruit and 
screen applicants (Stinchcombe, 1990). Other structural 
theorists maintain that the segregating effects of 
informal recruitment are a result of the gender and racial 
composition of work-related networks through which many 
jobs are recruited (Campbell and Rosenfeld, 1985; Kanter, 
1977; Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 198 0; Co H i n s o n  et 
al., 1990). Moreover, Campbell and Rosenfeld (1985) 
contend that females are more likely to be employed in 
lower and middle level white-collar jobs because these 
jobs are recruited for through formal channels, and less 
likely to be employed in higher status white-collar jobs 
because these vacancies are often recruited for through 
gender-segregated networks. All of these explanations are 
consistent with Fararo's (1989) biased information
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dissemination model. He argues that the underlying 
structure of a given context (in this case labor markets) 
biases the flow of information (in this case job 
information) through the network. What I am trying to 
show is that in certain market segments, information about 
certain jobs is channeled away from blacks and females, 
and this is reflected in the racial and gender composition 
of jobs in those segments. The basic theme presented in 
the above arguments is that recruitment practices serve to 
deny certain categories of individuals access to certain 
market segments; by that, I mean that individuals cannot 
compete for job openings about which they have no 
information. If recruitment practices actually structure 
and segment external labor markets, as the above arguments 
suggest, then the racial and gender composition of jobs 
should vary significantly across market segments.
Moreover, as I state in hypothesis H15 above, I expect that 
the percent female and percent black employed in the 
market segments which are characterized by informal 
recruitment to be significantly lower than the percent 
female and black employed in segments characterized by 
formal recruitment.
I use analysis of variance to test the between 
segment and within segment variations in percent female 
and percent black. I include all twelve clusters in the 
analysis in order to test if the gender and racial
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composition of jobs in the market clusters differ from the 
composition of jobs in the non-market sectors. These 
results are presented in Table 4.2. I also report the 
percent female and percent black by each cluster in Table 
4.1. The analysis of variance shows that the clusters do 
explain a significant amount of the variation in the 
racial and gender composition of jobs. The clusters 
explain 11.3% of the variation in percent black, and 10.7% 
of the variation in percent female.This shows that the 
distribution of percent black and percent female across 
market segments is influenced to some extent by the job 
and recruitment characteristics of the market segments.
The analysis of variance also shows that the grand mean 
for percent female across all clusters is 49%, with a 
standard deviation of 34.8%. The grand mean for percent 
black is 15.3%, with a standard deviation of 14.5%. The 
grand mean for percent black closely resembles the 
proportion of blacks in the greater Chicago SMSA in 198 0 
(14%) . The grand mean for percent female (49%) is 
slightly higher than the female representation in the 
greater Chicago SMSA in 1980 (41.5%).25 Because percent 
black/female in OCC/IND categories are a function of the 
recruitment practices of employers, I use the labor force 
representation percentages to compare with the mean
25These labor force representation data for the 
greater Chicago SMSA are taken from the 1980 PUMS-D file.
















































percent black/female employed in OCC/IND categories in 
each cluster.
Table 4.1 shows the mean percent female and the mean 
percent black for the OCC/IND categories in each cluster. 
Of the six identifiable clusters, females are under­
represented in Clusters 6 and 11. On the other hand, 
females are over-represented in Clusters 2 and 8. Females 
are just-represented in Clusters 1 and 4. Blacks are 
under-represented in Clusters 1, 4, and 6. Moreover, 
blacks are over-represented in Clusters 2, and 11; and 
just-represented in Cluster 8. Females are slightly 
under-represented in Cluster 6 (31% vs 41%), and just- 
represented in Cluster 1 (39% vs 41%). Blacks are under­
represented in Clusters 1 (9% vs 14%) and 6 (7% vs 14%). 
Cluster 1 is characterized by informal recruitment through 
colleagues and business associates and professional jobs, 
and jobs high in data complexity. These two clusters are 
characterized by informal recruitment through colleagues 
and business associates. This analysis suggests that jobs 
in labor market segments where workers are allocated to 
jobs through informal recruitment through colleagues and 
business associates are less likely to employ blacks. 
Moreover, there is a moderate negative relationship 
between the percent female employed and market segments 
characterized by executive/managerial jobs and informal 
recruitment. The finding that blacks and females are
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under-represented in one or more of the clusters which are 
characterized by informal recruitment serves to support 
hypothesis H 15 that jobs in labor market segments with 
informal recruitment employ fewer females and blacks.
A further interesting comparison can be drawn between 
Clusters 4 and 6. The percent black employed in each 
cluster is near equal, but the percent female differs by 
ten percentage points. The strongest discriminator in 
each cluster is executive/managerial occupations. The 
second strongest discriminator is employment agency use. 
The better representation of females employed in Cluster 4 
may be attributed to the lack of informal recruitment in 
that cluster. The discriminant function for recruitment 
through colleagues in Cluster 6 is 1.73, compared to .46 
in Cluster 4.26 What this disparity in percent female 
suggests is that a greater percentage of females in 
executive/managerial occupations are likely to be 
allocated to these positions through employment agencies, 
while males are more likely than females to be recruited 
through business colleagues and associates for 
executive/managerial positions.
Females are over-represented in Clusters 2 and 8. In 
Cluster 8 the average percentage female in a job is over
26 The discriminant function for recruitment through 
colleagues is not reported for Cluster 4 because the value 
(.46) is not in the top three positive discriminators.
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2 0 percentage points above the percent female employed in 
the greater SMSA (41% vs 67%). Cluster 8 consists of 
professional and government jobs that are recruited for 
through colleagues and business associates. The 
relationship between government job status and informal 
recruitment is addressed above. The other relationship of 
interest is that between colleagues recruitment and 
percent female. One possible scenario is that female 
professionals are more likely to be employed in the public 
sector because of the perceived benefits which accrue to 
females and minorities in the public sector (Smith, 1980; 
DiPrete, 1987). In addition, given the relationship 
between professional occupations and informal recruitment 
through colleagues and business associates, recruitment of 
female professionals in the public sector could still be 
informal. According to Braun (1984), the federal 
government disapproves of informal recruitment by any 
government agency (state, local or federal) . However, if 
informal recruitment is helping a group which the 
legislation (EO 11375) against informal recruitment is 
intended to help, then the federal government may be 
willing to look the other way. Of course, this is just 
speculation. Further testing with appropriate data are 
warranted to better support this hypothesis.
Blacks and females are over-represented in Cluster 2. 
Moreover, this cluster is characterized by white-collar
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occupations and formal recruitment. These findings 
suggest that Cluster 2 represents labor market segments 
where females and blacks (Roos and Reskin, 1990) are 
matched to lower-level white-collar jobs. Both the 
association of these jobs with the use of signs to 
advertise, and the lack of professional and managerial 
jobs in this sector support this position. These findings 
are consistent with Hypothesis H 15 that females and 
minorities are over-concentrated in labor market segments 
which are characterized by formal recruitment techniques.
While females are over-represented in Cluster 8, 
blacks are not. This suggests that the informal 
recruitment of professional jobs in the public sector may 
help females more than blacks. The mean percentage of 
blacks employed in positions in Cluster 11 is higher than 
percent black employed in the greater Chicago SMSA.
Females are just-represented in this cluster. The 
analysis shows that this is a segment of unionized jobs 
where workers are recruited through benign formal methods 
(signs and walk-ins). Blacks (probably black males- 
Reskin and Roos, 1990) are over-represented in these jobs.
Clusters 3 and 7 partially represent labor market 
segments. Cluster 3 is comprised of jobs that are 
recruited for through formal techniques. This sector is 
comprised of some jobs where skills are applicable across 
establishments and firms. Females are over-represented in
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Cluster 3. The mean percent female employed in jobs in 
this cluster is 66%. Blacks appear to be just-represented 
(mean=16%). These findings suggest that females, but not 
blacks, tend to be over-concentrated in market segments 
which have high external viability. However, the lack of 
strong discriminators in the analysis requires that 
caution be used when interpreting these results.
Cluster 7 also shows tendencies toward a labor market 
segment. This segments appears to be characterized by 
union and manufacturing jobs. Females are under­
represented in this segment (cluster mean=29%), while 
blacks are over-represented (cluster mean=20%). These 
findings are consistent with other union segments in the 
analysis, where a larger proportion of blacks are employed 
in these jobs. Again, caution should be exercised when 
interpreting the results for these two clusters.
If Clusters 12, 5, and 9 represent competitive 
external labor markets then the distribution of blacks and 
females in these sectors is noteworthy. For Cluster 12, 
the mean percent female is 57%, and the mean percent black 
is 27%. For Cluster 9 the respective scores are 66% and 
19%. Females and blacks are also slightly over­
represented in Cluster 5 (47% and 18%). If these clusters 
represent competitive external markets, as I suggest 
above, then the distribution of females and minorities 
supports other theories that females and minorities are
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more likely to compete for jobs in competitive labor 
markets, while white males tend to be concentrated in less 
competitive markets (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980; 
Roos and Reskin, 1984; 1992; Reskin and Roos, 1990; 
Stinchcombe, 1990).
Discussion
The purpose of this chapter is to test path (b) of 
the conceptual model, which represents the relationship 
between work structure correlates, recruitment techniques 
and external labor market segments. Employer recruitment 
and job matching practices segment external labor markets 
by restricting access to job information. I find clusters 
of jobs and recruitment practices which, empirically, 
represent the market segments in the conceptual model.
The analysis does show some relationship between 
recruitment and job characteristics. Moreover, in order 
for recruitment techniques to structure and segment 
markets, the recruitment practices should have the effect 
of denying individuals access to certain markets. The 
analysis does show that the racial and gender composition 
of jobs differs significantly across clusters. The 
analysis also shows that blacks are under-represented in 
most clusters characterized by informal recruitment 
through colleagues and business associates. Likewise, 
females are slightly under-represented in Cluster 6, 
characterized by informal recruitment via colleagues and
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business associates. Females are also over-represented in 
clusters which are characterized by formal recruitment and 
white-collar occupations (see Clusters 2 and 4).
I conclude in Chapter 3, with the support of 
Granovetter's job match theory, that colleagues and 
business associates represent an inter-organizational 
network through which job and employee information flow. 
Overlaying my findings with Boylan's theory shows that 
jobs which are recruited for informally through colleagues 
and associates have structural advantages in the external 
market and should have outcome consequences for 
individuals. The analysis shows a tendency for blacks and 
females to be under-represented in some labor market 
segments which are characterized by informal recruitment. 
Furthermore, these findings tend to support the new 
structuralist hypothesis that market-specific recruitment 
techniques have consequences for individuals because the 
manner in which workers are recruited to work structures 
explains why certain work structures have more or less 
individuals with certain attributes (Kalleberg and Berg, 
1987) .
However, the hypothesis that informal recruitment 
techniques serve to close-off opportunities for certain 
groups, especially females and minorities is not 
completely supported. The analysis shows that females are 
better represented in market segments which are
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characterized by informal recruitment than the recruitment 
and segregation literature predicts. Females are well- 
represented in Clusters 1 and 8, and slightly under­
represented in Cluster 6, while blacks are also well- 
represented in Cluster 8. All of these are market 
segments which are characterized by informal recruitment.
What these results suggest is that further analyses 
within each cluster are warranted. To further address 
this issue, I analyze the correlation between percent 
female and recruitment through colleagues and associates 
within Cluster 1. The analysis shows a negative 
relationship between percent female and colleagues (r=- 
.399;p<.001), and a positive relationship between percent 
female and recruitment through employment agencies 
(r = .226; p < .05). Within Cluster 1, informal recruitment 
is positively associated with the percentage of men 
employed in those jobs, while formal recruitment is 
positively associated with the percent female. In 
addition, for percent black, these correlations are in the 
expected direction; however, they are not significant.
I also conduct the correlation analysis for Cluster 
4, which is characterized by executive/managerial 
positions, white-collar occupations, and agency 
recruitment. In this cluster, percent female is 
negatively correlated with colleague recruitment (r=-.167; 
p<.05); but there is no relationship between percent
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female and agency recruitment. This suggests that 
employment agencies recruit for gender neutral jobs within 
this sector, while recruitment through informal colleagues 
and business associates recruits for predominantly male 
jobs. I also analyze these patterns within Cluster 6.
The number of cases in this cluster is limited, and the 
analysis fails to show strong relationships. However, 
within Cluster 6, there is a positive relationship between 
percent black and informal recruitment through current 
employees (r=.35; p<.05).
In order to address to what extent informal 
recruitment leads to inequality, I construct a variable to 
measure the average starting salary of the job in question 
from the MEWS.27 Unfortunately, over 15% of the cases for 
this variable are missing. Therefore, I substitute the 
mean salary from OCC/IND categories for missing cases, and 
this explains why I do not use this variable in the main 
analyses (see Cohen and Cohen, 1975). The values are 
reported in hourly wages, weekly wages, monthly wages and 
annual salary. I convert all values to annual salary.
For hourly wages, I compute salary based on a forty hour 
work week, and 52 weeks a year. This assumes that all 
wage jobs are full-time jobs (40 hours a week), and it 
ignores the wages earned from overtime, which can vary
27 The question asks: What is the average starting 
salary for (job) in your establishment?
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greatly from job to job. Also, my measure assumes that 
salaried jobs are not temporary jobs. I take the natural 
log because the distribution is skewed toward the lower 
end.
The relationships in Cluster 1 show a negative 
correlation between starting salary and percent female 
(r=-.301; pc.Ol), a negative relationship between agency 
recruitment and salary (r=-.21; pc.05), and a positive 
relationship between percent female and agency recruitment 
(r=226; p<.05). What this analysis shows is that even 
within informal market segments, female jobs tend to be 
recruited for thorough employment agencies, and that these 
jobs have lower starting salaries than jobs recruited for 
through other methods. Cluster 6 shows a negative 
relationship between salary and percent female (r=-.507; 
pc.001); but no other clear relationships. Cluster 4 
shows negative relationships between salary and percent 
black (r=-.228; p<.01), and percent female (r=-.249; 
p < .001), but no significant patterns with any other 
variables.
Returning to labor market structure theory, these 
clusters and correlations within clusters suggest that 
recruitment through colleagues and business associates is 
positively correlated with the percentage of men employed 
in jobs, while employment agency use is positively 
correlated with percent female. These patterns suggest
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 7 4
two distinct paths of information flow, one path where job 
information reaches predominantly males (informal 
recruitment path) and one path which reaches predominantly 
females (formal recruitment path). Given the negative 
relationships between percent female and starting salary 
in all three clusters analyzed, and the negative 
relationship between salary and employment agency 
recruitment (especially within Cluster 1), these findings 
further suggest that the flow of information of higher 
paying jobs away from information channels through which 
females learn of openings (employment agencies) leads to 
labor market inequality.
However, caution must be exercised when interpreting 
these results. First, the cluster analysis does not 
stringently control for other factors that influence the 
salary of a job (education and experienced required, 
etc.). Second, the cluster analysis does not adequately
control for the quality of the labor supply. That is,
male-dominated jobs may be found in certain clusters 
because the majority of females in the greater Chicago 
SMSA do not possess the human capital credentials, nor the 
desire to occupy these jobs, although there is literature 
to suggest otherwise (England et al., 1988; Jacobs,
1989b). Third, the lack of controls leave the results
open to criticism. For example, the negative relationship
between informal recruitment and percent female may be
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spurious if adequate controls for the quality of labor 
supply are not included. The hypothesized associations 
between informal recruitment, executive/manaqerial status, 
and gender composition may be spurious if males and 
females of equal credential levels have equal 
probabilities of learning of these openings. That is, the 
negative relationship between informal recruitment and 
gender composition is a product of the fact that females 
lack the credentials to compete for these jobs, no matter 
how they are recruited.
In the next chapter I will better address path (c) of 
the conceptual model by focusing on the direct 
relationship between recruitment and the racial/gender 
composition of jobs. I examine the effects of each 
recruitment practice on the percent female and percent 
black employed in OCC/IND categories, net of the effects 
of other establishment, job, occupational and industry 
characteristics. I also review, in detail, the racial and 
gender occupational segregation and employment literature, 
and the literature which attempts to link recruitment to 
occupational segregation. Other issues, such as racial 
and gender differences in educational attainment and 
occupational aspirations are also examined.
Summary
The analysis in this chapter reinforces the 
conclusions drawn about informal recruitment from the
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analysis in Chapter 3. Cluster 1 shows that informal 
recruitment through colleagues and business associates is 
associated with professional occupational status and data 
complexity. Cluster 6 shows that executive/managerial 
occupations are associated with informal recruitment 
through colleagues and business associates as well. I 
conclude at the end of Chapter 3 that employers use 
colleagues and associates to recruit for high-quality, 
white-collar jobs. The analysis in this chapter 
reinforces this conclusion.
One of the advantages of cluster analysis is that it 
does not force linear assumptions. By eliminating the 
linear restrictions of correlation and regression 
analysis, I am better able to assess the relationship 
between the independent variables and informal recruitment 
through current employees. Cluster 2 shows a relationship 
between white-collar occupations and recruitment through 
current employees. Moreover, females and minorities tend 
to be concentrated in these jobs, and under-represented in 
clusters that are characterized by informal recruitment 
through colleagues and associates. This suggests that 
recruitment through colleagues matches males to jobs, 
while recruitment through current employees matches 
females and minorities to jobs. This is an important 
finding, given the emerging evidence which suggests that 
jobs recruited for through colleagues are of higher
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quality than those recruited through current employees, 
address this topic in detail in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5. RECRUITMENT AND JOB COMPOSITION
The analysis in Chapter 3 shows that certain 
characteristics of organizations, jobs, occupations and 
industries are associated with particular recruitment 
techniques. Executive/managerial and professional jobs 
are associated with informal recruitment through 
colleagues and business associates, while other white- 
collar occupations are associated with formal recruitment 
through advertisements. In Chapter 4, I attempt to show 
that the manner in which employers recruit for vacancies 
segment external labor markets much in the same manner 
that internal job ladder matching processes segment 
internal labor markets (see Sbrenson, 1983; Sorenson and 
Kalleberg, 1981). In the process of testing this idea, I 
demonstrate that certain recruitment techniques cluster 
with certain job characteristics, and argue that these 
combinations represent labor market segments. I also show 
that there are a higher proportion of blacks and females 
employed in the segments which are characterized by formal 
recruitment, and a lower percentage employed in the 
segments characterized by informal recruitment.
These findings support my hypothesis that informal 
recruiting is negatively associated with the percentage of 
blacks and females employed in a job. However, the 
possibility exists that these results actually reflect an 
under-supply of females and blacks with the proper
178
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credentials to occupy the jobs associated with informal 
recruiting. That is, the negative relationships between 
percent black/female and informal recruiting through 
colleagues and business associates could be spurious 
because of inadequate measures and techniques to control 
for the supply of qualified workers. Therefore, in this 
chapter I re-address path (c) of the conceptual model with 
analytic techniques and controls which strengthen the 
argument, and reinforce my conclusions presented in 
Chapter 4.
Literature Review 
White male domination of power hierarchies in 
organizations is a result of occupational segregation by 
race and gender (Charles, 1992; England and Browne, 1992; 
Roos and Reskin, 1992; Bielby and Baron, 1986; Taylor et 
al., 1986; Harrison, 1989; Jacobs, 1989a; Jenkins, 1986; 
Jones and Rosenfeld, 1989; Collinson et al., 1990). 
Occupational segregation forces women and minorities into 
a narrow range of occupations which offer little training 
and few opportunities for advancement (Charles, 1992; 
DiPrete and Soule, 1988; Kaufman, 1986). The consequences 
of occupational segregation are lower wages (Tienda et 
al., 1987; Rosenfeld, 1980; 1983; Abrahamson and 
Sigelmann, 1987; Fossett et al., 1987; Kaufman, 1986; 
Jacobs, 1989a; Corcoran, Duncan and Ponza, 1984) , less 
autonomy (Singelmann and Mencken, 1992; Jaffe, 1989), and
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less authority (Jaffe, 1989; Wolf and Fligstein, 1979a; 
1979b) for affected groups.
Segregation causes other social problems.
Occupational segregation and subsequent lower wages are 
linked to the feminization of poverty (Roos and Reskin, 
1992). The wage-gap has long-term negative effects on the 
earning power of single women, and negative consequences 
for the educational and occupational attainment of the 
children in female-headed households (Sandefur, McLanahan, 
and Wojtkiewicz, 1992). Jacobs (1989a) contends that the 
wage-gap leads to power inequalities in the household. 
Moreover, the poor work histories which often result from 
the occupational segregation of black workers are 
associated with unemployment, labor market isolation and 
the cycle of poverty in the inner city (Wilson, 1987: 60). 
Occupational segregation also constrains the productive 
capacity of the labor force, robs the economy of valuable 
human resources, and exacerbates the problems mentioned 
above (Blau, 1984).
Ideally, norms of bureaucratization, rationalization, 
and formalization, which characterize industrialized 
economies, should work to minimize occupational 
segregation (Charles, 1992). Yet despite legal
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
decisions,28 and female/minority gains in education, work 
experience, and labor force participation (Bielby and 
Baron, 1986; Tienda et al., 1987; England and Brown, 1992; 
Taylor et al., 1986; England et al., 1988), occupational 
segregation persists. For example, Jacobs (1989b) shows 
that two-thirds of all women in the labor force work in 
jobs that are at least 75% female. These women also earn 
significantly less money, despite a less than 1 year 
difference in mean level of education. Reskin and Roos 
(1990) argue that accounts of the occupational gains of 
women during the 197 0s are greatly overstated.
Furthermore, Reskin and Roos (1990) claim that white males 
are still over-represented in
professional/executive/managerial and craft occupations, 
both high status white and blue-collar occupational 
categories. White females are over-represented in 
clerical, administrative support and "semi-professional" 
occupations. Black females are concentrated in personal 
service occupations, while black males continue to be 
under-represented in white-collar managerial and blue- 
collar craft occupations.
28 Executive Order 11246, EEOC hiring guidelines, 
Local 93. International Association of Firefighters v. 
City of Cleveland . Local 28. Sheetmetal Workers v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. United States Supreme 
Court, July 2, 1986. Bowes, 1987: 74, 165-66.
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Gender and racial segregation persist, despite 
increased numbers of skilled women and minority workers, 
and despite legislation aimed at meritocratic hiring 
policies. In the next section I review pertinent theories 
which attempt to account for occupational segregation. 
Unfortunately, gender segregation is a much better 
researched topic than racial segregation. There are 
several reasons for this difference. Roos and Reskin 
(1990: 6) argue that historically, racial segregation has 
been less resistant to social change than gender 
segregation. Therefore, scholars have focused on issues 
of gender segregation more than racial segregation. Also, 
Abrahamson and Sigelmann (1987) suggest that to the extent 
that discrimination is the cause of segregation, the 
locale of the labor market under scrutiny plays a key 
role. Racial segregation may be more prevalent in the 
South than in the West (Fossett et al., 1987). These 
factors encourage scholars to focus on issues of gender 
segregation, at the exclusion of racial segregation. I 
begin with a discussion of gender segregation, and follow 
with a discussion of racial segregation.
Gender and Occupational Segregation
There are several competing theories to explain 
occupational segregation. According to choice or labor 
supply theories, the choices that women and men make 
concerning their education, training, and careers explain
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occupational segregation (England and Browne, 1992; 
Rosenfeld, 1984; Abrahamson and Sigelmann, 1987). Women 
choose training paths and careers which are compatible 
with the division of labor in the family, the caregiver 
role, and the status of women as being "in service to 
others." Also, family responsibilities influence women to 
choose jobs which maximize earnings without having to make 
a long-term commitment to the labor force. As a result, 
women choose occupations which offer little on-the-job 
training, few opportunities for advancement, and flat wage 
curves (England et al., 1988).
Gender-role ideology and gender-role socialization 
affect the occupational choices made by women and men 
(Jones and Rosenfeld, 1989; Mason, 1984; Strober, 1984; 
Marini and Briton, 1984; Roos and Reskin, 1984).
According to Mason (1984: 164), the gender-role ideology 
has historically been based upon four basic assumptions:
1) sexes are inherently different; 2) women are naturally 
suited to be mothers and caregivers, and men are naturally 
suited to be adventures; 3) masculine carries a higher 
status than feminine; 4) men have the right to control 
women. Marini and Briton (1984) argue that gender is the 
first social identification that an individual learns, and 
that starting at a very young age, boys and girls are 
rigorously socialized into their proper gender role, as 
defined by the dominant gender-role ideology. The process
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of socialization influences women to choose training and 
occupations which are compatible with their caregiver 
roles, and which reaffirm their femininity and gender-role 
expectations (Strober, 1984).
Jacobs (1989a) argues for a life-time social control 
explanation for occupational segregation. According to 
Jacobs, gender-role socialization is a necessary, but 
insufficient explanation of occupational segregation. He 
shows that individuals vacillate between male-dominated 
and female-dominated occupational aspirations prior to and 
during college and/or labor force entry. Likewise, 
informal tracking of males and females into male and 
female dominated college majors plays an insufficient role 
to explain post-graduate occupational segregation. Males 
and females move near equally among gender-specific and 
gender-neutral college majors. Moreover, college major is 
a less than perfect predictor of future occupation, and a 
substantial number of individuals change occupations 
several times during their careers.
According to Jacobs (1989a), there is a life-long 
system of social control which accounts for occupational 
segregation. Jacobs (1989a) argues for a "revolving door" 
theory. According to this theory, as formal and informal 
labor market controls are relaxed, more women in all age 
cohorts aspire to and move into male-dominated 
occupations. However, once in male-dominated occupations,
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women face other measures of social control which 
eventually force them back into female-dominated 
occupations. Measures of social control at this stage 
include sexual harassment, undermining of performance, and 
other actions which create a hostile environment and make 
women in male occupations appear inferior and feel 
unwelcome (Jacobs, 1989a: 167). In short, women move into 
male-dominated occupations as some measures of social 
control are relaxed, but other measures of social control 
eventually force them to seek employment in female- 
dominated occupations.
Labor demand or constraint theories are also popular 
in sociology and economics. One factor that contributes 
to gender segregation and to wage differentials is the 
"taste for discrimination" among employers, male 
coworkers, and customers (Jacobs, 1989a; Blau, 1984). 
According to Blau (1984), the neoclassical model assumes 
that male and female labor are perfect substitutes. That 
is, there are no inherent biological differences in male 
and female labor; men and women have equal capacities to 
be productive and are deserving of equal wages under such 
circumstances. However, employers with tastes for 
discrimination will hire women only at a wage level that 
is sufficiently discounted to compensate for the 
disutility of hiring women. Also, profit maximizing firms 
with no tastes for discrimination may segregate and
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discount wages if employees or customers have tastes for 
discrimination. Male workers with tastes for 
discrimination will work with women only at a wage 
sufficiently large to compensate them for the disutility 
of having to work with women. Instead of raising the 
wages of male employees, they may accommodate these tastes 
by only hiring men. Customers with tastes for 
discrimination will purchase goods only at a sufficiently 
discounted price to accommodate the customers for having 
to purchase the goods from women. Employers are forced to 
lower revenues, or employ only males for positions that 
require customer interaction.
A variant of this is the queuing theory developed by 
Reskin and Roos (1990). According to queuing theory, 
there are labor supply and labor demand queues that 
determine which workers are matched to which jobs. The 
labor demand queue ranks jobs according to their 
desirability and credential requirements. The jobs at the 
top of the queue are the most desirable, and these are 
wanted by most market actors; but relatively few are 
qualified to compete for these jobs. Qualifications or 
credentials usually include human capital factors, such as 
education and experience, but they may also include 
personal attributes such as race and gender. Employers 
prefer white males for certain types of jobs (jobs with 
authority, autonomy and a high degree of complexity), and
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 8 7
rank jobs in the labor demand queue based on these 
requirements. Moreover, employers place potential workers 
in the queue based on these credentials and requirements.
The major difference between queuing theory and the 
taste for discrimination model is that with queuing 
theory, employers place jobs in the queue based on the 
quality of the job. Employers, in turn, place workers in 
the queue based on the "appropriateness" of certain 
attributes for certain jobs. For example, most employers 
would not hire black females for jobs that require them to 
supervise white males (Reskin and Roos, 1990; Kaufman, 
1986) . The taste for discrimination model relies upon 
personal beliefs and prejudices to explain discrimination.
Labor supply queues also affect the job match and 
occupational segregation. These queues are based on 
worker differences in qualifications and aspirations. 
Historically, gender differences in preferences for 
certain types of work have led to gender differences in 
occupational aspirations. However, recent evidence 
(Reskin and Roos, 1990; Tomaskovic-Devey; 1993a; 1993b; 
Jacobs; 1989a) shows that gender differences in 
educational and occupational aspirations, and differences 
in educational achievement have been minimal since the 
late 1960s. Additionally, Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a) 
maintains that differences in aspirations cannot explain 
segregation at the job level, because males and females
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both want jobs with autonomy, authority and task 
complexity.
The effects of labor supply queues on occupational 
segregation derive from the effects of job 
characteristics. According to Reskin and Roos (1990), 
white males will not apply for jobs that have low 
desirability. The proportion of white males applying for 
a job decreases directly with the decrease in job quality. 
Therefore, deskilling a job or occupation increases gender 
integration, because as the quality of jobs declines, 
fewer white males place themselves in the labor queue.
The statistical discrimination model is a labor 
demand economic model which maintains that employers avoid 
hiring from certain groups in order to minimize hiring 
risks (Rosenfeld, 1984). Employers are unwilling to take 
the risk that they will lose their training investment 
(turnover) and are not likely to hire high risk groups 
(such as women with children) with unstable work histories 
(see also Stinchcombe, 1990). England and Browne (1992) 
argue that in addition to statistical discrimination, 
managers will also hire men and women based on perceived 
appropriate gender roles. The preferences of managers are 
shaped by the same gender-role ideology which structures 
the training and occupational choices of males and 
females. Collinson et al. (1990) argue that managers fill 
jobs according to the cultural notions of femininity and
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masculinity. Males are preferred for certain jobs because 
breadwinner responsibilities translate into motivation to 
succeed and compatibility, flexibility, and subservience 
to firm needs. Females, on the other hand, are better 
suited for occupations which are compatible with the 
caregiver role. This stems from the expectations that 
women are better at caring for others (more nurturing) 
than men. This explains why certain (caring) occupations 
are deemed more appropriate for women (secretary, social 
worker, nurse, teacher). Line managers reason that it 
makes for a more effective operation of business to fill 
jobs based on these criteria.
Institutional theory explicitly indicts recruitment 
practices as contributing to the occupational segregation 
process. This theory focuses on the institutional 
barriers which restrict female access to jobs within firms 
and establishments. Formal barriers originate at the 
level of the firm and once institutionalized, are tough to 
remove. These barriers tend to disproportionately 
disadvantage women (Roos and Reskin 1984; England and 
Brown, 1992). Roos and Reskin (1984) identify 
institutional barriers in blue and white-collar labor 
markets. One reason why women fail to hear about blue- 
collar jobs is the myth that they are not interested in 
such jobs. Other institutional barriers to blue-collar 
jobs include veteran's status (only veterans are
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eligible), union sponsorship, toxic substance laws and
gender-bias in machinery design.
While blue-collar barriers are overt,
institutionalized barriers in white-collar labor markets
are more subtle. Roos and Reskin (1984; 1992) identify
lack of access to job information networks as the primary
source of institutionalized barriers to professional and
managerial jobs. Vacancies in white-collar labor markets
are rarely filled through fully public means. Since men
hold most of the professional and managerial jobs, they
enjoy personal and work associations that facilitate
learning of other job opportunities. Women, on the other
hand, tend to find out about positions formally advertised
(see also Rosenfeld, 1984; Campbell and Rosenfeld, 1985).
Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan (1980) expand this
argument to explain white male domination of the core
economic sector and primary labor markets. They contend
that white males dominate all jobs in the core sector, and
that most recruitment is informal. Females and minorities
are excluded from most core sector jobs, because white
males use informal recruitment and hire only other white
males for jobs in this sector. The following quote
encompasses their argument:
Since men hold most of the "good" primary sector jobs 
and recruiting is informal, young white men will be 
able to use informal channels to obtain good primary 
sector jobs. If informal channels available to black 
men and women of both races merely lead to jobs held
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by blacks and women, then informal recruitment and 
influence channels will not benefit these groups as 
much as white men (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan,
1980: 6).
Patriarchy theory (Strober, 1984; Collinson et al., 
1990; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993a) claims that the 
discrimination model does not explain why segregation is 
gender-based. Strober (19 84) argues that employers are 
not just profit maximizers, because if they are, they 
would employ only women at lower wages. Employers also 
seek to maintain their male privilege. Through 
segregating and discriminatory practices, employers force 
women into a narrow range of lower status occupations.
This practice preserves male domination at the middle and 
upper-middle strata in organizations. Employers recognize 
that if male privilege is threatened at these levels, then 
the top levels would soon follow. Instead of hiring women 
at lower wages to maximize profits, employers will trade 
profits to keep the patriarchy system intact.
Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a) provides a theory of social 
closure which explains why females and minorities are 
excluded from many jobs. According to this theory, 
exclusionary practices are understood as attempts to 
reserve the best jobs for members of the superordinate 
group (white males). Therefore, personal prejudices and 
stereotypes do not explain discrimination, as the taste 
and statistical discrimination models suggest; but
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 9 2
discrimination must be understood as a conscious attempt 
by superordinate groups to develop and maintain status 
privilege.
According to Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a), gender 
occupational segregation is best understood within the 
context of patriarchy. Males attempt to protect their 
status through their actions at work and at home. At 
work, males achieve closure by defining work done by women 
as inferior or less important, and by denying females 
access to good jobs. Males seek to dominate the best 
jobs, which means that gender closure pressures are 
greatest at the top of the job hierarchy.
Hiring is intricately linked to social closure theory 
in two ways. First, hiring takes place at the task level 
(Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993a: 62). Line managers, at the next 
highest level, make hiring decisions. When females and 
minorities apply for jobs, they challenge not only the 
status of the white-male incumbents, but also of the 
managers making the hiring decisions. Therefore, managers 
will discriminate to protect their status, as well as that 
of the incumbents. I argue that hiring is also tied to 
social closure through recruitment. Social closure theory 
predicts that formalization of the employee-employer 
relationship diminishes exclusionary closure. EEOC and 
Affirmative Action programs are attempts to better 
formalize the hiring process, and attempts at closure by
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usurpation by subordinate groups. Therefore, I argue that 
one way of achieving closure and protecting status is to 
recruit informally, which diminishes the pool of females 
and minorities applying for desirable jobs. In other 
words, informal recruitment also allows superordinate 
groups to circumvent attempts at closure by usurpation.
Another institutional factor under investigation 
includes the manner in which new employees are assigned to 
firm internal labor markets (DiPrete and Soule, 1988; 
England and Brown, 1992; Roos and Reskin, 1984; 1992). 
DiPrete and Soule contend that gender segregation 
disadvantages equally qualified women because it assigns 
them to job ladders with low ceilings (low advancement 
opportunities) and little opportunity to move across 
ladders. Men, on the other hand, are routinely assigned 
to upper-tier job ladders, which have high ceilings, or 
are attached to other job ladders which offer promotion 
possibilities. These findings are consistent with social 
closure theory. Male privilege is protected by assigning 
men to better jobs. Also, men are more likely to switch 
internal job ladders because such moves are often 
maneuvered through informal network channels, which tend 
to advantage men in organizations.
Informal recruitment in white-collar labor markets is 
rationalized as efficient by employers (Granovetter, 1981; 
Stinchcombe, 1990; Roos and Reskin, 1984; Marsden and
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Campbell, 1990). Employers consider white-collar labor 
market positions as sensitive areas of the organization. 
Organizational elites have a stake in hiring the right 
person for sensitive positions (i.e. managerial job), and 
will recruit informally to make sure that the new employee 
can command respect from superiors, colleagues and 
subordinates. Stinchcombe (199 0) contends that employers 
rely heavily upon certification systems to reduce the 
inherent risks in hiring new employees. Unfortunately, 
females and minorities are excluded from certain positions 
because they often lack access to the certification 
systems that employers use to fill vacancies (in this case 
the informal network). Furthermore, Stinchcombe (1990) 
concludes that such segregation is not the result of 
malicious intent on behalf of employers, but the 
irrational consequences of seemingly rational action.
Roos and Reskin (1984) take a more critical view of 
the institutionalization of informal recruiting practices 
in certain white-collar labor markets than do efficiency 
theorists (i.e. Stinchcombe, Granovetter). Roos and 
Reskin argue that such barriers to job information are set 
in the hiring policies of organizations and also in other 
institutional arrangements, such as inter-organizational 
networks (see also Granovetter, 1981; 1985; 1988). 
According to Giddens (1984), institutionalization of 
social practices means consistent repetition through time
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and social space. Roos and Reskin (1984) maintain that 
these recruiting practices are grounded in the overall 
gender-role ideology, which defines the appropriate roles 
for men and women and reinforces conventions about the 
differences between women and men. Moreover, it is the 
support of the gender-role ideology which allows these 
recruiting practices to become institutionalized—  to 
exist repetitiously in time and space—  because the 
occupational segregation that results reinforces 
culturally defined gender-roles.
The literature indicates strongly that there is more 
than one mechanism of occupational segregation operating. 
The purpose of this discussion is not to fully explain 
occupational segregation, but to discuss recruitment of 
new employees as one of a number of mechanisms that 
generate and reproduce occupational segregation by 
gender. Women, despite appropriate credentials, 
experience, and aspirations (see Jacobs, 1989a; England et 
al., 1988) cannot compete for positions about which they 
are not informed. In the next section I address the issue 
of race and occupational segregation.
Race and Occupational Segregation
Less scholarly work has been done exclusively on 
racial occupational segregation. England and Browne 
(1992) argue that an ideology of white supremacy continues 
to dominate social institutions. This ideology leads to
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racial discrimination and segregation in the labor force, 
and the subsequent racial inequalities in wages, 
authority, and autonomy. Other research shows that blacks 
are discriminated against in organizations (Wilson, 1980; 
Jenkins, 1986), and have been used in the past by 
management as antagonists to keep workers from organizing 
(Lieberson, 1980; Kaufman, 1986).
The queueing theory maintains that blacks are ranked 
by employers as less desirable than whites for certain 
types of jobs. Like gender, race is an attribute which is 
easy to identify and often used to discriminate. In terms 
of labor supply queues, while there have been gender 
differences in occupational aspirations in the past, there 
are no racial differences in aspirations. Blacks do not 
aspire to part-time work and jobs with low levels of 
authority and autonomy. However, racial differences in 
credentials are more likely than gender differences in 
credentials. Historical patterns of overt and 
institutional racism mean that blacks are more likely than 
whites to have poorer quality elementary and secondary 
educations. Blacks are also less likely to have the 
financial resources to attend college; and if they attend, 
they are less likely to attend schools which confer high 
status credentials upon graduates (Tomaskovic-Devey,
1993a).
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Racial closure theory argues that occupational 
segregation by race can be understood as attempts by 
whites to create and keep a social distance between 
themselves and blacks, and to retain positions of 
superiority over blacks (Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993a).
Closure is achieved by restricting good job opportunities 
to whites. Recruitment is one method by which the best 
jobs are reserved for whites; it keeps blacks from 
competing for the best jobs.
Racial closure is carried out primarily in the 
workplace, while gender closure, or patriarchy is carried 
out both at work and at home. Institutionalized racism 
leads to lower levels of educational attainment for blacks 
in some geographical areas. According to Tomaskovic-Devey 
(1993a), this means that blacks do not challenge whites 
(i.e. white-males) in high-quality occupations to the 
extent that females do. Therefore, practices of 
exclusionary closure are more prevalent in blue-collar 
occupations than in white-collar occupations. This does 
not mean that blacks are not excluded from white-collar 
jobs, only that blacks are more of a challenge to the 
status of working-class whites (see also Lieberson, 1980).
According to Kaufman (1986), many of the gender 
segregation arguments also apply to racial occupational 
segregation. Minority status is a cheap screening device 
in evaluating potential employees. Therefore, minorities
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are channeled into the periphery sector, which leads to 
unstable work histories and difficulty in moving into the 
core sector (see also Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980). 
Furthermore, this has a spiraling effect, because once a 
worker is saddled with a bad work history, the problems of 
statistical discrimination are exacerbated, which further 
excludes the worker from future opportunities (see also 
Stinchcombe, 1990)
Tastes for discrimination among employers, employees 
and clients disadvantage blacks. Kaufman (1986) contends 
that large firms and unions are great proponents of racial 
segregation within the workplace, due to the need to keep 
a "social" distance between black and white workers.
Large firms have greater assets to indulge worker tastes 
for racial discrimination. Unions usually require 
sponsorship for membership, and white members are 
reluctant to recommend blacks even if they have no 
personal tastes for discrimination (see also Rees, 1977). 
But Taylor (1979) implies that blacks may receive more 
equitable treatment in some large firms because these tend 
to be the targets of governmental anti-discrimination 
action and public pressure (i.e. Operation PUSH).
According to Kaufman (1986), "racial typing" also 
plays a key role in racial segregation. Racial typing 
refers to societal misconceptions that certain jobs are 
more appropriate for blacks. Jobs that are typed
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appropriate for blacks are menial, physical, labor- 
intensive tasks. These jobs have low skill levels, are 
highly routinized, have low pay, and poor working 
conditions. Conversely, jobs that are typed inappropriate 
for blacks include those with formal authority (especially 
over whites), and autonomy. Also, jobs that have high 
levels of technical expertise, which also have informal 
authority, are typed inappropriate for blacks. In sum, 
jobs that are high in skill requirements are inappropriate 
for blacks, while those that are low in skill requirement 
are typed as appropriate.
Wilson (1980) claims that much discrimination since 
1964 has been statistical discrimination against lower- 
class blacks, not blacks in general. He contends that 
affirmative action and other social programs aimed at 
helping minorities achieve equal access in the labor force 
have helped middle-class blacks to the exclusion of the 
inner city poor. However, Reskin and Roos (1990) show 
that black males are still under-represented, relative to 
their skill levels, in managerial and other professional 
white-collar occupations, and argue that blacks occupy 
lower rungs on job queues than whites. Other research 
demonstrates racial inequalities within the public sector 
(Smith, 1980; Zwerling and Silver, 1992). This evidence 
may serve to limit the applicability of Wilson's class 
hypothesis.
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Jenkins (1986) addresses race and the statistical 
discrimination model. First, black workers are more 
likely than white workers to be viewed as an 
undifferentiated category, which interacts negatively with 
stereotypical images of black workers. Second, managers 
claim that it is important to hire those workers who will 
create the fewest possible problems. However, black 
workers have a lower suitability rating because they are 
perceived to be more disruptive in the workplace, and less 
likely to passively submit to bureaucratic authority in a 
capitalist production hierarchy.
Jenkins also argues for a structural or institutional 
explanation. He claims that black workers often lack 
access to information chains through which positions are 
recruited (Jenkins, 1986: 234-236; see also Corcoran, 
Datcher and Duncan, 1980; Wilson, 1987). Additionally, 
discrimination is partly attributed to the need of a 
particular group to maintain control over an occupational 
specialization. Control is achieved through tight control 
over job information. As with women, this limits the 
opportunities of blacks primarily to occupations for which 
recruitment is a formal process.
Gender. Race and Government Employment
The discussion shows that the levels of gender and 
racial occupational segregation are significant, and that 
blacks and females are much less likely to occupy high-
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quality white and blue-collar occupations, despite proper 
credentials and interests in such occupations (Reskin and 
Roos, 1990; England et al., 1988; Jacobs, 1989a; 1989b; 
Kaufman, 1986) . However, research shows that the extent 
and consequences of racial and gender occupational 
segregation are reduced in the public sector. For 
example, Smith (1980) shows that black/white wage 
differences are significantly lower in the public sector. 
Additionally, Eisinger (1986) finds that the proportion of 
blacks in administrative and managerial positions is 
significantly higher in the public sector. Elsewhere, 
Zwerling and Silver (1992) show that termination rates for 
blacks are significantly lower in the public sector. 
Finally, DiPrete (1987) argues that public service offers 
women greater opportunities for advancement than private 
firms.
There are a variety of reasons why blacks and women 
fare better in the public sector. First, EEOC protects 
these groups from discrimination in hiring, and the 
government is constrained by congress, public pressure and 
private firms to enforce EEOC hiring guidelines (Taylor, 
1979). Second, standardized entrance exams help women and 
minorities to compete more fairly public sector employment 
(DiPrete, 1987). Third, once hired by a government 
agency, Affirmative Action programs help blacks and 
females gain greater occupational mobility through
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programs which require agencies to promote women and 
minorities from lower status occupations (Braun, 1984; 
DiPrete, 1987). Executive Orders 11246 and 11375 extend 
anti-discrimination laws to private and public 
firms/agencies with federal government contracts. These 
orders also require firms with government contracts to 
implement Affirmative Action programs and to publicly 
advertise all vacancies. Moreover, the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance (OFCCP) monitors government 
contractors. Research demonstrates that the OFCCP is much 
more effective at bringing about compliance with federal 
guidelines than is the EEOC (Braun, 1984; Hartmann and 
Reskin, 1986) .
While there are positive benefits of government 
employment for blacks and females, inequality in this 
sector still persists. Research (DiPrete, 1987; Smith, 
1980; Baron and Newman, 1990; Bridges and Nelson, 1990) 
still shows public sector gender and racial gaps in 
earnings and promotions. DiPrete (1987) argues that white 
males are more likely to be on professional and 
administrative career ladders within government agencies. 
Bridges and Nelson (1990) demonstrate gender composition 
differences in the manner in which public sector jobs are 
assessed with comparable jobs in the private sector for 
pay increases. Smith (1980) shows that the black-white 
wage gap is less severe in the public sector, but the
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aggregate means are still significantly different.
Finally, Zwerling and Silver (1992) show that blacks are 
significantly more likely to be terminated from a 
government job than are whites. In conclusion, government 
employment offers greater opportunities for blacks and 
women, but, despite these benefits, there are still gender 
and racial differences in income, promotions, and due 
process in the public sector.
Recruitment and Occupational Composition
As stated in the introductory chapter, the general 
hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between 
informal recruitment and gender/racial composition of a 
position drives this dissertation. The two main 
hypotheses to be tested are that net of the effects of 
other establishment, job and industry characteristics 
which affect gender and racial job composition (see 
above), informal recruitment has a negative effect on the 
percent black and percent female in a given position.
Any analysis which addresses the relationship between 
employer recruitment practices and occupational 
segregation and composition must be sensitive to the 
issues of labor supply. For example, Stinchcombe (1990) 
cites three labor supply issues which influence employers 
to engage in statistical discrimination against females 
and minorities. One, minorities tend to have poorer 
credentials as a result of attending inferior schools (see
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also Jacobs, 1989a). Two, minorities tend to have poorer 
work histories, and females the perception of poorer work 
histories, resulting primarily from their historical 
concentration in unstable jobs in peripheral industries. 
The third reason employers engage in statistical 
discrimination against females is that they are perceived 
as unreliable, and more likely to leave the labor force 
because of familial responsibilities.
One solution to this problem is to include measures 
in the analysis that will control for the quality of labor 
supply, and the demand for highly skilled, reliable and 
committed employees. I include measures of data 
complexity, professional, and executive/managerial 
occupational status to control for the supply of 
credentialed labor. Moreover, I include a measure of 
durable goods manufacturing plants, because these plants 
generally employ high-quality blue-collar workers with 
stable work histories (see also Stinchcombe, 1990). The 
measures of how long employers expect employees to stay 
with the establishments should capture the effects of 
employer concerns about labor force interruptions. In 
addition, some variant of these measures have been used by 
others to control for employer labor demand in individual 
earnings models (England et al., 1988), and industrial 
sector composition models (Singelmann and Mencken, 1992).
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Again, the purpose of these measures is to insure
that the relationships between recruitment and
occupational composition reflect some dimension of the
labor market other than the quality of labor supply. The
hypotheses are formally stated as:
H 16: There is an inverse relationship between the use 
of informal recruitment techniques to recruit for a 
position and the percentage of blacks working in the 
position.
H17: There is an inverse relationship between the use 
of informal recruitment techniques to recruit for a 
position and the percentage of females working in the 
position.
Analysis
I utilize all of the establishment, job and industry 
characteristics presented in Chapter 3 to.predict the 
racial and gender composition of occupation-by-industry 
categories. The independent variables are defined in 
Chapter 3. I also use each the six recruitment scales in 
Chapter 3, in combination with the establishment, job and 
industry characteristics, in separate regression models to 
predict the percent female and percent black in 
occupation-by-industry categories. These six recruitment 
scales are defined in Chapter 3. The dependent variables 
in this analysis are percent black and percent female 
employed in occupation-by-industry categories. A 
description of how these measures are constructed is found 
in Chapter 4. The data used in this chapter are the same 
used in the previous two chapters, the employer file from
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the Metropolitan Employer and Worker Survey. Recall from 
previous chapters that there are 969 cases from the 
employer sub-file that pertain to positions that are 
recruited for exclusively from the external labor market. 
Listwise deletion of missing cases reduces the total cases 
used in this analysis to 668. There are 78 cases missing 
on all of the recruiting measures.29 
Measurement Issues
Chapter 4 presents a discussion of the measurement 
issues concerning percent female and percent black. An 
interesting measurement issue for this chapter is the 
degree to which gender and racial composition of 
occupations and industries in the greater Chicago area are 
representative of national trends. Abrahamson and 
Sigelman (1987) argue that gender and racial composition 
vary greatly depending upon which labor market is under 
investigation. For example, they expect that the racial 
and gender mix of an occupation will be more equitable in 
non-southern metropolitan labor markets, due to past and 
present cultural beliefs about the proper roles of women 
and minorities in society. Also, the racial mix of an 
occupation depends heavily upon the locale of the labor
29 I remove all 78 cases so that all positions in the 
subsample have information on all recruiting techniques.
I reanalyze each model with these cases included and 
verify that this procedure did not change the outcome of 
the models.
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market. Areas where few blacks live are going to have 
skewed racial distributions.
Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a) argues that racial closure 
practices are more prevalent in labor markets where blacks 
are more numerous. Racial closure practices are more 
prevalent in the South and in the Midwest (especially 
large cities). Moreover, closure in white-collar 
occupations is greater in the Midwest, because blacks in 
large, midwestern cities have higher credentials than 
blacks in the South. Closure based on gender is uniform 
across large cities, but more intense in rural areas. 
Abrahamson and Sigelman (1987) develop occupational 
indices of dissimilarity for all major metropolitan areas. 
These indices represent which proportion of males would 
have to change occupations in order for every occupation 
in the labor market to be representative of the gender 
composition of the workforce. The index for the Chicago 
area in 1980 is .412, significantly below the mean for all 
major cities. Unfortunately, Abrahamson and Sigelman 
(1987) do not construct a measure for race. However, 
Schmitz and Gabriel (1992: 53) do construct an index of 
dissimilarity between white males and black males in 1980. 
The score for Chicago (36.54) is lower than scores for 
other midwestern (Cincinnati, 52.70; Cleveland, 43.95; 
Milwaukee, 52.68), and southern (Atlanta, 43.29; Houston, 
46.56; Charlotte, 52.47) metropolitan areas. However, as
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Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a) points out, the degree of 
segregation at the job level is greater for some 
occupations than others. Therefore, comparing 
dissimilarity indices across metropolitan areas does not 
reflect the true level of segregation.
Racial Composition Results
Table 5.1 contains zero-order correlations between 
the recruitment variables and the job composition 
measures. Focusing on the relationship between percent 
black and the recruitment measures, the analysis shows a 
significant, negative correlation between percent black 
and informal recruitment through business associates and 
colleagues. Moreover, there is a positive relationship 
between percent black and reliance upon walk-ins to 
recruit. Another interesting relationship is the 
positive, significant correlation between formal-only 
recruiting and percent black. Each of these findings is 
consistent with the general theme that blacks are likely 
to find jobs recruited for through formal channels, while 
whites are likely to find jobs through informal channels. 
One unexpected negative correlation is that between 
recruitment through advertisements and percent black. One 
reason for the negative relationship is that blacks are 
less likely than whites to use advertisements when 
searching for a job. Also, as the analysis in this 
chapter will show, blacks are more likely to be employed
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Table 5.1. Zero-Order Correlations between Recruitment 
and Percent Female and Percent Black (n=668) .
Percent Black Percent Female
Advertisements -.112* . 084*
Signs . 038 . 016
Walk-Ins . 163* . 077*
Employment
Agencies -.047 -.077*
Employees -.045 . 050
Colleagues and 
Business Assoc. -.175* -.082*
*p<.05
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in the public sector. Jobs in this sector are rarely 
recruited through advertisements.
Table 5.2 presents the regression results for racial 
composition. Each of the ordinal recruitment measures is 
treated as an independent variable, therefore there are 
six models in this analysis. The relationship between 
recruitment and racial job composition is the primary 
focus of this table. The effect of each recruitment scale 
is analyzed separately in order to assess the impact of 
that particular recruitment technique on the racial 
composition of the jobs in the sample. First, I need to 
explain what the results do not show. While the
correlations in Table 5.1 show a positive relationship 
between percent black and formal recruitment techniques, 
the regression analysis shows no clear positive 
relationship between any recruitment technique and the 
racial composition of jobs. Once labor demand controls 
are added to the model, there is no clear positive 
relationship between percent black and any of the formal 
recruitment techniques. Only the use of signs has a 
positive effect on percent black, but it is not 
significant.
The main hypothesis of this analysis is that there is 
a negative relationship between informal recruitment and 
the proportion of blacks that occupy the job in question. 
The results in Table 5.2 partially support this
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hypothesis. There is a significant negative relationship 
between the frequency of colleague and associate use to 
recruit for a job across establishments in the greater 
Chicago SMSA, and the proportion of blacks that occupy 
that occupation-by-industry category throughout the labor 
market. Employee recruitment has no effect on percent 
black. As I point out in Chapter 3, employee recruitment 
is not associated with any of the other work structure 
correlates in the analysis. One explanation is that 
employers do not use employees to recruit in any 
systematic manner. Another explanation is that 
recruitment through employees is associated with good and 
bad quality jobs. Therefore, forcing linear relationships 
with OLS analysis does not allow employee recruitment to 
show a clear relationship with the dependent variable.
This analysis does show clear support for the 
argument that informal recruitment through colleagues and 
business associates for certain jobs disadvantages blacks. 
The previous analysis in Chapter 3 shows that this type of 
recruitment is strongly associated with white-collar, 
professional, and executive/managerial positions. The 
negative effects of these measures on percent black in 
Table 5.2 show that blacks are not likely to be employed 
in these positions. Informal recruitment is an important 
reason why.

















Table 5.2. The Effects of Recruitment Techniques on the Percent Black in OCC/IND 









Dependent Variable; Percent Black
-.006   -----
--------- .003 -----




Job Ladder Entry Point . 006 . 006 . 006 .006 . 006 . 006
Time Needed to Learn Job - . 008* -.008* -.008 -.008 -.008 -.008
Transportability of
Skills Learned - . 004 -.004 -.005 -.004 -.004 -.004
Permanence of Employee .001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
Union job . 001 . 005 .006 .005 .005 .005
Oraanizational Characteristics
Size of Establishment . 006 .006 .006 . 006 .006 . 006
% of Sales From Govt. .001* .001* .001* .001* . 001* .001*
Government Agency .112*** .114*** .115*** . H 3 * * * .113*** .112***
Manuf. Durable Good Est. - . 036* -.038* -.039* -.038* -.038* -.039*
Occupational Characteristics
DOT Data Complexity
Scores - . 014 -.013 -.013 -.013 -.014 -.012
White-Collar - .074*** -.077*** -.077*** -.076*** -.076*** -.074***
Executive/Managerial .043* -.044* -.044* -.042* -.043* -.035*
Professional - . 044* -.041* -.042* -.042* -.042* -.039*
A d j . R-Square
*p<.05; **p<.01;***p<.001
.229*** .225*** .225*** .225*** .225*** .231*** 212
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Informal recruitment also mediates the negative 
effects of other variables on percent black employed in 
OCC/IND categories. Executive/managerial occupations 
employ a lower percentage of blacks than do non­
executive/managerial positions. Executive/managerial 
occupational status also has an indirect negative effect 
on the percent black employed in these positions through 
colleague recruitment. The indirect effects of 
executive/managerial occupational status through colleague 
recruitment account for fifteen percent of the total 
direct and indirect effects of executive/managerial status 
on percent black. Professional occupational status also 
has a negative indirect effect through colleague 
recruitment, as does white-collar occupational status. 
However, the effects are strongest for 
executive/managerial positions.
A competing explanation of the racial composition 
findings suggests that blacks in this labor market lack 
the adequate human capital to occupy professional and 
managerial jobs, and the link between recruitment and 
percent black is spurious. In order to address some of 
these issues, I compare the mean level of education for 
blacks and whites from the employee file. The MEWS 
employee file is representative of the greater Chicago 
SMSA (Villemez and Bridges, 1988). If the supply-side 
argument that blacks lack the human capital to occupy high
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quality white-collar jobs is true, then I expect racial 
differences in education, work experience and labor force 
interruptions among workers in the labor force. My 
analysis shows that there is less than one year of 
education difference between blacks and whites, and less 
than one year of work experience difference, as well. 
Blacks, on average, have 1.18 labor force interruptions 
compared to 1.01 for whites.30 One might argue that while 
the means are similar, the qualitative differences between 
the education levels of the two groups are outstanding. 
However, controlling for the data complexity, and 
utilizing other job content and occupational status 
measures should account for the demand of workers with 
superior credentials (see England et al., 1988).
One other supply-side possibility is that blacks who 
are qualified for executive/managerial or professional 
positions may choose government employment because of the 
perception that black professionals can advance further in 
the public sector (Smith, 1980). If black professionals 
choose public sector employment, positions which tend to 
be recruited formally by relying on self-initiated 
applications (see Chapter 3), then blacks would exclude 
themselves from those particular private sector
30For whites, the mean education, work experience (in 
years) and labor force interruptions are: 13.84; 16.59; 
1.01. For blacks the mean education, work experience, and 
labor force interruptions are: 13.12; 16.56; 1.18.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 1 5
professional/managerial positions which tend to be 
recruited informally. This choice argument assumes that 
the relationship between percent black and 
professional/executive/managerial status is captured by 
the relationship between percent black and government 
employment status.
I address this idea by removing government job status 
from the model with colleaaue recruitment as the 
recruitment variable (I do not show these results). I 
anticipate that the negative effects of professional and 
executive/managerial job status on percent black will 
diminish once government job status is removed from the 
model. The analysis meets my expectations. Once 
government job status is excluded from the model, 
professional and executive/managerial job status fail to 
have a significant negative effect on percent black. This 
suggests that professional and managerial occupations in 
the public sector have a higher percentage of blacks than 
comparable occupations in the private sector (Eisinger, 
1986; Smith, 1980).
Another finding that I did not anticipate in the 
amended model is a positive relationship between union 
status and percent black, once government job status is 
removed. One interpretation of this finding is that black 
union members are concentrated in government jobs and 
white-collar unions. These results also imply that blacks
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choose public sector employment because of the perceived 
positive benefits in this sector. It is hard to argue 
that blacks are recruited into the public sector, as Smith 
(1980) maintains, because the results in Chapter 3 show 
that government agencies rely upon self-initiated 
applicants. These are interesting findings and 
propositions. However, other analyses are needed to test 
the hypothesis that blacks choose public sector work.
Hypothesis H 16 states that there is a negative 
relationship between the use of informal recruitment 
techniques to recruit for a position and the percentage of 
blacks employed in that position. My analysis shows 
support for this hypothesis. Net of other job, industry, 
occupational and organizational characteristics which 
influence the racial composition of jobs, informal 
recruitment for jobs through colleagues and business 
associates has a negative effect on the percent black 
employed in these positions. Following the discussion of 
gender composition results, I expand on these findings by 
analyzing the relationships among percent black, 
recruitment and starting salaries of jobs. Note also that 
employee recruitment and the other formal recruitment 
variables have no effect on percent black. I will comment 
on these findings after I present the gender composition 
results.
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Net of the effects of the recruitment variables, 
several variables have consistent effects on percent black 
across all of the recruitment models. Establishment size 
has a positive effect on percent black. This finding is 
consistent with Kaufman's (1986) argument that minorities 
are more likely to be employed in large establishments 
because large establishments have high visibility and are 
more likely to come under pressure from government 
agencies and citizen's groups to hire minorities. 
Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a) argues that large companies 
cannot satisfy all of their labor needs with white 
workers. Therefore, larger companies have to employ 
blacks. Also, larger establishments use formal 
recruitment techniques, which benefit minorities (Smith, 
1980; DiPrete, 1987; Zwerling and Silver, 1992).
Table 5.2 also shows that blacks are much more likely 
to be employed in government agencies. Again, this is 
consistent with past findings (Smith, 1980; Taylor, 1979; 
Burstein, 1979; Zwerling and Silver, 1992), and there are 
several competing and complimentary explanations. First, 
federal agencies are more likely to hire 
disproportionately from occupations in which blacks (and 
females) tend to be concentrated (Smith, 1980). 
Demographically, blacks are more likely to be hired into
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these positions.31 Second, government agencies at all 
levels are more egalitarian in their employment practices 
than are private sector firms (Baron and Newman, 1990; 
Smith, 198 0). For example, the federal government hires 
new employees based on their performance on the Federal 
Standard Entrance Exam (DiPrete, 1987). Also, through 
Affirmative Action programs, minorities, females, veterans 
and other groups can have points added to their final 
scores, thus increasing their chances of being hired 
(Fasman, 1976).
The percentage of revenue from government contracts 
is positively associated with percent black across all 
recruitment models. Executive Order 11246 might explain 
some of this relationship (Reskin and Hartmann, 1986). 
Establishments with government contracts are required to 
comply with discrimination laws, and implement Affirmative 
Action programs (Braun, 1984; Hartmann and Reskin, 1986). 
As Burstein (1979) points out, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act gives the EEOC little power to prosecute 
offenders. However, the OFCCP has the power to cancel 
government contracts of firms that do not comply. 
Therefore, establishments with a greater percentage of 
revenue from government contracts may hire a greater
3IFor example, Smith (1980) argues that the Postal 
Service is more likely to hire from clerical occupations, 
increasing the likelihood that females and minorities are 
hired.
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percentage of blacks to avoid reprimand, or worse, from 
the OFCCP.
Professional, executive/managerial, and white-collar 
jobs all have consistent negative effects on percent black 
across all recruitment models. These findings are 
consistent with Reskin and Roos' (1990) description of the 
concentration of blacks in the occupational structure 
(non-craft blue-collar occupations, personal service 
occupations). According to Kaufman (1986: 313), race 
typing is to blame for the negative relationship between 
white-collar job status and percent black. Jobs with 
high-skill requirements, formal authority, technical 
expertise and jobs with white clients are not typed as 
appropriate for blacks.
The final variable with consistent effects is durable 
goods manufacturing industry sector. Blacks are less 
likely to be employed in this sector than in other 
industry sectors. Additionally, Kaufman (1986) contends 
that many jobs in manufacturing plants are highly 
technical, and impart informal authority in individuals 
who occupy these jobs. Blacks are not likely to be 
employed in such jobs because of racial typing, or the 
perception that these jobs are not "appropriate" for 
blacks. Kaufman (1986) notes, moreover, that such 
establishments can indulge their tastes for racial 
discrimination, because such establishments can utilize
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reserve capital to compensate for the loss of marginal 
revenue from hiring more expensive (white) labor. Social 
closure theory argues that employers reserve the best jobs 
for whites, and given that blue-collar durable goods 
manufacturing jobs are better than non-durable goods 
manufacturing jobs (Tolbert et al., 1980), and that racial 
closure is greater for blue-collar jobs, then the racial 
differences in this sector are expected. Blacks are not 
hired for jobs in this sector because they are reserved 
for whites.
Gender Composition Results
Similar to percent black, there is a significant, 
negative correlation between percent female and the use of 
colleagues and business associates to recruit for jobs. 
Additionally, there is a positive relationship between 
percent female and the use of advertisements to recruit 
for a job. Again, these findings are consistent with the 
stated hypotheses and the general theme throughout the 
dissertation. One interesting and unexpected finding is 
the negative relationship between the use of employment 
agencies to recruit and percent female employed in a given 
category. This finding directly contradicts Campbell and 
Rosenfeld's (198 5) hypothesis concerning the relationship 
between gender composition and recruiting. However, there 
may be other possible explanations that I will discuss 
later.
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Table 5.3 presents the results for gender composition 
of OCC/IND. These models are designed to test the 
hypothesis that informal recruitment has a negative effect 
on the percent female employed in an OCC/IND category. I 
analyze the effects of each of the recruitment variables 
separately on percent female, net of the effects of other 
variables.
There are four measures of formal recruitment, and 
only the use of advertisements in newspapers and other 
media has a significant effect on percent female. The 
greater the percentage of employees for an OCC/IND 
category that are found through advertisements, the more 
likely those employees are females. There are two 
measures of informal recruitment. While recruitment 
through employees fails to show a significant 
relationship, the model with colleagues as the recruitment 
predictor does support the main hypothesis. Net of all 
the other job, establishment and industry characteristics 
that influence the gender composition of an OCC/IND 
category, the use of colleagues and associates to recruit 
for a vacancy has a negative effect on the percentage of 
females employed in that OCC/IND category.
These findings are consistent with the argument that 
recruitment affects the visibility of job information in 
labor markets. The differences between formal and 
informal recruitment are differences in degrees of public

















Table 5.3. The Effects of Recruitment Techniques on the Percent Female in OCC/IND 
Categories (Unstandardized Coefficients, N=668) .















Job Ladder Entry Point 
Time Needed to Learn Job 
Transportability of 
Skills Learned 

































Size of Establishment .003 
% of Sales From Govt. .001 
Government Agency .064* 















































Adj. R-Square .326*** .322*** .322*** .322*** .323*** .329***
*p<.05; **p<.01;***p<.001 222
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access to job information (see Haulman et al., 1987). I 
argue that females are more likely to find jobs that have 
higher visibility; that is, females are more likely to 
find jobs that are recruited for through formal methods 
(see also Campbell and Rosenfeld, 1985; Boylan, 1992).
Informal recruitment through colleagues and business 
associates has a negative effect on the percent female 
employed in a job. However, recruitment through current 
employees has no effect. One possible reason for the lack 
of findings for current employee recruitment is the lack 
of a linear relationship between employee recruitment and 
the types of jobs being recruited. Chapter 3 shows that 
colleagues are used to recruit for higher quality jobs 
(executive/managerial, professional). Current employees 
can be used to recruit for good and bad jobs. To test 
this hypothesis, I re-analyze the gender composition model 
with all of the recruitment variables in the analysis at 
the same time (I do not show these results) .32 The results 
show that once colleagues and current employees are 
included in the model together, recruitment through 
colleagues has a negative effect, while recruitment 
through current employees has a significant, positive
32The recruitment variables are not highly correlated. 
Therefore, including them in one model does not introduce 
collinearity.
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effect (recruitment through advertisements also has a 
positive effect).
I argue that employee recruitment is associated with 
both good jobs and bad jobs. Employers may use colleagues 
at other firms and current employees to recruit for good 
jobs (executive/managerial jobs). However, employers are 
not likely to use colleagues to recruit for bad jobs 
(clerical, unskilled jobs). The positive effect of 
employee recruitment is net of the effect of colleague 
recruitment. What this means is that once the effects of 
informal recruitment for "good" jobs has been accounted 
for (i.e. through colleagues) the effects of informal 
recruitment through employees represents the effects of 
informal recruitment for "bad" jobs. This secondary 
analysis shows that females also have access to jobs 
which are recruited for through informal channels, except 
that these channels do not lead to the same types of jobs 
that men are likely to be employed in. An interesting 
question to pursue is whether or not informal recruitment 
through employees is positively associated with percent 
female because females are likely to tell other females 
about the job, or because females are likely to use other 
females when searching for work.
Neither signs or employment agencies have an effect 
on percent female, or on percent black. One reason for 
the lack of effects is that these techniques are not used
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very often. Table 5.4 presents one-way frequency 
distributions for the six recruitment measures. The table 
shows that employment agencies and signs are not used to 
recruit for over 80% of cases in this sample. Recruitment 
through walk-ins has no effect on percent black or percent 
female either. Walk-ins are closely related to size of 
establishment. Therefore, the effects of walk-ins may be 
captured by the effects of establishment size. Net of the 
effects of establishment size, recruitment for vacancies 
through walk-ins has no effect on percent female, or 
percent black.
There are a number of work structure correlates that 
have consistent effects on percent female across all of 
the recruitment models. I report these direct effects and 
then discuss the indirect effects of these variables 
through recruitment. The union status of the job has a 
significant negative effect across all six models. Union 
jobs employ 10% fewer females than comparable non-union 
jobs. Roos and Reskin (1984) argue that sponsorship, 
preference for veterans, and perceived lack of interest 
all operate against females getting blue-collar union 
jobs.
Durable goods manufacturing sector status has a 
negative effect on the percent female employed in OCC/IND 
categories in this industry sector. On average, these 
jobs employ 17% fewer females than comparable jobs in

















Table 5.4. Frequency Distributions for Recruitment Variables (n=668).
Frequency Distributions
Advertisements Sians Walk-ins Emp. Acrencies Employees Colleaaues
1. 341 1. 596 1. 335 1. 547 1 . 281 1. 426
2. 64 2 . 6 2. 42 2 . 20 2. 59 2 . 61
3. 57 3. 26 3. 89 3. 49 3. 139 3. 108
4. 102 4. 19 4. Ill 4. 36 4. 119 4. 62
5. 104 5. 21 5. 91 5. 16 5. 70 5. 11
n= 668 n= 668 n= 668 n= 668 n= 668 n= 668
Values: l=None 2=A Few 3=Some 4=Most 5=A11
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other industry sectors. Jobs in this sector are primarily 
high-quality blue-collar jobs, and technically-oriented 
white-collar jobs, These jobs also have core-sector 
characteristics and employ mainly white males (Reskin and 
Roos, 1990; Stinchcombe, 1990; Kalleberg and S0renson, 
1979). Reskin and Roos (1990) argue that while 
establishments in this sector are also going to have an 
administrative branch, the percentage of total jobs that 
administrative support represents is probably small.
Since females tend to be concentrated in administrative 
support jobs, they are not likely to be employed in this 
sector.
Occupational status has positive and negative effects 
on the percentage of females employed market-wide in given 
OCC/IND categories. White-collar occupational status has 
a positive effect on percent female across all models. 
Executive/managerial occupational status, on the other 
hand, has a strong negative effect on the percent female 
employed in these positions throughout the greater Chicago 
area. Given that the estimate for white-collar status is 
net of the effects of higher status white-collar 
occupations (executive/managerial, professional), the 
estimate represents the effects of lower status white- 
collar occupations on percent female. The analysis shows 
that on average, lower status white-collar occupations 
employ 33% more females than other occupations; while
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executive/managerial occupations employ, on average, 35% 
fewer females than non-executive/managerial occupations.
There are a number of establishment, industry and job 
characteristics that have an indirect effect on percent 
female through the recruiting measures. Durable goods 
manufacturing sector status has a positive effect on 
advertisement and a negative effect on percent female. 
While jobs in this sector are recruited for through 
advertisements, they are not typically filled by females. 
What this means is that females get into durable goods 
manufacturing jobs through advertisements, even though the 
percentage of females employed in this sector is low. 
Another explanation is that employers use advertisements 
to find employees, but hire primarily men; this 
explanation is consistent with Tomaskovic-Devey's (1993a) 
social closure argument.
The length of time it takes an employee to learn a 
job has an indirect negative effect on percent female 
through advertisements. These jobs have low external 
market viability, and generally have greater due process, 
and mobility opportunities (Bridges and Villemez, 1991). 
This finding supports the hypothesis that "better" jobs 
are not recruited for through advertising. Given the 
positive relationship between advertisement and percent 
female, these findings also suggest that females who find 
positions with low external market viability are being
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recruited through other channels. Furthermore, 
advertising these positions might increase the employment 
opportunities for females.
White-collar occupational status has a positive 
effect on the percent female employed in the OCC/IND 
category, a positive effect on employment agency use, and 
a positive, but not significant, effect on advertisement 
recruiting (p=.07). This shows that lower status, white- 
collar occupations (i.e. non-professional, non-executive- 
managerial) are consistently recruited for through 
employment agencies and less consistently through 
advertisements. Moreover, white-collar status has a 
positive direct effect on percent female across all 
recruitment models, and a weak positive effect through 
advertisements. White-collar occupations are successfully 
recruited for through colleagues and associates, which has 
a negative effect on percent female. This suggests that 
white-collar occupations that are recruited for informally 
through colleagues and business associates are less likely 
to be filled by women. This indirect effect, coupled with 
the weak positive indirect effect of white-collar status 
through advertisements, provides some support for Campbell 
and Rosenfeld's (1985) claim that females are recruited 
for predominantly female white-collar jobs through formal 
channels.
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White-collar, executive/managerial and professional 
occupational status each has an indirect negative effect 
on percent female through colleagues. All three have 
positive, significant effects on recruitment through 
colleagues, which has a negative effect on percent female. 
These direct and indirect relationships among informal 
recruitment, white-collar occupations and percent female 
show that jobs for which vacancies are recruited for 
informally through colleagues and business associates are 
less likely to employ females. These relationships also 
lend support to the institutional hypothesis that informal 
recruitment denies women access to vacancies in certain 
labor markets.
The findings for informal recruitment and gender 
composition are also consistent with other hypotheses 
about recruitment and gender segregation. For example, 
Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan (1980) argue that male 
occupations are more likely to be recruited for through 
informal methods, while less desirable, predominantly 
female occupations (i.e. less training, lower skill 
demands, repetitive tasks) are likely to be filled through 
formal methods, such as advertisements. Stinchcombe 
(1990) argues that jobs in the core sector are dominated 
by men, and recruited for through certification systems—  
such as informal networks—  which seek to reduce the 
inherent risks in hiring new employees. Formal methods of
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recruitment are less effective at reducing risks. 
Unfortunately, women often lack access to the 
certification systems (informal recruitment network) 
through which many vacancies are filled.
Roos and Reskin (1984) argue that institutional 
barriers in white-collar or occupational internal labor 
markets are more subtle than in blue-collar labor markets. 
In occupational internal labor markets, Roos and Reskin 
(1984) argue that females lack information about the very 
existence of jobs, because few methods of job recruitment 
are fully public in these markets (see also Haulman et 
al., 1987). Moreover, they contend that occupational 
gender segregation persists in white-collar labor markets 
because information networks are used to recruit 
employees, and these networks are gender segregated 
(Kanter, 1977; Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan, 1980). 
According to Roos and Reskin (1984; see also Moore, 1990), 
since males hold most of the professional and managerial 
jobs, they have work-related associations which allow them 
to build networks which facilitate the learning of other 
opportunities. Females in white-collar jobs, on the other 
hand, are concentrated in clerical and service categories. 
This excludes women from the job information networks 
through which much job information travels. The effects 
of past segregation practices have created gender 
segregated networks, which preserve occupational
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segregation because much recruiting in occupational 
internal labor markets is done through these segregated 
networks (Roos and Reskin, 1984; 1992).
Recruitment and Salary Results
Much of the discussion so far has centered on 
occupational composition, and has assumed that informal 
recruitment leads to labor market inequalities, such as 
pay differentials. In order to show that informal 
recruitment has labor market consequences in line with the 
occupational segregation literature, I re-analyze these 
models with the natural log of the average starting salary 
for positions included in the model (see Chapter 4). I 
report these analyses in Tables 5.5— 5.7.33 I treat 
starting salary as an independent variable because of mean 
substitution. Also, this seems feasible given the 
arguments presented in Chapter 3 which maintain that the 
characteristics of the job in question influence the 
recruitment technique used to recruit for the job. In 
addition, job queue theory and social closure theory 
presented in the literature review section of this chapter 
suggest that the quality of the job determines the demand 
for female and minority labor (see Reskin and Roos, 1990).
The results in Table 5.5 show that starting salary is 
a positive predictor of the use of colleagues and business
33 Recall that means had to be substituted for over 
15% of the cases for the salary measure.

















Table 5.5. The Effects of Work Structure Correlates and Salary on Recruitment Practices
(Unstandardized Coefficients, n=812).
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t ou>
2 3 4
associates to recruit for vacancies. Starting salary is 
also a positive predictor of employment agency use, and a 
negative predictor of recruitment through current 
employees, signs and reliance upon walk-ins. These 
findings demonstrate that jobs recruited for through 
employment agencies and colleagues/business associates 
have higher starting salaries, while jobs recruited 
through current employees, signs and walk-ins have lower 
starting salaries.
I include salary in the model with recruitment 
techniques to predict percent black (Table 5.6) and 
percent female (Table 5.7). The analysis shows negative 
relationships between salary and percent female and 
percent black. Jobs which employ a higher percentage of 
females and blacks have, on average, lower starting 
salaries. Increasing the starting salary of a job by 1% 
reduces the percent black employed in an OCC/IND category 
by 5.5%, and percent female by 28%. In addition, informal 
recruitment through colleagues and business associates 
continues to have a negative effect on the percent female 
employed in OCC/IND categories, but no longer has a 
significant effect on percent black.
This suggests that the negative effects of informal 
recruiting on compensation are more pronounced for females 
than for blacks. However, caution must be exercised when 
examining these findings for two reasons: 1) mean

















Table 5.6 The Effects of Recruitment Techniques and Salary on the Percent Black in
OCC/IND Categories (Unstandardized Coefficients, n=668).
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Table 5.7. The Effects of Recruitment Techniques and Salary on the Percent Female in
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substitution for the salary measure; 2) percent female 
represents both black and white females. Distinctions are 
hard to draw between percent female and percent black 
because the separate effects on black and white females 
cannot be removed from percent female.
Having noted these limitations, there are interesting 
differences between percent female and percent black. 
First, the size of establishment has no effect on gender 
OCC/IND composition (Table 5.3), but a positive effect on 
percent black. Kaufman (1986) suggests that large firms 
and establishments are under government and public 
pressure to employ more minorities and females. The 
relationship between size and racial composition fits 
Kaufman's hypothesis. However, the argument does not hold 
for females in the greater Chicago SMSA. Second, the same 
finding holds for the percentage of revenue from 
government agencies. Firms with government contracts are 
required by EO 11375 to implement Affirmative Action 
programs, and to guarantee anti-discrimination in the 
workplace (Hartmann and Reskin, 1986; Braun, 1984).
Revenue from government contracts has a positive effect on 
the racial composition of OCC/IND categories in the 
establishment, but no effect on the gender composition of 
the OCC/IND categories in the establishment. This shows 
that attempts at formalizing employment relations may 
produce greater benefits for blacks than for females, at
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least in the Chicago SMSA. Moreover, given the positive 
effects for percent black, and the lack of effects for 
percent female, these findings suggest that government 
programs are more beneficial for black males than for 
black and white females.
Another interesting finding is the relative indirect 
effects of executive/managerial occupational status 
through colleague recruitment. For percent female, the 
indirect effects of executive/managerial status through 
colleague recruitment account for just 5% of the total 
effects of this measure on percent female. However, for 
percent black, the indirect effects account for 15% of the 
total effects. This suggests that informal recruitment 
for these positions may be more detrimental for blacks 
than for females. Job ladder status also has a negative 
effect on percent female, while no effect on percent 
black. Some of the effect may be captured by government 
employment. The positive benefits of government 
employment, and the higher percentage of blacks employed 
in the public sector are noted above. Federal and state 
governments also have elaborate internal job structures 
(DiPrete and Soule, 1988). Therefore, government job 
status may usurp some of the effects of job ladder status 
on percent black. Analyzing this model by government and 
non-government jobs may show other results.
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Discussion
If females are more likely to search for jobs through 
formal means, then this might partially explain the 
positive effects of advertisements on percent female. In 
addition, females may be more likely to use close, 
personal friends to look for a job, while males may be 
more likely to call upon colleagues and associates at 
other firms when looking for work (Moore, 1990) . The same 
questions apply to the racial differences. I address 
these issues by analyzing the racial and gender 
differences in how searchers look for jobs. I use the 
employee file from the MEWS to address this issue. By 
cross-classifying the manner in which people search for 
jobs by the race and gender of the job searchers in the 
employee file, I assess the racial and gender differences.
The analysis shows no racial differences in the use 
of newspaper advertisements to find a job. Blacks are 
more likely than whites to check with friends and 
relatives, and to use public and private employment 
agencies. This last point is important because the 
frequencies in Table 5.4 show that very few jobs are 
recruited for through employment agencies. The analysis 
also shows that blacks and whites use work contacts and 
business associates to search for jobs with equal 
frequency. This is important, because this suggests that 
the negative effects of informal recruitment on percent
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black cannot be attributed to racial differences in job 
searching strategies.
The analysis for gender presents different results. 
Males are slightly more likely to use business associates 
and work contacts than females to find a job. In fact, 
males are 9% more likely use these techniques. However, 
there are no gender differences in searching for jobs 
through newspaper advertisements, employment agencies, or 
friends and relatives. Males are also more likely to 
search for a job through advertisements in trade 
publications. Also, about 50% of males and females use 
newspaper advertisements, and about 3 0% of males and 
females use business associates and work contacts. These 
results also suggest that the effects of advertisements 
and recruitment on percent female cannot be attributed to 
gender differences in search strategies. In fact, these 
results suggest that males search through advertisements 
more than females.
There are a number of choice and constraint theories 
which provide alternative explanations of gender 
segregation. Supply-side theories of occupational 
segregation attribute the wage-gap and occupational 
segregation to the life-long educational, career and 
occupational choices/aspirations of men and women. My 
analysis shows that executive-managerial jobs are 
positively associated with informal recruiting through
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colleagues and business associates, and negatively 
associated with percent female. Five percent of the total 
direct and indirect effects of executive-managerial status 
on percent female are through recruitment. And the effect 
of managerial-executive status on percent female is 
powerful. On average, the mean percent female employed in 
executive/managerial positions is 35 percent less than the 
mean percent female employed in non-executive/managerial 
positions.
Females have traditionally been under-represented in 
comparable executive/managerial positions (Reskin and 
Hartmann, 1986: 21). Supply-side choice models contend 
that females lack proper educational credentials to 
perform these jobs (Jacobs, 1989a). But Jacobs (1989a) 
shows that the educational differences between males and 
females are historically insignificant. The choice model 
stresses that gender differences in college majors 
restrict the occupational choices of females. Females are 
less likely to choose majors which lead into predominantly 
male jobs, such as engineering or the physical sciences. 
However, Jacobs (1989a) shows that a majority of college 
majors are gender neutral, and argues that aside from the 
physical sciences, many managerial and professional 
occupations recruit students from a broad range of gender- 
neutral college majors.
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Choice models also stress that females do not aspire 
to professional and managerial positions. According to 
this model, females choose and pursue career options that 
are compatible with their home and family
responsibilities. However, Jacobs (1989a) shows that the 
aspirations of females has changed dramatically since the 
1960s. The biggest increases in females aspiring to 
executive/managerial positions came in the late 1960s and 
early 197 0s, when the percentage doubled. By 1980, Jacobs 
(1989a: 80) shows that more females aspire to 
executive/managerial positions than to any other 
occupational category. Others concur that aspirations 
cannot explain the levels of gender segregation in these 
occupational categories (see England et al., 1988).
Jacobs (1989a) shows that supply-side theories cannot 
adequately explain occupational segregation.
Additionally, the structural efficiency model, a demand- 
side theory of cited in the recruitment literature, cannot 
explain the negative effects of informal recruitment on 
percent black and percent female. This perspective relies 
on the unconnectedness of females and minorities to 
informal recruiting networks to explain occupational 
segregation. Work related networks are segregated by 
gender and race. Therefore, when jobs are recruited for 
informally, females and minorities will not learn of these 
vacancies because they are unconnected to the particular
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recruiting network through which the job information 
flows.
Research on segregated network structures has 
provided inconsistent and inconclusive results. Recent 
theories on network structures (Moore, 1990; Campbell, 
1988; Fisher and Oliker, 1983; Brass, 1985) suggest that 
males tend to have more non-kin and work-centered network 
ties, which are useful in building careers. Females, on 
the other hand, are more likely to have kin-centered 
networks, which constrain opportunities for social 
mobility. Structural explanations of these differences 
emphasize that men have greater structural opportunities 
because they typically have jobs (high status jobs) which 
are more conducive to constructing far-reaching networks. 
Moore (1990: 727) argues that high status jobs may foster 
work-related network development because of the recognized 
importance of such ties for social mobility. Women, on 
the other hand, even when they have full-time jobs, are 
still more likely to provide all household and childcare 
services (Moore, 1990: 727), which constrains non-kin 
network formation (Miller and Garrison, 1982; Fischer and 
Oliker, 1983).
Campbell and Rosenfeld (1985) find that females are 
less likely to utilize personal contacts in searching for 
jobs. Women typically have networks comprised of other 
women, who do not have high status jobs or contacts
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because effective contacts (those that ultimately lead to 
jobs) are likely to be men. Additionally, females tend to 
be concentrated in low and mid-level white-collar 
occupations which encourages the use of formal employment 
agencies. Campbell and Rosenfeld (1985) also report that 
blacks tend to use personal friends (or strong ties) in 
finding jobs. Using personal contacts has a positive 
effect on finding employment among blacks, but it rarely 
leads to upward mobility or greater earnings. Hence, the 
argument is consistent with the strong-tie hypothesis. 
Blacks who have lower quality jobs are likely to offer job 
information about other lower quality jobs.
Other research has further clouded this issue. Moore 
(1990) finds that men and women of similar work and family 
characteristics also have similar non-kin, gender- 
integrated, network structures (Moore, 1990: 734).
However, Moore (1990) also argues that female networks 
lack sufficient access to powerful contacts within 
organizations (see also Kanter, 1977; Campbell and 
Rosenfeld, 1985; Campbell, 1988). Brass (1985) finds that 
males and females tend to be in gender segregated networks 
within organizations. However, Brass (1985: 336) also 
finds that the true power clique in any organization is 
limited in size, and that males and females have near 
equal access to the power clique. Finally, neither Moore 
(1990), nor Brass (1985) find support for the idea that
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gender differences in network structure ultimately leads 
to labor market inequality.
The supply-side job searching models and the 
structural efficiency models cannot explain why informal 
recruitment through colleagues and business associates has 
a negative effect on percent female and percent black. In 
Chapter 6 I provide my interpretation and explanation for 
these results.
Summary
The hypotheses in this chapter predict that informal 
recruitment has a negative effect on the percentage of 
females and blacks employed in a job. My analysis shows 
that informal recruitment through business associates and 
colleagues has a market-wide negative effect on the 
percentage of blacks and females employed in occupation- 
by-industry categories. Moreover, these negative effects 
are net of other effects which account for the supply and 
demand of labor. However, informal recruitment through 
current employees has no direct effect on the racial or 
gender composition of jobs, and has a positive net effect 
on percent female once the effects of other recruitment 
techniques are controlled. This shows that informal 
recruitment is associated with both good and bad jobs, and 
that employers are more likely to use informal recruitment 
through current employees to recruit for lower quality 
jobs.
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In addition to the negative effects of informal 
recruitment on the racial and gender composition of jobs,
I also show that informal recruitment through colleagues 
and business associates is positively associated with the 
starting salary of a job. Starting salary, in turn, has a 
negative effect on the racial and gender composition of 
jobs. The analysis of how individuals search for jobs 
shows that gender and racial differences in search 
patterns cannot explain the negative effects of informal 
recruitment through business associates and colleagues on 
the percent female and black employed in a job.
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CHAPTER 6 . CONCLUSION
In Chapter 1, I present a conceptual model that links 
job matching processes to occupational segregation. Path 
(a) of the conceptual model posits a relationship between 
the characteristics of jobs, and the work structures in 
which they are embedded (organizations, industries, 
occupations) and different methods of matching workers to 
those jobs. The analysis in Chapter 3 establishes an 
empirical link between certain characteristics of 
organizations, jobs, occupations and industries and 
different recruitment techniques. Of particular 
interests, executive/managerial and professional jobs are 
associated with informal recruitment through colleagues 
and business associates, while other white-collar 
occupations are associated with formal recruitment through 
advertisements.
In Chapter 4 I analyze path (b) of the conceptual 
model. This path represents an argument derived from job 
matching theories about internal labor markets and applied 
to external labor markets. Specifically, if internal job 
matching processes can segment internal labor markets, as 
Sbrenson (1983) argues, then employer recruiting practices 
segment external labor markets much in the same manner.
In the process of testing this idea, I demonstrate that 
certain recruitment techniques cluster with certain job 
characteristics, and argue that these combinations
247
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represent labor market segments. Recruitment through 
colleagues and business associates clusters with jobs high 
in data complexity, professional, and executive/managerial 
jobs. Other white-collar occupations (clerical and 
administrative support) cluster with sign recruitment and 
current employees. I also show that there are a higher 
percentage of blacks and females employed in the segments 
which are characterized by formal recruitment, and a lower 
percentage employed in the segments characterized by 
informal recruitment. While executive/managerial jobs 
cluster with both colleagues and employment agencies, the 
percentage of females employed in executive/managerial 
clusters characterized by employment agency recruitment is 
higher than the percentage female employed in the 
executive/managerial clusters characterized by colleague 
recruitment.
The results of Chapter 5 confirm the results of the 
cluster analysis in Chapter 4. Net of many work structure 
correlates which affect the supply and demand for labor, 
and the racial/gender composition of jobs, informal 
recruitment through business associates and colleagues has 
a market-wide negative effect on the percent black and 
percent female employed in given OCC/IND categories.
Employers use informal recruitment techniques to 
consistently recruit for high-quality white-collar jobs. 
Some argue that these recruitment techniques serve to deny
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individuals access to information about these vacancies 
(see Boylan, 1992; Roos and Reskin, 1992; 1984; 
Stinchcombe, 1990; Collinson et al., 1990). My analysis 
shows that net of other structural characteristics which 
affect the quality of labor demanded by employers (job 
content, skills required, commitment to the firm, etc.,), 
informal recruitment through colleagues and associates has 
a negative effect on the percent female and black employed 
in these categories. My analysis also shows preliminary 
evidence which suggests that not only are the positions 
that are recruited for informally less likely to employ 
blacks and females, they are also more likely to have 
higher starting salaries.
Linking the analysis along all three paths of the 
conceptual model shows clear support for the general 
hypothesis that employer recruitment practices create and 
sustain occupational segregation. Characteristics of 
desirable jobs (professional, executive/managerial 
occupations, salary) positively affect the use of informal 
recruitment through colleagues and business associates. 
This type of recruitment, in turn, has a negative effect 
on the percentage female and black employed in a job.
I argue that recruitment affects segregation because 
these are the types of jobs (executive/managerial, high 
paying) in which blacks and women are under-represented 
(Reskin and Roos, 1990; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993a).
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However, I do not wish to be misinterpreted as claiming 
that recruitment is the most important variable in the 
segregation process. The relative effects of the 
recruitment techniques on percent female and black are not 
outstanding. However, they are significant, and given the 
sample size and number of parameters in the model, they 
are also robust estimates.
While the analysis establishes an empirical link 
between informal recruitment and occupational segregation, 
the key theoretical question yet to be answered is how 
does the process of informal recruitment deny females and 
blacks information in labor markets? There are several 
competing explanations discussed already. The supply-side 
models argue that the relationships between recruitment 
and job composition are spurious because females and 
minorities lack the human capital to compete for the jobs 
that are recruited for through colleagues and business 
associates. Moreover, these negative effects will 
disappear once the human capital credentials of females 
and minorities increase. I borrow from Jacobs (1989a) to 
show that human capital explanations are inadequate for 
gender differences, and do my own comparison of whites and 
blacks in the Chicago labor force during this period to 
show that racial differences in education, experience and 
labor force interruptions are minimal.
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Another supply-side issue concerns how workers search 
for jobs. If females and minorities search for jobs 
differently than white males, then this may explain some 
of the racial and gender differences when it comes to 
recruiting. However, my analysis shows no difference 
between whites and blacks when it comes to using work- 
associates to search for a job, and minimal differences 
between men and women. I conclude that the negative 
effects of informal recruiting through colleagues and 
associates on percent black and female cannot be 
attributed to racial and gender differences in the manner 
in which individuals search for jobs.
I discussed in the last chapter the limitations of 
the structural efficiency argument. This theory maintains 
that females and minorities are structurally unconnected 
to the recruiting networks through which certain jobs are 
recruited. The segregation that results is an unintended 
or irrational consequence of otherwise rational action. 
This argument, however, is internally inconsistent, and 
relies too much upon the concept of social homophily to 
explain the segregated nature of work networks. Work is 
an arena which draws individuals from many backgrounds 
together, to interact on a daily basis. As the complexity 
of integrating and maintaining an advanced capitalist 
economy increases, the social integration of different 
groups throughout society increases (see Fararo, 1989).
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The division of labor integrates individuals at the top of 
the hierarchy with those at the bottom. Therefore, work- 
related networks should be more integrated than any other 
type of network structure. The review of studies on work- 
related network structures in Chapter 5 shows that work- 
related networks are indeed much more integrated than the 
structural efficiency argument predicts.
Another theoretical perspective that attempts to 
explain the negative relationship between recruiting and 
percent female and black is the institutional approach. 
This theory argues that informal recruitment techniques 
become institutionalized in certain labor markets because 
the segregating effects of these practices reinforce 
culturally held beliefs about masculinity and femininity. 
My problem with this approach is that it is incomplete.
The theory relies almost exclusively upon the prevailing 
gender-role ideology to explain informal recruitment. 
First, this is unsound because not everyone accepts the 
prevailing conceptions of masculinity and femininity. 
Second, the gender-role ideology does not have all- 
powerful influences. Jacobs (1989a) shows this in his 
analysis of the weak effects of gender-role ideology on 
gender-role socialization and occupational aspirations. 
Third, institutional theory does not explain the effects 
of informal recruiting on percent black. Fourth, the 
institutional theory does not adequately explain the
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"institutionalization" of informal recruitment practices. 
That is, it does not explain why these practices persist 
through time and space.
I maintain that social closure theory offers a more 
realistic interpretation of these results. The 
institutional theory cannot adequately explain the 
institutionalization of informal recruitment practices. 
According to the social closure theory, recruitment 
practices become institutionalized because employers use 
them to recruit and hire white males. Social closure 
theory maintains that practices which deny individuals 
access to good jobs are attempts by white males to exclude 
females and minorities from the best jobs. Moreover, 
closure practices are understood as attempts to protect 
economic status and image status, or image of self as a 
member of the superordinate group.
When minorities and females attempt to enter male- 
dominated occupations, they challenge the social status of 
white males. Female and minority status are defined by 
prevailing cultural beliefs as inferior. Therefore, white 
males will attempt to exclude them to protect their 
status. Additionally, employers participate because they 
know that females and minorities are aiming at the top of 
the power hierarchy. Therefore, employers will reserve 
good jobs at lower levels for white males, because doing 
so not only protects white male privilege at lower levels,
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 5 4
but it also better insulates themselves from inferior 
groups.
I argue that employers use informal recruitment 
practices to bring about closure because of attempts at 
closure by usurpation on behalf of females and minorities. 
Before 1960, there were no laws against discrimination in 
hiring. Therefore, informal recruitment was not necessary 
to exclude females and minorities from jobs. Besides, 
before 1960 most minorities and females did not possess 
the human capital to occupy the best positions in the 
occupational structure. However, between 1970 and 1980, 
the human capital gap between males and females narrowed 
to a non-significant difference, and the gender difference 
in occupational aspirations disappeared as well (see 
Jacobs, 1989a). Also, during the 1960s and 1970s federal 
laws were passed to outlaw employment discrimination based 
on race and gender.
Employment anti-discrimination laws are best 
understood as attempts at closure by usurpation on behalf 
of females and minorities. Closure by usurpation is an 
attempt by disadvantaged or excluded groups to gain access 
to the protected resources (i.e. good jobs) of the 
superordinate group. Employers can no longer overtly 
discriminate against women and minorities. In addition, 
the human capital gains of minorities and females create 
competition for the coveted jobs. Therefore, in order to
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bring about closure, employers use informal recruitment to 
find white males for certain jobs, and to minimize the 
competition for these jobs.
However, I do not wish to overstate the importance of 
recruiting, relative to other social closure processes.
As I  report above, the relative effects of informal 
recruitment are not large. However, they are significant 
and robust, and I maintain that the subtle effects are 
what we should expect. The process of occupational 
segregation is like a puzzle, and each of the labor supply 
and labor demand perspectives contributes many pieces to 
that puzzle. However, the puzzle is incomplete, and 
focusing on recruitment adds a few more pieces to that 
puzzle. In addition, the effects of recruitment or other 
hiring practices on occupational segregation have to be 
subtle. The laws which ban discrimination in hiring, and 
which attempt to regulate the job matching process require 
employers to find subtle ways of achieving closure.
In addition to bringing about social closure, I argue 
that employers also use informal recruitment techniques to 
locate the "appropriate" candidates for certain jobs, and 
to minimize competition for these jobs from inappropriate 
candidates. The definition of appropriate candidates 
comes from job queue theory. I maintain that employers 
want certain types of individuals for certain jobs. For 
example, employers are not likely to hire black or white
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females to supervise white males. However, given the 
human capital gains of females and minorities, advertising 
such a position would no doubt draw applications from 
females. Therefore, employers use informal recruiting to 
locate a white male for the job.
One theoretical problem with this argument is that 
employers in my sample use informal and formal recruiting 
techniques to locate employees. However, it would not be 
wise of employers to find all of their employees for good 
jobs through informal recruitment, because then this 
practice would be a larger target for those attempting 
closure by usurpation. The significance of the effects 
allows employers to use recruiting to achieve closure, and 
at the same time, the paucity of the relative effects 
allows employers to insulate their recruiting practices 
from external investigation and allegations.
The relative effects of informal recruiting through 
colleagues and business associates are small, but 
important. Of all the variables in the model, recruitment 
practices are the only variables which can be manipulated. 
All of the other significant effects are structural. 
However, employers can change their recruiting practices 
for a given position. This has important policy 
implications that I discuss at the conclusion of this 
chapter. The findings for recruitment are also important 
because the analysis addresses recruiting in the external
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 5 7
labor market, which is assumed to be more competitive than 
job matching in internal labor markets. The consistent 
effects across companies in the greater Chicago SMSA 
support theoretical propositions of structure in external 
labor markets, and support the idea that recruitment is a 
means of achieving social closure.
I do not believe that social closure theory in itself 
can fully explain the negative effects of informal 
recruitment through colleagues on percent female and 
percent black. Employers disseminate job information 
through networks of colleagues and business associates.
In order for social closure theory to apply, everyone 
along the network has to engage in social closure.
However, not everyone along the network may want to deny 
opportunities to females and minorities. Tomaskovic-Devey 
(1993a) points out that racial closure is contingent upon 
the region of the country. It is possible that not all 
white males in a given geographic area attempt to restrict 
good jobs for white males. Therefore, an amended theory 
is needed to explain why individuals who are not prone to 
social closure may still pass along job information to 
white males.
One possible theory is a combination of general 
theories of occupational segregation and social exchange 
theory. Individuals embedded in job information networks 
who are not prone to practices of closure may unwillingly
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support a system of closure based on a fear of retaliation 
or norm violation. If I relay job information to a black 
female, for a job for which an employer wants to hire a 
white male, then I face possible sanctions from the 
employer. And given that most of these inter- 
organizational relationships are business exchanges first 
and foremost (see Granovetter, 1974), I may not want to 
risk sanctions. Therefore, some individuals in the 
network actively engage in closure to keep a system of 
white male patriarchy in place. Others, however, may 
engage in closure unwillingly, in order to avoid the 
repercussions of violating the normative expectations 
which govern these relationships. This last point can 
also be used to explain why females and minorities who 
have access to recruiting networks still relay certain job 
information to white males. It may have nothing to do 
with cultural beliefs and the gender-role ideology, as the 
institutional theorists maintain, but be a result of the 
normative expectations that govern these relationships. 
Minorities and females in the "white male world" may be 
unwilling to relay job information to other females and 
minorities (unless explicitly instructed to do so) to 
avoid jeopardizing their unique position.
Strengths and Limitations 
This study has several strengths and limitations.
One area of strength is the sample. The MEWS is a unique
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data set. It is a representative sample of how employers 
recruit for vacancies in the external labor market. Most 
of the other studies that focus on recruitment use job 
search data collected from employees. One problem with 
employee data is that employees may find a job differently 
than a company recruits for the job. For example, a 
company may recruit for an accountant through an 
employment agency. However, the accountant who is hired 
may have learned of the job from a friend who visited the 
employment agency. Therefore, when the employee is 
interviewed on how s/he found the job, they may respond 
that they learned of the vacancy through an employment 
agency, or through a friend. Either answer is correct in 
that context. However, if a researcher attempts to model 
how companies recruit for accountants, and the employee 
responds that they learned of the job through a friend, 
then the researcher is at risk of making a measurement 
error, by attributing informal recruitment to a job that 
is recruited formally. One strength of this study is that 
it avoids this situation.
A second major strength of this study is how 
representative the sample is, in comparison to other 
studies. Most studies that examine firm recruitment 
practices utilize case studies of a few companies. My 
sample contains recruiting data on over 600 companies in 
one major metropolitan area. This gives us a better idea
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of the recruiting strategies used throughout a major labor 
market. Another major strength of the study is how 
exhaustive the models are. Each model controls for a wide 
variety of labor supply and labor demand issues. Few 
studies can match the degree of employer-level controls 
that this study uses. The strength of this is that it 
purifies the statistical relationship between recruitment 
and job composition.
The study also has major limitations. The major 
limitation is the lack of job level composition data. I 
measure composition at the occupation-by-industry level. 
However, it is best to measure job composition at the job 
or task level. However, it is not practical to do this 
for over 600 jobs in a given labor market. Another 
problem is whether or not these findings have any 
application outside of Chicago. This is a unique labor 
market, with a relatively strong public sector. The 
public sector provides job opportunities for females and 
minorities that the private sector does not. Recruitment 
practices in a labor market not characterized by a strong 
public sector may be more unequal. If blacks and females 
cannot find good jobs in the public sector, it forces them 
to compete with white males for private sector jobs, which 
may increase pressures for closure and affect the relative 
effects of recruitment techniques on the racial and gender 
composition of jobs.
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Another limitation of the study concerns the 
recruitment measures. First, there are no measures of 
head-hunter firms. Marsden and Campbell (1990) label 
these organizations as formal recruiting structures 
because they act as a formal intermediary between 
employers and potential employees. However, I question to 
what extent these structures should be considered formal 
recruitment methods. My personal experience reveals that 
agents in these firms use personal market networks to 
locate potential new employees for hiring firms.
Moreover, my understanding of head-hunter organizations is 
that they attempt to hire agents with a wide range of 
contacts in a particular field, so that the firm may take 
advantage of agent's networks when providing a service. 
Unfortunately, the MEWS survey does not contain a question 
pertaining to head-hunter firms. I argue in earlier 
chapters that some of the effects of head-hunter firms may 
be attributable to the question concerning employment 
agencies. I propose that a survey of headhunting firms 
and their recruitment practices would be useful to further 
understand the structure of labor markets.
Another important recruiting measure limitation is 
the failure of the MEWS to distinguish between public and 
private employment agencies. There is considerable 
variation in the types of jobs posted at these agencies. 
This may explain the lack of strong effects for employment
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agencies in the analysis. In addition, it may explain why 
the study fails to show support for Campbell and 
Rosenfeld's hypothesis that recruitment through employment 
agencies has a positive effect on the percent female 
employed in a job.
While this dissertation focuses on issues of 
recruitment, there are other equally important components 
of the job match that must be considered, especially 
applicant screening. It is of great interest to scholars 
of inequality how employers screen applicants, and which 
characteristics they use to eliminate applicants (Bills, 
1992). Unfortunately, gathering cross-sectional, 
representative data on screening practices is not 
practical. As Bills (1992) admits, it is not likely that 
social scientists are going to be allowed to tape or 
participate in the interviewing or screening process. 
However, these are still important dimensions that need to 
be acknowledged in any study that investigates employer 
hiring practices.
Screening applicants is one area where Bourdieu's 
theory of cultural capital has exciting possibilities. 
Bourdieu (1984) maintains that employers subconsciously 
screen applicants based on the cultural background that 
they reveal during the interview process. Applicants who 
reveal a social background inconsistent with the cultural 
capital associated with the job will not be hired. The
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relationship between recruitment and social class is 
addressed by Bourdieu. He maintains that class also 
imparts social connections which are useful in acquiring 
jobs and advancing one's career.
I think that the connection between class and 
recruitment is most salient at the entry level. New labor 
force participants may use family connections to acquire 
entry level positions. Those from the working and lower 
classes probably lack such connections, and consequently 
learn of entry level positions through formal channels. I 
believe that this is an area where further research is 
needed. Additionally, placement offices at universities 
may be possible data sources.
A final issue concerns the size of establishments in 
my sample. The average establishment size is 601
employees. Establishments with 25 or less employees are
exempt from EEOC hiring guidelines. Such establishments 
constitute less than 15% of my sample. Therefore, I 
expect that the effects of recruitment and other hiring
procedures on occupational segregation and other forms of
labor market inequality are greater in labor markets 
characterized by smaller establishments (25 or less 
employees).
Policy Implications
Having noted these limitations, the policy 
implications of my analysis are clear. Extending the
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requirement to publish all vacancies to all firms and full 
enforcement of these orders by EEOC would reduce gender 
and racial segregation, and create greater employment 
opportunities for females and blacks. One possible way of 
encouraging firms to recruit formally might be to extend 
tax breaks to defer recruiting and screening costs, since 
these are the often cited reasons why firms recruit 
informally (Marsden and Campbell, 1990). This would 
increase the visibility of opportunities in the labor 
market, and decrease occupational segregation. This, in 
turn, would help to reduce wage gaps, and subsequent 
social problems.
Research Agenda
I have several studies planned for the future.
First, the structural efficiency argument needs to be 
better clarified. I will do this by examining the 
relationship among gender of market contact and gender 
composition of job acquired. The basic question is 
whether or not males and females use same gender social 
contacts when searching for jobs, and if so, do these 
contacts lead to gender-specific jobs? I will address 
this question using the employee search file from the 
MEWS.
A second study concerns how "inappropriate" 
individuals are recruited into certain jobs. In 
particular, I am interested in whether or not black
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females are recruited into white male jobs through 
informal contacts, or through formal channels, or both. 
Firms are under pressure to hire minorities for certain 
positions. DiMaggio and Powell (1990) argue that 
professionals recruit members informally in order to 
socialize them and to make sure that the recruited 
individual will conform to the norms of the occupation. 
When hiring someone outside of the normative boundaries of 
an occupation, organizations may recruit informally to 
highly screen the applicants. I will test this idea using 
the MEWS employee search data.
Another topic in need of investigation is the 
interaction effect of establishment size on the 
recruitment/percent black relationship. Larger 
organizations are more formal in their hiring procedures. 
In addition, they are more likely to come under pressure 
form EEOC and political groups to hire and promote 
minorities. Both of these factors improve the employment 
relationship for blacks (Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993a). 
Therefore, the relationship between recruitment and 
percent black needs to be estimated for different 
establishment sizes.
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